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Abstract  
 
 
This comparative study examines the reasons why right-wing parties in power in the UK, 
Switzerland and France changed their immigration policy stances between 2002 and 
2015. The analysis of immigration policy change in each of the three cases suggests that 
the causes of immigration policy change are broadly the same, but the way these 
narratives are used by the UK Conservative Party, Sarkozy’s Union for a Popular 
Movement and Swiss People’s Party are different and context-dependent. This thesis 
explores factors exogenous to the party that influence right-wing parties’ choices on 
immigration. With immigration becoming a key issue on the political agenda in Western 
Europe and beyond, it is crucial to explain what drives right-wing parties in power to 
toughen their stance on immigration as it signals both the revival of nationalism and party 
system change. This research brings contributions to three different literature strands: 
party politics, public policy and the literature on Euroscepticism. 
 
The analysis of semi-structured elite interviews with politicians, civil servants, special 
advisors, representative from of interest groups, which examined work, student and 
family migration routes, has found that two factors were consistent across three cases: 
public opinion and economic anxieties, which underpinned their logic of immigration 
policy change. The differences across cases regarding the changing nature of parties’ 
stances on immigration are demonstrated examining the effects of the EU integration, 
party competition on the right and identity anxieties. In addition to the importance of 
exploring structural factors that influence immigration policy-making, the research does 
not disregard the role of the agency and the findings demonstrate that one agency-
related factor was crucial in explaining the evolution of British immigration policy: Home 
Office’s ideological dogmatism.  
 
Using process tracing analysis, this research identifies the mechanisms that account for 
this change. The analysis of semi-structured elite interviews demonstrates that framing 
 ix 
was a discursive mechanism that was prescient across all three cases. The procedural 
mechanisms, the mechanisms that actually accounted for immigration policy change 
varied across the cases. While departmental competition was a mechanism that led to 
the policy change in France and in the UK, in Switzerland direct democracy led to the 
evolution of immigration policy. By comparing three case studies, the research shed light 
on the differences in the responses of right-wing parties in power to immigration and 
pinpointed that political opportunity structures helped to explain this variation. The 
research has identified three facets of a POS that explain this variation: a party’s attitude 
to the EU, the presence of a strong radical right competitor and citizenship regime. 
 
The findings of this research are relevant for the various actors involved in policy making, 
including politicians, special advisors and interest groups by shedding the light on the 
process of immigration policy making in three cases. While this thesis addressed the 
decision-making processes of right-wing parties in power in relation to immigration, the 
implications for policy-making process can be extrapolated onto other policy areas. 
Actors involved in policy making can learn the significance of competition between 
different departments for making their policy choices to dominate.   
 x 
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Chapter 1  
Introduction  
 
1.1 Rationale 
Political parties change their policies all the time because of a variety of factors, both 
internal and external. This thesis explores why right-wing parties in power change their 
positions on immigration, examining factors exogenous to the party that lead to 
subsequent immigration policy change. Immigration is one of the crucial issues facing 
political parties today, especially for the rightist parties. Europe and the world are 
witnessing the revival of nationalism and right-wing parties in power are becoming more 
radical in their approach to immigration. More restrictive immigration policies have 
become a feature of right-wing parties in power in Western Europe and beyond. Donald 
Trump’s election as president of the United States illustrates that more radical ideas are 
entering mainstream politics and that there is a growing demand for such kind of ideas. 
Britain’s exit (Brexit) from the European Union (EU), the acceptance of the Initiative 
Against Mass Migration in Switzerland and Marine Le Pen’s success in the 2017 
presidential elections all highlight the growing scepticism towards the EU and 
immigration in general. Right-wing parties in power have played a key role in the launch 
of the Initiative Against Mass Migration and in the launch Brexit referendum. One 
explanation is that this is happening because nationalist parties across Europe are 
gaining more electoral ground, which increasingly worries established mainstream 
parties, both on the right and on the left of the ideological spectrum. Even without making 
it to government, radical right parties have become significant players on political arena 
by politicising issues like immigration, economy and security (Mudde, 2012). Growing 
public support for such parties has an impact on the behaviour of mainstream parties 
that are trying to prevent the alienation of their electorates. Political discourse and the 
policies of established parties are shifting further to the right, which demonstrates the 
‘right turn’ in European politics (Alonso & Da Fonseca, 2012: 875). However, the impact 
of radical right is not the only explanation of why right-wing parties in power change their 
 14 
policy stance and this thesis seeks to investigate what are the other factors that explain 
this change.  
 
Immigration has become a key issue in politics partly due to the politicisation of 
immigration by radical right parties (Van Spanje, 2010; Abou-Chadi, 2016). With growing 
support for the radical right across Western Europe, immigration has become a highly 
prominent issue on the political agenda. The nature of the debate around immigration 
has changed a great deal partly due to the electoral rise of radical right parties, which 
have played a major role in politicising immigration by associating it with high 
unemployment rates, welfare dependency and high crime rates (Schierup et al., 2006: 
97). However, it would be wrong to assert that right-wing parties are adopting more 
restrictive immigration approaches only because of the electoral growth of radical right 
(Akkerman, 2012b; Alonso and Da Fonseca, 2012). There are a variety of factors that 
lead the right-wing parties in power to change their immigration policy stances and this 
research aims to trace these factors and uncover the causal mechanisms that account 
for this change.  
 
Various factors could be leading to immigration policy change in each country, 
dependent on the context, yet there would appear to be pan-European concerns around 
immigration. Among the challenges that immigration poses to sovereignty, identity and 
welfare concerns come to the forefront. Europeanisation of national immigration policies 
combined with the widening of the EU present sovereignty concerns to European nation 
states. Support for the Europeanisation of immigration policy is diminishing among states 
and their electorates, while nation-state sovereignty in immigration matters is seen as 
increasingly important: “With the emergence of European political community that has 
diminished national sovereignty at a time when global forces are also undermining nation 
states, both Europe and migration become linked as sources of instability” (Delanty, 
2008: 676). 
 
 15 
Furthermore, cultural and social questions have arisen as a response to the widening of 
the European community, linking immigration with anxiety about social security and 
welfare (Delanty, 2008). Immigration has adopted a negative connotation in European 
discourse and became linked to new social security issues as national welfare states of 
countries are facing change (Schierup et al., 2006: 36). Immigration has become 
intertwined with social security concerns, with radical right parties being at the origins of 
this. Front National (FN) in France, United Kingdom Independence Party (UKIP) in the 
UK, Dansk Folkeparti in Denmark and others have been promoting ‘welfare chauvinism’, 
arguing for limitation of immigrants’ access to social welfare benefits (Andersen and 
Bjørklund, 1990). Nordensvard and Ketola (2014: 16) point out that: “the new rightist 
discourse therefore argues that social policy should be directly linked with an ethnic and 
sovereign nation state”. Radical right parties view immigrants as a drain on their welfare 
systems and in this way immigration becomes connected to social policy. The 
popularisation of ideas linking EU, immigration, welfare and security as sources of 
uncertainty is not any more a distinctive feature of radical right parties, but has become 
a key issue on the agenda of right-wing parties in power. 
 
This is a comparative case study that explores the causes of immigration position change 
of right-wing parties in power in three country cases and traces the mechanisms that 
account for the change. Process tracing method was used as a method of within case 
analysis to uncover the causes and mechanisms of immigration policy change (Beach 
and Pedersen 2013; Bennet and Checkel 2015; Goertz and Mahoney 2012). The 
evidence of immigration policy change comes from a series of semi-structured elite 
interviews conducted with political elites, civil servants and non-governmental actors 
including pressure groups and academics. The main emphasis was on getting access to 
politicians of three right-wing parties in power, however getting access to other actors 
involved in immigration policy-making was also crucial for corroborating the evidence 
given by politicians in their interviews. Elite interview data was analysed thematically, 
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using a two-cycle coding technique (Saldaña, 2009). An elaborated discussion of 
methods, data collection and data analysis is presented in chapter three. 
 
 
1.2 Gap and contribution  
 
Gap  
Whilst there is now a vast literature on the radical right, there has been less attention 
paid to the rightward moves of right-wing parties, despite the much greater policy 
importance of the right (Bale, 2008). As a large part of the previous research (Kitschelt 
and McGann, 1995; Carter, 2005; Akkerman, 2012, 2015; Mudde, 2013; Van Spanje, 
2010; Van der Brug et al., 2005) has given considerable attention to how radical right 
parties have influenced the immigration debate, it has disregarded the role of right-wing 
parties in power in immigration policy change. The radical right has been increasing 
immigration salience, yet right-wing parties in power have been more responsible for this 
anti-immigration turn because of the implementation more restrictive immigration policies 
(Mudde, 2013: 12). Existing research has largely focused on radical right parties and 
immigration, while the role of right-wing parties in power in politicising immigration and 
bringing it to the forefront of mainstream politics, has been mostly ignored. There is a 
lack of qualitative research on how right-wing parties in power form their immigration 
stances. As Bale (2008: 317) highlights:  
 
It is about time, however, that we turned the telescope around and, trained it, too, 
on the parties that have a more direct impact on public policy at and beyond the 
level of the state. In this respect, parties of the centre-right […] have enjoyed 
nowhere near the scholarly attention of their more radical counterparts, are an 
obvious point of departure.  
 
The right-wing parties has been far more important in shaping immigration policies 
across Europe because of its decision-making power, being either in government or in a 
coalition with other parties, having a direct effect on immigration policy making (Schain, 
2006). While existing scholarship has focused more on the demand side, addressing 
electoral support for conservative parties and the factors that lead to the successes of 
parties, supply side explanations that examine the right-wing parties’ positions and the 
reasons behind their change stances on immigration remain limited. More detailed 
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literature review is incorporated in each country case in chapters four, five and six. 
Therefore, this study contributes to filling the gap by examining the role of right-wing 
parties in power in immigration policy change in the UK, Switzerland and France. 
 
Scope of the study  
Despite the fact that immigration has become a concern for established parties on both 
sides of ideological spectrum (Bale et al., 2010) and both left and right parties are 
increasingly incorporating it into their agenda, this thesis examines right-wing parties in 
power, but not left-wing parties. There are two main reasons for such selection. First, 
immigration constitutes a vital part of right-wing ideology and this issue has been 
primarily of interest and ownership of right-wing parties in power, as they are seen by 
voters as more credible than mainstream left with regard to immigration (Alonso and Da 
Fonseca, 2011: 3-4). Politicisation of immigration poses more electoral threat to right-
wing parties because it is one of the core issues as “their ideological raison d’etre is to 
defend national security and national communitarian values” (Akkerman, 2012: 516). 
This is not to say that left-wing parties do not suffer from the voter defection when it 
comes to immigration, it is also “experiencing pressure from their traditional working-
class constituencies to be tougher on immigration and issues of law and order” (Zaslove, 
2006: 10). While immigration still remains an important issue for the left, due to “a tension 
between representing the interests of the native working-class and wider concerns about 
social justice” (Duncan and Van Hecke, 2008: 434), left parties are less susceptible to 
losing voters over immigration because immigration is not the priority issue for them and 
because left is not seen as credible on immigration as the right are. Therefore, right-wing 
parties in power are more likely to pursue the implementation of restrictive immigration 
policies. Finally, as immigration and welfare become intertwined, it is more plausible to 
examine the right parties rather than left as the economic basis of the right is largely anti-
state, with a liberal view on welfare (Esping-Andersen, 1990). On the other hand, left-
wing parties are more prone towards expansive welfare state and it is more hazardous 
for them to reframe welfare policies as it will threaten their essence. The intersection 
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between changing nature of welfare state and nationalism is more evident on the right 
of the political spectrum, than on the left. 
 
Contribution  
Even though this research’s primary focus is on right-wing parties in power and 
immigration, it aims to bring contributions to three different literature strands: party 
politics, public policy and Euroscepticism literature. This research is timely because it 
helps to explain the general European shift to the right through one of the key lenses: 
immigration. The goal is to explain why right-wing parties in power are changing their 
stances on immigration by elucidating those key factors which have led three 
conservative parties to do so between 2002 and 2015. This research contributes to the 
current debates on the variance of the European approaches to immigration in Western 
Europe, by drawing on the similarities and differences in the evolution of immigration 
policies within three European countries - the UK, France, and Switzerland – as a 
consequence of the interplay between local, national and European politics. 
Understanding why parties change their positions on immigration is important because 
the adoption of more restrictive immigration positions has a profound impact on party 
system, erasing the distance between radical right and right-wing parties in power on 
this issue and shifting them to the right.  
 
First, the contribution to research on party politics sheds light on the role of the right-wing 
parties in power in explaining immigration policy change. This thesis contributes to the 
literature on party position change by identifying causes associated with immigration 
policy change. More precisely, it contributes to the external tradition, which emphasises 
the importance of exogenous factors in explaining the change in party’s positions and 
policies. By testing existing theories on party policy change, this thesis aims to explain 
what accounts for variation in parties’ responses to immigration. Furthermore, the goal 
is to link the research on party politics with research on immigration policy. Those 
scholars, who work in the field of migration, tend to focus on a variety of actors that 
influence policy choices (Bale, 2008: 315), which includes “interest groups, courts, ethnic 
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groups, trade unions, law and order bureaucracies, police and security agencies, local 
actors and street-level bureaucrats and private actors” (Lahav and Guiraudon, 2006: 
207). Various actors influence immigration policy-making, yet researchers have omitted 
the role political parties play in it (Duncan and Van Hecke, 2008: 434). There is a gap in 
the literature regarding the role of political parties in shaping immigration policy as “those 
who study migration do not focus much on parties, while those who study parties tend to 
focus on migration only insofar as it affects electoral competition and positioning, the role 
of political parties in immigration control and integration policy has been underestimated” 
(Bale, 2008: 315). The aim of this research is to link immigration policy studies and party 
politics literature to examine how political parties influence immigration policy and 
examine what other causal factors apart from the party competition drives right-wing 
political parties to change their immigration stances.  
 
Second, the project contributes to the literature on public policy as it also aims to trace 
causal mechanisms that account for immigration policy change. Therefore, it explains 
how particular policy preferences dominated over the other ones, it examines policy 
determination and explores the interaction between different political actors in the policy-
making process: governmental departments and administrative institutions, which fall 
within public policy literature. Apart from examining the causal factors that allowed 
political actors to make certain policy decisions, the research explores causal 
mechanisms through which the change has occurred. Thus, the study not only tests the 
presence of hypothesised causal mechanisms, extracted from the literature on 
mechanisms, but also contributes to the identification of new mechanisms such as 
departmental competition and direct democracy, derived from data analysis. 
Furthermore, this research brings contributions to the public policy area by identifying 
causal factors that contributed to the policy change and causal mechanisms that 
accounted for that change. As Afonso (2014: 568) successfully pinpoints: “if the outcome 
of this change in policy positions has been extensively documented, however, its causes 
and the processes leading to it remain unclear”. There has been some research done 
 20 
on causal factors leading to party policy change (for example, Adams et al., 2004; Adams 
et al., 2006, Burns and Gimpel, 2000; Harmel and Janda, 2004; Harmel and Tan, 2003), 
but there has not been much research (Afonso, 2014) on identifying causal mechanisms 
that account for this change. Thus, this research aims to trace mechanisms that account 
for immigration policy change. Identification of mechanisms pertinent to immigration 
policy can also be useful for future research, which can test their presence in the 
explanation of policy change in other areas of public policy. 
 
Third, the project makes a contribution to the literature on Euroscepticism (Boomgarden 
et al., 2011; Kuhn, 2012; Meijers, 2017; Usherwood 2013; Usherwood and Startin, 2012) 
examining how the anxieties about the EU lead to immigration policy change in three 
cases, especially such Eurosceptic parties as the Conservative Party in the UK and the 
Schweizerische Volkspartei (SVP) in Switzerland. Furthermore, it explores the impact of 
supranational forms of regulation on the development of immigration policies in three 
countries by addressing the respective roles of the EU and nation states in shaping 
immigration policy (Geddes, 2003). At the same time it also demonstrates how such 
critical junctures as Brexit in the UK and the Initiative Against Mass Migration in 
Switzerland are changing the political landscape and how domestic policy changes affect 
the relationship with the EU. Finally, this research also brings added value to the 
emerging scholarship on Brexit, which has so far focused on the quantitative approach 
in explaining support for it (Clarke et al., 2017; Goodwin and Heath, 2016; Goodwin and 
Ford, 2017; Goodwin and Milazzo, 2017), producing qualitative research and pointing 
out how Conservative’s party changing immigration stance has been at the origins of 
Brexit referendum.   
 
1.3 Case selection and timeframe  
Before proceeding with the case selection justification, the clarification of the research’s 
goal should be elaborated. The nature of this research is to yield explanations of 
immigration policy change in three country cases by pointing out to causal factors that 
lead to the change and by tracing causal mechanisms responsible for this change. This 
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thesis explains why the right-wing parties in power change their policies on immigration 
and the answer to this question lies in these three cases. Even though parties adopted 
a more restrictive approach to immigration, which led to subsequent immigration policy 
change, parties’ responses to immigration were not identical and varied across the 
cases. This research also explains what accounts for the variation in parties’ responses 
to immigration issue in the UK, Switzerland and France. One of the goals of this research 
is not only to spell out why all three cases with different characteristics arrived at a similar 
outcome, but also to explain what accounts for varieties in approaches to immigration in 
three European countries. Explaining variation is crucial because it allows to expand the 
explanatory power of the findings by pointing to the factors that lead to the existence of 
this variation.  
 
Case selection  
The UK, Switzerland and France were chosen because they exemplify the introduction 
of more restrictive immigration policies in old European democracies with significant 
migrant populations. Thus, the UK and France share colonial past, which resulted in a 
substantial number of immigrants coming to these countries. Switzerland, is an 
interesting case because twenty-five percent of its eight million population are foreign 
(Federal Statistical Office, 2017). Furthermore, and as chapters four, five and six 
demonstrate in some detail, recent events point to the increased anti-immigration 
attitudes both within the political establishment and general public. Euroscepticism has 
been growing in all three cases and a big part of this is because of immigration. UK voted 
to leave the EU in July 2016, Switzerland voted against mass EU migration in February 
2014, the popularity of National Front in France is growing and that its leader Marine Le 
Pen being the second top candidate in the first round of presidential elections and scoring 
almost 40 per cent of the votes in the second round (Clarke and Holder, 2017). 
Immigration policies have undergone considerable tightening between 2002 and 2015. 
The cancelation of the post study work visa for international students in the UK and 
France, the introduction of financial requirement for spouse visa in the UK, banning the 
construction of minarets in Switzerland and introducing automatic expelling for non-
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Swiss offenders are just some examples how immigration policies have changed. The 
selection of these typical cases was made with the aim of providing generalisations for 
other cases that share similar attributes such as post-industrial democratic states with 
free elections and substantial migrant populations. 
 
These cases were selected because, despite the evidence that right-wing parties in 
those countries adopted more restrictive immigration positions over time, the 
environment in which these parties operate differs on two major levels, which are 
important for understanding the development of immigration policies: relationship with 
the EU and citizenship regime. One of the goals is to trace how these characteristics 
influence on the way political parties alter their immigration stances if they do at all. First, 
the cases vary in terms of their citizenship regimes, which are crucial for explaining the 
incorporation of identity anxieties into the evolution of the immigration policies in three 
cases. Three countries belong to different citizenship regimes, which create 
opportunities or constraints for political parties to use identity theme in their immigration 
discourse and policies. Thus, Switzerland and France belong to an assimilationist type 
of regimes, the UK refers to multicultural regime. Here, it is important to emphasise that 
all three countries are multicultural in nature with immigration inflows from diverse 
countries, but they differ in terms of their integration approach, which is described by the 
citizenship regime.  
 
Switzerland and France both relate to assimilationist model, though with some 
differences. While France is a part of civic-assimilationist model, combining a “civic 
conception of citizenship and assimilationist view of cultural obligations” (Guigni and 
Passy, 2004: 59), Switzerland belongs to the ethnic-assimilationist model, which requires 
“assimilation to the norms and values of the national community on the ethnocultural 
basis and tend to exclude those who are not entitled to sharing its norms, values and 
symbols” (Guigni and Passy, 2004: 58). The assimilationist model brings identity 
concerns to the forefront of the immigration discourse. UK is different from Switzerland 
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and France and belongs to the multicultural citizenship regime, where immigrants are 
allowed to ‘maintain their distinctive cultures and form ethnic communities, providing they 
conform to national laws’ (Castles and Miller, 2009: 45). Thus, multicultural citizenship 
regime creates less opportunities for political parties to have identity anxieties dominate 
their immigration discourse. It does not completely take identity out of the equation, but 
it can constrain the choices of political parties, when it comes to immigration discourse 
and policy change. The differences in citizenship regimes help to explain the attitudes of 
right-wing political parties in power towards integration, which is an important facet of 
immigration policy-making that is also included in this research.  
 
Second, countries vary with the regards to their relationship with the EU. Country’s 
relationship with the EU affects the development of its immigration policies. Being part 
of the EU means that national sovereignty over certain issues can be limited and that 
countries could be bound by the EU legislation to act in a particular way. EU legislation 
by creating adaptational pressures generates certain anxieties towards the EU and right-
wing political parties are known to be quite skeptical on this issue. For example, one of 
the areas, where EU exerts influence is free movement of people, which has been a 
heated topic in recent debates in Europe. UK, Switzerland and France were selected as 
cases for this research because they differ in their connections to the EU and this 
research aims to trace if this can explain the variety of responses to immigration issue in 
three cases. Thus, UK is an EU member state that is characterised by Eurosceptic 
attitudes, when it comes to the Conservative Party. The country has always had a special 
relationship with the EU, having doubts about its membership in the European Economic 
Community (EEC). Its membership in the EEC was first questioned in 1975 referendum 
and recently, in the historic 2016 referendum, where the UK decided to leave the EU. 
Switzerland is not part of the EU, has never been and does not have any plans to join it 
in the nearest future, but is part of the free movement of people and has access to EU’s 
single market for most of its industries.  Despite not being a member, the SVP’s hard-
core Eurosceptic discourse is a dominant theme in immigration debate in Switzerland. 
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Finally, France has always been a Europhile country, by and large having a positive 
stance towards the EU, being one of its core finders and one of the key players, who 
views Europe as a platform to exert its influence (Drake, 2011). Selecting cases that 
share some important characteristics, which include type of citizenship regime and 
relationship with the EU is necessary to examine if these differences play any role in the 
variety of the responses of the right-wing parties on immigration in three cases.     
 
 
Time frame 
This study examines the period between 2002 and 2015, based on the country case and 
on the occurrence of critical junctures in Switzerland, the UK and France. First, in 
Switzerland, in 2003 SVP became the largest party in National Council for the first time 
in Swiss history and since then has established itself as a major player on the Swiss 
political agenda. As immigration was one of the cornerstones of SVP’s programme, since 
2003 Swiss immigration policy has undergone major transformation in a more restrictive 
direction. Despite the consensus character of the Swiss political system, SVP managed 
to transform immigration policy not only through the parliamentary arena, but also using 
the instruments of direct democracy. Second, the UK presents a puzzling case because 
the Conservative Party’s position on immigration has become increasingly restrictive 
between 2005 and 2015 despite the pledges of its then new leader David Cameron to 
transform the party’s image. In 2005, Cameron signalled the decontamination strategy 
of the Conservative Party, which needed to become more attractive for a broader 
electorate as it had been seen as too right-wing on issues like Europe and immigration 
in particular (Bale, 2010: 284). However, once the party managed to get reelected in 
2010 and formed a Coalition government with the Liberal-Democrats, the Conservatives 
made a u-turn on immigration, toughening its immigration discourse and subsequently 
immigration policies. Hence, it is interesting to trace the reasons behind this position and 
subsequent policy change. Finally, with the appointment of Nicholas Sarkozy as minister 
of the Interior in France in 2002, who was notoriously tough on immigration, his approach 
focused on decreasing the immigration inflow and on introducing tougher integration 
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policies towards foreigners, in particular, Muslims. During his time as president of the 
Republic between 2007 and 2012, French immigration policy became even more 
restrictive, targeting the reduction of all immigration inflows, including students and 
introducing the so-called ‘burqa ban’ in public places in 2010. Overall, all three cases 
have experienced their respective conservative parties adopting a tougher immigration 
stance, which subsequently led to more restrictive immigration policies. This research 
explains why it has happened.   
 
With reference to a broader political climate, the timeframe is chosen because certain 
big scale events contributed to the growing salience of immigration and made it one of 
the key topics in political debates. First, the events of September the eleventh 2001 in 
the USA cannot go unnoticed because they brought a shift in perception of certain 
categories of migrants, having an impact on the perception of Muslims in the Western 
world, which contributed to the rise of Islamophobia and backlash against 
multiculturalism (Castles and Miller, 2009: 15). Furthermore, important changes have 
been happening on the European arena as well. The 2004 EU enlargement welcomed 
ten new countries, which substantially increased the EU’s population by 75 million 
(European Commission, 2009). The accession of Bulgaria and Romania in 2007 
contributed to the already existing tensions in certain European countries like the UK, 
especially with regard to labour migration. Finally, the 2007-2008 global financial crisis 
has unfolded and brought recession across the world, having a negative impact on labour 
markets and bringing economic insecurities, which manifested in decreasing economic 
growth and rising unemployment (Hemerijck, 2013:1-2). The new millennium has 
brought a new set of challenges that influenced the immigration positions of right-wing 
parties in power. This thesis traces the changes that were responsible for the shift in 
immigration approach of the Conservative Party, UMP and the SVP.  
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1.4 Research questions  
The research aims to explain the logic underpinning the rightward shift in immigration 
policy stance of three right-wing parties in power: Union for a popular Movement (Union 
pour un Movement Populaire: UMP) in France, The Conservative Party in the UK and 
the SVP in Switzerland. It seeks to answer the following research question: Why have 
right-wing parties in power changed their immigration policy stances and shaped 
immigration policy in a more restrictive way in the UK, Switzerland and France between 
2002 and 2015?  
 
Immigration policy also includes an integration aspect, as integration constitutes an 
important part of the immigration issue and drives immigration policy changes in 
Switzerland and France in particular. It should be underlined that asylum is not included 
in the analysis as it represents a separate legal framework. This research question is 
further divided into two sub-questions.  
 
The first sub-question asks: What are the key factors which have led three European 
right-wing parties in power to change the tone of their immigration policies between 2002 
and 2015? Here, the aim is to trace the causal factors with the research focusing 
primarily on exogenous factors leading to policy change, however still accounting for 
internal ones. The justification for focusing on external factors is made in chapter two.  
 
The second sub-question asks: What causal mechanisms account for the immigration 
policy change in three country cases? In other words, in what way are these causal 
factors are translated into more restrictive immigration policies and why do some policy 
choices prevail over others? 
 
1.5 Concepts: right-wing parties in power and immigration policy 
This subsection briefly defines the major concepts of the research question. The goal is 
to clarify what is meant by them in this particular study. This allows for a better 
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understanding of the selection of right-wing parties and for the specification of 
immigration policy change.  
 
In this research, right-wing parties in power are defined as right-wing parties that have 
the largest electoral support among other right-wing parties and that have been in 
government before, or are in government now, either in coalition or solely. It is important 
to clarify what is meant by right-wing parties in power in this thesis because if in the case 
of UK and France there is no doubt that the Conservative Party and the UMP are right-
wing parties in power, yet the case of Switzerland poses certain questions. The Swiss 
People’s party is often described mostly as radical right wing (Skenderovic, 2009) or 
populist radical right (Afonso & Papadopolous, 2015; Heinisch and Mazzoleni, 2016) 
because of the nature of its rhetoric on immigration, which is profoundly nationalistic. 
Despite this important characteristic, this study views the SVP as right-wing parties in 
power in the sense that it has been the largest party in the Swiss political arena since 
2003, scoring its biggest electoral success at that time and being the biggest party in 
Swiss parliament since. SVP is identified as mainstream because it has been the most 
popular party with Swiss voters for more than a decade. 
 
The definition of immigration, given by Messina and Lahav (2006: 9), is “the movement 
of persons across national borders for purposes other than travel or short-term 
residence”. However, this definition is broad and includes different categories of 
migrants. This research only focuses on legal migration routes: labour, student and 
family migration, including both EU and non-EU migration. It deals with legal migration 
as addressing the question why political parties have restrictive positions towards illegal 
immigration is in part self-explanatory, while the explanation of why right-wing parties in 
power introduced more restrictive approach towards legal migration routes is more 
puzzling.   
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Furthermore, it also examines changes in integration as it is an important facet of 
immigration policy that deals with migrants’ acceptance of and by the host society. 
Immigration and integration are interconnected because sometimes certain aspects of 
integration need to be fulfilled as conditions for future immigration (Groenendijk, 2011). 
Furthermore, the success of integration can determine a country’s attitude towards 
prospective immigration policies. Especially in societies that follow less multicultural, but 
more assimilationist approach, integration is significant in understanding the logic of 
immigration policy-making. This thesis does not include asylum policy as it is a different 
legal domain and is a matter of separate study. 
 
 
1.6 Limitations of the research   
This research has the goal of explaining immigration stance change of right-wing parties 
in power between 2002 and 2015 by examining factors exogenous to the party that 
nonetheless do influence parties’ positions on immigration. It also explores causal 
mechanisms that account for this change in three cases. It is important to clarify the 
scope of the research as there are certain limitations to what it can cover. First, 
recognising that political parties change their policy positions because of both external 
and internal factors, this study focuses mainly on external factors, aiming to provide 
contribution to the structural theories on party policy change. However, it recognises the 
importance of the agency in producing policy change and this is highlighted in the case 
of France and the UK. Second, this research is not looking at the policy change cycle as 
a whole, but only focuses on the agenda setting cycle, examining the formulation of the 
immigration policies. Third, by focusing on right-wing parties in power, this research does 
not examine the impact of other actors like interest groups, business associations, 
courts, ethnic groups, trade unions, security agencies (Lahav and Guiraudon, 2005: 
207). Where it was possible, interviews with major interest groups that were involved in 
the process of policy formulation, were conducted, but actors other than political parties 
have not been the centre of this study. Fourth, this research explored the immigration 
policy agenda setting from the perspective of a party as a whole, but does not delve into 
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a discussion on intra-party dynamics on immigration, as the focus of this explanation is 
on structural factors and not on agency-related ones. Finally, this study demonstrates 
that the immigration stance change of right-wing parties in power led to a major political 
development in the UK: Brexit - referendum on Britain’s exit from the European Union 
(EU). But as Brexit happened after the interviews were conducted and originally Brexit 
has not been included in the timeframe of the research, it does not examine the evolution 
of Conservative Party’s stance and subsequent immigration policy change after 2015.  
 
 
1.7 Roadmap  
Having introduced the rationale for the study, gap, research questions, hypotheses, case 
selection and brief description of the main concepts in this chapter (chapter one), the 
thesis proceeds in the following manner. Chapter two reviews literature on party policy 
change and literature on political opportunity structures (POS) and provides the 
operationalisation of factors that contribute to party policy change. Its innovative 
character seeks to combine political opportunity structures theory and theories of party 
policy change. It also revisits the broader social science problem of structure versus 
agency, not aiming to answer this fundamental problem, but emphasising that in the case 
of immigration policy, structural factors give a more complete insight into the change. 
Chapter three examines the methods used in this research, explaining the use of a 
comparative case study approach with process tracing as a within case method of 
analysis. Furthermore, the chapter delves into the discussion of the data employed in 
the research. After theory and methods have been laid out, the thesis proceeds with the 
empirical analysis of three country cases: the UK, Switzerland and France. It 
commences with the case of the Conservative Party and the evolution of the British 
immigration policy, which is explored in chapter four. It delves into the discussion of the 
Conservative Party’s immigration discourse change in opposition and the evolution of 
the British immigration policy under the 2010-2015 Coalition government. By focusing 
on the role of the Conservative Party, the chapter also discusses the impact of some 
interest groups on the immigration agenda-setting of the Conservative Party and on the 
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Coalition government. In addition to testing exogenous factors, the analysis of interviews 
also points to the Home Office’s ideological dogmatism, which was an agency related 
factor that led to the introduction of restrictive immigration policies. Process tracing 
establishes the presence of two mechanisms that accounted for the change: framing and 
departmental competition. Chapter five examines the evolution of the SVP’s immigration 
stance and their role in toughening of immigration policies in Switzerland. It explores how 
the consensual model of Swiss politics provided extra-parliamentary venues for the SVP 
to use the direct democracy mechanism to influence the development of Swiss 
immigration policy using a bottom-up approach. The chapter also highlights that, despite 
not being a member of the EU, Swiss immigration policy has been facing adaptational 
pressures from Europeanisation. These anxieties have been repeatedly used by the SVP 
in their discourse and led to acceptance of the Initiative Against Mass Migration, which 
has endangered the cooperation between Switzerland and the EU. Finally, it explores 
what drove the changes in integration policies, which can be described as primarily anti-
Muslim. Chapter six analyses the evolution of immigration policies in France under right-
wing UMP and Sarkozy’s presidency. It demonstrates that Sarkozy’s preoccupation 
towards immigration was not only directed towards the limitation of family migration, but 
also focused on cultural integration of immigrants, mainly Muslims, with a failure to target 
the socio-economic aspect of integration. The chapter points out that Sarkozy’s pledges 
in reducing ‘unqualified’ family migration and increasingly highly skilled labour migration 
were not achieved as the global financial crisis unfolded. Finally, it examines how 
institutional reshuffle and competition between governmental departments led to the 
introduction of more restrictive policies, but also accounted for some gaps between 
policy demands and policy outcomes. These three core chapters of the thesis are 
structured in the following way. First, each chapter sets out the country’s political context, 
then it proceeds with the analysis of factors that contributed to immigration policy change. 
After the causes have been laid out, the chapters proceed with the identification of the 
mechanisms. Each chapter points to the factors that influenced right-wing parties’ 
positions on immigration and points out whether it was a combination of factors 
 31 
necessary for producing a change. Chapter seven links empirical findings with 
theoretical scholarship by synthesising the findings from three case studies and 
demonstrates which causal factors were similar across the cases and draws certain 
generalisations. It also points out that the causes of immigration policy change are 
broadly similar in three cases, but with some variation, which is explained by four political 
opportunity structures (POS) that account for the variation in causal factors and causal 
mechanisms across three cases. Chapter eight reminds the reader about the focus of 
this research and provides a summary of findings. It spells out both theoretical and 
practical implications and demonstrates how new causal factors identified in this study 
can be tested in other cases of party policy change on immigration. This thesis concludes 
with offering some avenues for further research.  
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Chapter 2  
Theory  
 
This chapter presents a combination of different theoretical frameworks that explain 
immigration policy change. It sets out theoretical underpinning of the thesis by reviewing 
social scientific theories of policy change and POS theory. It highlights how these 
theories help to explain why parties change their policies and what explains the variation 
in parties’ positions across the cases. Before proceeding with the examination of specific 
theories, the chapter starts with the discussion of the ‘agency versus structure’ problem, 
which is a fundamental debate that deliberates whether agency or structure is 
predominant in shaping actors’ behaviour. The first part of this chapter discusses the 
symbiosis between agency and structure as it is often hard to explain a change by 
accounting simply for either agentic or structural factors. While some factors might 
prevail, often it is a combination of both of them that leads to the change.  Then, the 
chapter examines theories of party policy change and justifies why this research is 
focused on exploring external factors that lead parties to alter their positions, however 
still accounting for the role of the agency in immigration policy change. It also 
operationalises these external factors into independent variables, the factors specific to 
this research, the presence of which is to be tested in the case study chapters. The 
chapter continues on discussing how POS help to explain the variation in three cases 
and why it is useful. Finally, it concludes with a discussion of the causal mechanisms 
that account for the change.  
 
 
2.1 Role of exogenous factors in party policy change  
This research explains the immigration policy change from a standpoint that emphasises 
the importance of exogenous factors in producing the change, but before delving into 
discussion of these factors, the examination of one of the fundamental debates in social 
and political theory of ‘agency versus structure’ needs to be elaborated. This dualism 
serves as a broader basis for theories of party policy change because it explores whether 
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political parties influence the structure, the environment they are operating in, or the 
structure shapes agency, the choices parties make. The agency-structure problem posits 
that “instead of being antagonistic partners in a zero-sum relationship, human agents 
and social structures are in fundamental sense interrelated entities, and hence we 
cannot fully account for one without invoking the other” (Carlsnaes, 1992: 245-246).  The 
agency, or the actor(s) actions are determined by structures that the actor operates 
within, while structure is not immune to the changes brought by the agency, therefore it 
is clear that one does not happen without the influence of another. International relations 
scholars argue that "single decision makers or small groups of decision makers - are 
surrounded by the factors that structure the nature of the decision, the options available, 
the consequences, costs and benefits of those options" (Most and Starr, 1989: 27, 29). 
Therefore, an actor’s decision(s) are not simply defined by the actor, they are based on 
the factors that are external to the actor in question - the structure.  
 
Structure is something that is hard to grasp or define and there is no single definition that 
is agreed upon. Sibeon (1999: 142) states that ‘‘‘structure’ refers to the relatively 
enduring though not immutable circumstances within which actors operate”, which 
means that structure can also be understood with a reference to a wider context, in which 
actor operates, while Betts (1986: 41) underlines that actors are influenced, constrained 
or enabled by social structure or social conditions. The notion of ‘structure’ is vague, but 
it relates to something external to the actor, whether these are resources or rules and 
can be specified under the umbrella of ‘context’, in which the actor operates. This study 
emphasises that exploring the range of external, structural factors is necessary to explain 
party policy change on immigration because parties do not make decisions in the 
vacuum, but they need to account for what is happening around them.  
Having emphasised that structure shapes the choices of the agency, the study does not 
disregard agency’s role, but it accounts for it in what the agency-structure problem 
presents a dualism, where “actions can transform structures and structures constrain 
actions” (Hollis and Smith, 1994: 243). This means that while actor’s actions are shaped 
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by the structure, it is the agency that decides which structures shape its choices: 
“Individuals, then, make choices within a complex set of incentive structures” (Most and 
Starr, 1989: 27, 29). Agency is important in its “ability to interpret and the power to 
choose among not only different behavioral options, but also among different interests, 
identities, decision-making procedures” (Friedman and Starr, 1997: 11). Hence, actor’s 
choices are the result of consideration and those parts of the structure are meaningful 
that are chosen by the agent. This study explores which exogenous factors affect right-
wing parties’ choices on immigration and also examines the role that the agency in the 
change as it is the agency, who decides which factors are meaningful.  
 
Having been extensively studied in international relations and foreign policy analysis 
(Carlsnaes, 1992; Joseph, 2008; O’Donnell, 1973; O’Donnell and Schmitter, 1986; 
Wendt, 1987), the agency-structure dualism can also be applied to politics within state 
(Mahoney and Snyder, 1999) and to public policy (Castles, 1981), explaining policy 
choices of political parties. The goal of this study is not to advance the ontological 
discussion on the agency-structure problem, but to use it as a lens through which to 
explain the policy change of right-wing parties in power. In the context of explaining party 
policy change, the debate around structure and agency is about generating valid 
knowledge to answer the research question. Thus, in the given situation structural 
explanations provide a more complete insight into why parties change their positions and 
why change does occur, because parties do not form their policies in a vacuum, they 
build their policies based on events that happen around them. However, focusing on 
exogenous factors, the analysis of immigration policy change also accounts for the role 
of the agency in producing this change.   
 
 
2.2 Theories of party policy change 
Political parties change their policies all the time and there are a variety of explanations 
as to why this is so. This chapter draws on both internal and external factors that 
influence parties’ positions, but gives preference to explaining the change through 
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exogenous factors, justifying why this is the case. Thus, in order to determine the correct 
contextual factors, one needs to address the theory that helps to specify those factors 
(Faletti and Lynch, 2009: 1153). Research on party position and policy change can be 
divided into two categories: one tradition emphasises that change in party policy 
positions is caused by internal factors, while another tradition highlights the importance 
of external factors (Fagerholm, 2015: 2). This research gives preference to the external 
tradition and justifies why this is the case. However, it also briefly examines the 
standpoint, which emphasises the importance of internal factors and explains why this 
theory is not sufficient enough to explain changes in party’s policies.  
 
Party policy change can be explained by examining factors internal to the party that 
influence decision-making process within the party. Change in a party leader is one of 
the factors that lead political parties to alter their policies (Harmel et al., 1995; Harmel 
and Janda, 1994). Downs (1957: 111) also hypotheses that parties change their 
positions when a new leader takes over. However, evidence to support the hypothesis 
that changes in party leadership lead to the changes in parties’ positions is scarce 
(Fargerholm, 2015: 503). Another factor that is claimed to have an impact on parties 
changing their policy positions is change in a dominant faction (Harmel et al.,1995; 
Harmel and Tan (2003).  
 
The explanation of party policy change caused simply by internal factors is not sufficient 
because even if parties change their policies based on a change of leader or on a change 
in the dominant faction (Harmel and Janda, 1994), they still need factors external to party 
pressures that lead to the change in the policy to justify those changes. However, these 
explanations are not sufficient because parties are not immune to external pressures, 
which affect their decision-making and internal drivers are not able to explain everything 
(Partos and Bale, 2014: 604). Leaders need to justify the change in their policy positions 
based on the events that are happening within the country context or even within the 
broader context. If policy change would only depend on internal factors, then in 
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comparative perspective different parties will have the same policy outcomes. Since this 
is unlikely to be true there is a need to address external or contextual aspects that have 
an impact on party policy change. This is not to imply that the internal tradition is flawed, 
but to suggest it is insufficient to explain immigration policy change. Finally, this research 
tests exogenous factors that influence party position change to fill the gap in the literature 
as recent research on the Conservative Party (Bale and Partos, 2014; Partos, 2017) 
tested these internal factors and found that party leadership change influenced the 
development of immigration policies of the UK Conservative Party, while changes in the 
dominant faction were less significant. Therefore, this study argues that the internal 
tradition is not suitable in yielding sufficient explanations of party policy change and the 
examination of factors external to the party needs to be addressed. 
 
2.2.1 Exogenous factors  
The second tradition emphasises the importance of external factors for party policy 
change. The chapter proceeds with an examination of these external factors in detail, 
also giving special attention to their operationalisation. Alongside sketching out the range 
of external factors that might have an influence on parties’ positions, this subsection also 
operationalises these factors into specific variables pertinent for this research. The 
factors that underpin the logic of the right-wing parties’ change on immigration are not 
limited to those that are discussed in the theories on party policy change and some of 
the factors arise during data analysis. Existing theories of party policy change do not 
cover all the exogenous conditions that can impact the development of immigration 
policy in three country cases. While this subsection elaborates on the theorised 
exogenous factors, additional, agency-related factors that influence political parties’ 
choices on immigration are explored in the case-specific chapters (four, five and six).  
 
 
Party competition 
There has been extensive research done on party competition as an element that shapes 
party positions depending on the behaviour of other parties on certain issues. Party 
competition is one of the most discussed variables and it certainly plays a role in 
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immigration debate, especially when it comes to the right of the ideological spectrum. 
Budge (1994) argues that party policy change happens because parties respond to the 
shift(s) of rival parties. Adams and Somer-Topcu (2009: 835-837) found strong evidence 
that parties do adjust their positions in the same direction and that the likelihood is higher 
if they belong to the same ideological spectrum. In this case shifts by a rival party 
represent party competition on the right. “The mere presence of anti-immigrant parties 
can push mainstream parties towards a tougher line on immigration for fear of being 
outflanked” (Sides and Citrin, 2007: 477). The classic theory of party competition 
(Downs, 1957) emphasises that electoral rise of some parties will force other parties to 
adopt an accommodative strategy in order to prevent voter defection and maximise their 
vote share. Laver (2005) demonstrates that parties alter their policy positions as a 
response to shifting affiliations of the voters, adapting to the political environment. When 
it comes to immigration, party competition is likely to affect mostly right-wing parties, 
however left-wing parties are not immune to voter alienation either (Goodwin and Ford, 
2016). As Akkerman (2012: 55) pinpoints: “the pressure to coopt policy stances of the 
electoral competitor should be weighing on mainstream right […] because the appeal of 
radical right parties is most tempting for voters on the right side of the political spectrum”. 
Electoral rise of radical right “changes the structure of the political space, as well as 
influences other political actors” (Rydgren, 2003: 46), pressuring them to adopt an 
accommodative strategy (Meguid, 2007) towards the radical right. The success of radical 
right creates pressure for other political parties to reinforce their positions on immigration 
(Abou-Chadi, 2016).  
 
The salience of the issue puts pressure on political parties to respond to the concerns of 
the public, to stress the importance of the issue on their agenda and if need be to change 
their stance on the issue depending on the priority of the issue. Issue salience is 
something similar to the public opinion variable, but it is not the same thing. Political 
parties change their behaviour when the salience of the issue increases. When 
immigration gains salience mainstream parties either hold on to their positions or co-opt 
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the positions of the competitor (Bale et al., 2010). Issues like immigration, popularised 
by radical right parties, have entered mainstream politics and can no longer be 
disregarded by the other political parties. Thus, this study hypothesises that the rise of 
radical right parties, which increases the salience of immigration, lead right-wing parties 
in power to adopt a more restrictive immigration approach.  
 
Party competition on the right is operationalised through the rise of radical right’s parties’ 
electoral fortunes, which creates subsequent threats for right-wing parties in power, 
belonging to the same ideological family and having ideological proximity. Immigration is 
one of the key issues that right-wing parties in power and radical right choose to 
emphasise in their discourse. Therefore, party competition is assessed by examining the 
behaviour of right-wing parties in power towards their radical right competitors. Hence, 
in the UK, it is determined by the threat from UKIP in the UK and in France it is 
determined by the successes of FN. Switzerland constitutes a special case, where there 
is no presence of the radical right competitor for the SVP. There is a discussion among 
scholars whether SVP is the radical or the right-wing parties in power, but this thesis 
does not delve into this debate and considers SVP to be a mainstream party in a sense 
that it has been the most popular party in the country since 2003. Since 1991 it had a 
steady and consistent increase (Albertazzi and McDonnel, 2015: 83) and 2003 federal 
election brought a tremendous success for the SVP who “emerged as the clear winner, 
becoming the largest party in parliament and increasing its representation in 
government” (Dardanelli, 2005: 123). Hence, party competition is not considered as a 
factor that influences SVP’s positions on immigration because there is no radical right 
competitor in the Swiss political spectrum that would threaten the electoral fortunes of 
the SVP. 
 
Public opinion 
Probably the most developed theory of party policy change (Fagerholm, 2015) argues 
that parties change their policies as a response to the shifts in public opinion (McDonald 
and Budge, 2005; Stimson et al.,1995). Adams et al. (2004) found evidence that parties 
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alter their policy positions when public opinion shifts away from the party. Meyer (2013: 
90) agrees with these findings and argues that: ‘parties follow voter position shifts if these 
preferences move away from the party platforms […] in contrast parties are not likely to 
respond to public opinion shifts that move towards the party's policy platform’. 
Furthermore, previous research has found that niche parties usually do not respond to 
change in public opinion, while mainstream parties do (Adams et al., 2006: 518-519; 
Adams et al., 2009). Ezrow et al. (2011) demonstrate that mainstream parties respond 
more to shifts in the attitudes of their supporters rather than shifts in opinion of the 
general public. Recognising that there is a two-way relationship between public opinion 
and policy, meaning that they both influence each other (Page and Shapiro, 1983: 188) 
and sometimes it is hard to trace whether it is public opinion that had an impact on policy 
development or vice versa, this study does not have a goal to find this out. The aim is to 
investigate whether mainstream political parties actually respond to the change in public 
attitudes on immigration, whether they consider shifts in public opinion while altering their 
immigration policy positions because in some cases policy does not change despite 
public opinion shift on it (Page and Shapiro, 1983: 189). Therefore, it is not necessary 
that parties always react to public attitudes. Hence, this research traces if public opinion 
shifts influence parties’ choices on immigration.  
 
This overview of the influence of public opinion on party positions is important, but it 
gives a general picture whether parties consider it as a variable when deciding to change 
their immigration stances. However, what is more captivating to explore is, what factors 
within public opinion drive the opposition to immigration, which particular anxieties of the 
public the parties consider when altering their immigration stances. Therefore, the 
following paragraph provides a more detailed theoretical overview of the major concerns 
that explain public hostility towards immigration, which will also be tested in the case 
study chapters – four, five and six to explore whether right-wing parties in power 
considered specific concerns of the population on immigration.      
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Economic and cultural anxieties over immigration  
Public attitudes on immigration have been known to be linked to economic anxieties of 
the population (Citrin et al., 1997, Burns and Gimpel, 2000; Dustmann and Preston, 
2001; Harwood, 1986; Mayda, 2006) and to national identity concerns (Brader et al., 
2008; Citrin et al., 1990; Luedtke, 2005; McDaniel et al., 2011; McLaren, 2001; Sides 
and Citrin, 2007). Economic and cultural factors are the most discussed elements of the 
public opposition to immigration (Malhorta et al., 2013: 391-392). Viewing immigration 
as a threat through the economic lens is primarily linked to the competition for jobs 
(Malhorta et al., 2013: 391-392). Cultural threat is another driver of public opposition to 
immigration, which needs to be considered as a factor that drives parties to change their 
policy stances to please the public. The goal of this research is not to explain how public 
opinion on immigration changed between 2002 and 2015, but to explore first, whether 
right-wing parties in power considered shifts in public opinion on immigration when 
altering their immigration positions. And, second, to investigate whether concerns over 
national identity or concerns over economic anxieties drove this change.  
 
 
Global economic change  
Adams et al. (2009) posit that right-wing parties in power change their policy stances as 
a reaction to global economic change. Furthermore, Hibbs (1997), Garret (1998) and 
Pierson (2001) posit that political parties take into consideration domestic and 
international economic situation, which influences their positions. Economic variable and 
its impact on immigration debate is salient in a way that when a country faces economic 
hardship or economic repercussions, the origins of which are external to the country in 
question, immigration can become more restrictive because economic context of the 
country is not really conducive for increasing immigration flows. Global economic change 
can influence the nature of country’s welfare system and lead to tightening of welfare 
benefits. In times of economic hardship immigration can acquire a negative connotation 
by having immigrants blamed for perceived economic problems and by portraying them 
as benefit scroungers. Haupt (2010) and Ward et al. (2011) find evidence that political 
parties do not ignore global economic change and indeed alter their policy platforms as 
 41 
a response to economic globalisation. Because of the problems in operationalisation of 
‘economic globalisation’ and its measurement, this research operationalises changes in 
global economy through Global financial crisis that unfolded in 2007-2008. In the period 
studied, changes in global economy are operationalised through the global financial 
crisis that unfolded in 2007-2008. The study investigates whether the crisis had any 
impact on the development of more restrictive immigration discourse and policies in three 
cases. However, it should be said that this research does not delve into the discussion 
of specific economic indicators that influence parties’ positions on immigration, but 
explores whether global financial crisis led right-wing parties in power to change their 
immigration policy stances.  
 
The effects of EU integration  
Immigration policies are not determined only based on the internal to the country factors, 
they are also shaped depending on the broader context. As Geddes (2003: 4) pinpoints: 
“Analysis of immigration policies should be placed in the context of general changes that 
affect countries from within - welfare state and labour market changes, and from outside 
- commitments to European integration”. Even though immigration policy largely remains 
a matter reserved to national governments, some of its aspects like the ‘four freedoms’, 
which include free movement of people, services, goods and capital are defined by 
international agreements, established by supranational bodies. For instance, 
supranational forms of regulation can be those exogenous factors that have an effect on 
certain aspects of European countries’ immigration policies, however these forms of 
regulation influence immigration policies of countries in a different way because each 
government reacts to them in a way pertinent to local political and economic context. 
 
Fagerholm (2015: 1) states that “parties are also affected by major changes in the social 
and economic landscape […] The changing political, social and economic environment 
challenges the everyday life of political parties and forces them to adapt and change”. 
The changing pace of immigration and erasing of certain boundaries between states 
certainly has had an impact on immigration discourse and policies across Western 
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Europe. Namely, these big-scale political changes concern widening of the EU that has 
happened in 2004 and in 2007. It is hypothesised that it had an impact on the 
development of the immigration discourse and policies of right-wing parties in power in 
three country cases. Even though this variable is not explicitly elaborated in the literature 
on party policy change, the literature states that large-scale changes in political 
environment affect parties’ behaviour. Changes in political and socio-economic 
environment are operationalised through the effects of the EU integration. In this 
research EU integration is seen to have an impact through EU enlargements, 2004 and 
2007, when a big chunk of Eastern Europe joined the EU, which increased EU population 
by 75 million new residents (Kvist, 2004: 301). The enlargements brought anxieties about 
the “competition in the labor markets and for welfare benefits” (Kahanec, Zaiceva and 
Zimmermann, 2009: 4). Most of the EU member states imposed transitional controls for 
periods up to seven years, which restricted citizens of newly accessed countries to 
access labour markets in the old EU countries (Kahanec, Zaiceva and Zimmermann, 
2009: 4). Widening of the EU and increased intra-EU migration did not only bring more 
opportunities for EU citizens to find work in other member states, but it also brought 
anxieties about national identity and welfare.  
 
As Delanty (2008: 677) pinpoints:  
 
There is an emerging crisis of solidarity with Europeanisation and this is centrally 
about anxieties about peoplehood. With the emergence of a European political 
community that has diminished national sovereignty at a time when global forces 
are also undermining nation states, both Europe and migration became linked as 
sources of instability for many people. Anxieties about Europe and migration are 
linked with fears of a clash of civilisations and anxieties about crime and social 
securities.  
 
As widening of the EU has brought different kind of concerns around national identity 
and economic and social security anxieties, this research explores what kind of anxieties 
appeared in three country cases, and to what extent some anxieties predominated over 
the other ones and what were the reasons for it. Furthermore, if the effects of the EU 
integration underpinned the logic of immigration policy change of the right-wing parties 
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in power, what accounts for the variance in approaches of three cases when it comes to 
the EU. It should be said that EU enlargements are not the only aspects of EU integration 
that might drive political parties to redefine their immigration stances and that new 
features of EU integration might come during data analysis. As it was already noticed, 
Switzerland, despite not being a member of either EU or European Economic Area 
(EEA), is being affected by some of the EU policies, including immigration in particular 
because it joined the agreement of free movement of people with the EU in an exchange 
of Switzerland’s access to the single market (European Commission, 2016). And, as it 
will be shown in chapter five, politics of immigration in Switzerland is largely shaped 
around Switzerland’s relationship with the EU. 
 
In the discussion on the importance of external factors it is crucial to highlight that it is 
often a combination of factors that have an influence on certain processes rather than 
just a sole ingredient that causes the change. As Ragin (1987: 24) underlines: 
“Whenever social scientists examine large-scale change […] they find that it is usually 
combinations of conditions that produce change”. Furthermore, he argues that it is not 
simply the variety of conditions that produce the change, but the “intersection of 
appropriate preconditions - the right ingredients for change. In the absence of any of 
these essential ingredients, the phenomenon - or the change - does not emerge” (Ragin, 
1987: 25). Therefore, the study examines not only which factors lead right-wing parties 
in power to change their positions on immigration, but also explores whether the 
interaction of particular factors was responsible for producing the change. Finally, it is 
crucial to highlight that this research does not limit itself to these independent variables, 
derived from the literature. Other causes of immigration policy change in three cases 
emerge through the analysis of interview data. Tracing endogenous factors not 
previously discussed in theories brings the contribution to the existing theories on party 
policy change.  
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Based on the theories of party policy change that focus on the exogenous factors, the 
following six hypotheses are produced and are tested with the elite interview data in case 
study chapters: chapters four, five and six.  
 
H1: Party competition on the right, or more specifically, the presence of strong radical 
right competitor leads right-wing parties in power to adopt an accommodative strategy 
(Meguid, 2007) towards their rivals and go hard line on immigration1.  
 
H2: Right-wing parties in power pursued restrictive immigration stance as a response to 
shifts in public opinion on the issue, which became more negative over the years.  
 
H3: Perceived identity concerns of the public about the threat from Islam and integration 
of Muslims resulted in the introduction of more restrictive policies in integration domain.   
 
H4: Perceived economic anxieties of the public over immigration over unrestricted EU 
immigration were at the origins of the changing approach to immigration.  
 
H5: 2007-2008 global financial crisis underpinned more restrictive approach of the three 
right-wing parties in power on immigration and led right-wing parties in power to reframe 
immigration through social welfare lens.  
 
H6: The effects of the EU integration and widening of the EU community made the right-
wing parties in power to pursue a more restrictive immigration stance. 
 
 
                                                 
1 It should be noticed that in Swiss chapter the hypothesis about the impact of party 
competition is absent as in Swiss case, there was no credible competitor for the SVP 
that would be further to the right in the Swiss political spectrum.  
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2.3 Political Opportunity Structure Theory 
In recent years POS theory has become increasingly relevant in the study of party 
politics. Primarily the literature on party politics and POS focused on the populist radical 
right parties (Kitschelt and McGann, 1995; Koopmans et al., 2005; Mudde, 2007, 
Rydgren, 2005; Arzheimer and Carter, 2006; Kestila and Soderlund, 2007). Thus, 
Rydgren (2005) elaborated on various POS that led to the emergence of the new party 
family, Mudde (2007: 232-256) examined what POS influence electoral fortunes of the 
radical right and how does it happen, pointing to institutional, cultural and political 
context. Kitschelt and McGann (1995) and Arzheimer and Carter (2006: 419-443) 
provided a refined analysis of POS that explain the variation in radical right parties’ 
success, pointing to the crucial factors that affect radical right party support. If Arzheimer 
and Carter (2006) examined POS more broadly, Kestila and Soderlund (2007) presented 
a more refined discussion, focusing on the subnational POS that influenced the success 
of radical right in France. Finally, Koopman’s et al. (2005: 188) research pointed to the 
specific opportunities that influence claims-making of the radical right parties. As can be 
seen, the POS, successfully applied to party politics literature, concentrated on a radical 
right party family, tracing POS that explained the rise and variation in success of these 
parties. Right-wing parties have not received the same attention. Therefore, this study 
differs from the previous research because it demonstrates how POS explain the 
variation in different responses to immigration issue by right-wing parties in power.  
 
Despite having its origins and main application in the field of social movements, POS 
can also be applied to party politics because political parties like social movements are 
also collective actors. Lees (2008: 29) highlights that political opportunities can be taken 
both by social movements and by political parties. In this research POS theory helps to 
explain the degree of variation in parties’ positions and policies through the examination 
of the political environment in which parties operate. Political parties change their 
policies, even if they change it in the same direction overall, there is still a degree of 
variation. Political opportunities were first used in Eisinger’s (1973) work, which tried to 
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explain why some cities in America had major riots in 1960s (Meyer and Minkoff, 2004: 
1459). McAdam, Tarrow, and Tilly (1996: 2001) are known as classic developers of the 
POS that is usually applied to explaining social movements. The aim of this subsection 
is not to demonstrate how this theory has been advanced by various social movement 
scholars, but to pinpoint what is understood by POS and how this can be applied for this 
study to explain the variation in right-wing parties’ positions on immigration.  
 
Political opportunity structures are defined as “consistent - but not necessarily formal or 
permanent - dimensions of the political environment that provide incentives for the 
collective action” (Tarrow, 1994: 85). POS are used “to explain how the political context 
affects the differential development and influence of ostensibly similar movements” 
(Meyer, 2003: 17). The concept of opportunity implies that the answer to the question 
why the policies change is in part to do with the agency and in part to with the structure 
(context) in which the change is happening (McAdam, Tarrow, Tilly, 1996: 24). The 
theory gives more explanatory power to structure as it stresses that “the concept of 
political opportunity emphasises resources external to the group” (Tarrow, 1998: 20). 
POS are external in a way that there are “outside constraints on the activities of social 
movements and interest groups” (Princen and Kerremans, 2008: 1131). These 
opportunities and constraints are external to the agency of political parties and they are 
the attributes of the environment in which political parties operate. POS are “dimensions 
of the environment” (Tarrow, 1994: 85) that explain actor’s decision with the reference 
to the context in which actor operates. 
 
As this theory deals with collective action, it can also be extrapolated to explain the 
behaviour or the policy choices of political parties on immigration because political 
parties are collective actors that have specific interests. Parties, like interest groups are 
presented with opportunity structures that shape their positions. The theory is applicable 
party politics research because “factors that give rise to social mobilization are also those 
that give rise to policy change” (Meyer and Minkoff, 2004: 1462). As Meyer and Minkoff 
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(2004: 1463) highlight: “understanding the relationship between context and action is 
critical to tackling larger theoretical question of the relationship between structure and 
agency”. Understanding the interaction between opportunity structures and political 
parties’ positions on immigration is key for explaining the logic behind immigration policy 
change of right-wing parties in power. 
 
The fundamental dualism of ‘agency versus structure’ comes forward in the POS theory 
as well. This research does not perceive opportunity structures as stable and immune to 
change from the agency. On the contrary, it recognises that they “are dynamic in the 
sense that they may change in response to evolving societal sensitivities as well as the 
behaviour of interest groups” (Princen and Kerremans, 2008: 1134). Political parties, 
compared to interest groups or social movements, can even have a bigger impact on 
opportunity structures because they are the actors with decision-making powers. Thus, 
such opportunities as relationship with the EU do not only shape parties’ policy positions 
on immigration, but that political parties also influence how relationship between EU and 
member state is unfolding. Events like Brexit in the UK and the Initiative Against Mass 
Migration in Switzerland demonstrate how agency influences the structure. This research 
accepts that structure is not immune from the influence or actions of agency, but that 
“political actors identify and construct opportunity structures. Thus, opportunity structures 
are not merely imposed on political actors from the outside, but are (at least partly) the 
outcome of activities by those actors themselves” (Princen and Kerremans, 2008: 1143). 
Such perspective not only gives the explanatory power to the context, in which changes 
are happening, but also to the agency, which, to a certain extent is also responsible for 
creating the opportunities. Therefore, the study aims to bring contribution to the 
identification of those attributes of national POS that explain the variation in right-wing 
parties’ responses to immigration. Such understanding of opportunity structures 
recognises the relevance of rational choice theory, where the agency matters because 
although political opportunities are there, they only become relevant when they are 
perceived and taken or rejected by political parties. Opportunity structures are only 
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valuable if they are taken by political actors, in this case, by right-wing parties in power. 
And the relevant question here is which opportunities are taken by mainstream parties 
and which are not. The thesis explores this in chapter eight.  
 
This research aims to bring specific contribution to the application of POS to the field of 
immigration and right-wing parties in power by highlighting the attributes of POS that 
facilitate or constrain right-wing parties’ choices. As Koopmans et al. (2005: 188) 
successfully pinpointed: “social movement scholars have tended to specify political 
opportunity structures at a too general level, without taking into account the 
characteristics of particular issue fields and collective actors”. Therefore, this study aims 
to address this criticism by pointing to the attributes of POS that are pertinent to the 
explanation of immigration policy positions of right-wing parties in power. Having 
explored theories of party policy change that explain why do parties change their policy 
positions and POS theory, which helps to explain the variation, the chapter proceeds 
with the discussion of the importance of causal mechanisms that are responsible for 
producing the change. 
 
 
2.4 Causal mechanisms 
This research does not only explore exogenous factors that underpin the logic of right-
wing parties in power, it also explains in what way these causal factors translated into 
restrictive immigration policies by identifying the mechanisms. Mechanisms are crucial 
for unpacking the causal chain and painting the picture of how the change has occurred. 
Mechanisms are instrumental in explaining how the change has occurred as they 
“produce compelling causal explanations” (Faletti and Lynch, 2008: 333). For explaining 
certain outcomes, causal chain needs to be constructed and this can only be done with 
the exploration of causal mechanisms because independent and dependent variables 
are linked to each other through causal mechanism(s). Before proceeding with the 
discussion on mechanisms, there is a need to define what is meant by a mechanism in 
this study. It is important to highlight that there is no agreed definition of the mechanism 
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and that it can be understood as “a process, an outcome, or a factor” (Mayntz, 2004: 
238-239). This research does not delve into discussion on various definitions of 
mechanisms, but it justifies what kind of understanding of mechanism is pertinent in this 
particular case. Thus, mechanism is not identified as a variable (Faletti and Lynch, 2009: 
1145), but as “micro-level causal link between macro-level variable A and macro-level 
variable B” (Bengtsson and Hertting, 2014: 710). Mechanism “refers to recurrent 
processes linking specified initial conditions and a specific outcome” (Mayntz, 2004: 
241). Such understanding of a mechanism is dictated by the methods used to find the 
answer to the research question. Namely, because this study uses process tracing as a 
method to explore the causes and the mechanisms that account for immigration policy 
change, it understands a mechanism as a causal pathway (Gerring, 2008: 178; 
Bengtsson and Hertting, 2014: 4-5). Process tracing interprets mechanisms as a 
process, an action, because it is about figuring out “who knew what, when, and what 
they did in response” (Bennett, 2010: 209). As Mayntz (2004: 241) underlines: 
“mechanisms state how, by what intermediate steps, a certain outcome follows from a 
set of initial conditions”. Hence, this study follows the approach of understanding 
mechanisms as causal paths or processes that explain certain outcomes. 
 
It should also be noted that this study follows the probabilistic understanding of a 
mechanism, which means that it does not always operate the same, but can work 
differently, depending on the context. While some (Mahoney, 2001: 580-581) postulate 
that “the mechanism is sufficient to produce the outcome of interest”, following a 
deterministic approach for understanding mechanisms, others (Falletti and Lynch, 2009: 
1144) argue that the relationship between causal mechanisms and context is important 
in explaining the change because “credible casual social scientific explanation can occur 
if and only if researchers are attentive to the interaction between causal mechanisms 
and the context in which they operate. Thus, Faletti and Lynch (2009) believe that context 
influences the operation of mechanism. Only probabilistic understanding of the nature of 
a mechanism is compatible with process tracing method (Beach and Pedersen, 2013). 
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As a mechanism constitutes the link between the context and the outcome, it helps to 
uncover the causal chain that explains how this change was produced. It is also 
important to note that “a mechanism-based explanation describes the causal process 
selectively. It does not aim at an exhaustive account of all details but seeks to capture 
the crucial elements of the process by abstracting away the irrelevant details” (Hedström 
and Ylikoski, 2010: 53). Thus, these causal processes are described in relative 
subsections in chapters four, five and six, which taken together form a casual 
mechanism.  
 
When it comes to making causal inferences and generalising, Faletti and Lynch (2009: 
1144) postulate that a probabilistic standpoint helps to make stronger causal inferences 
than a deterministic one, by stressing the importance of appropriately contextualising the 
mechanisms to avoid flawed causal inferences. Bengtsson and Herrting (2014: 6) agree 
with them, arguing that: “claiming determinacy in individual case ex post does not help 
us in generalising to other cases”. From probabilistic point of view, the operation of a 
mechanism cannot be pre-determined, meaning that we do not know how a mechanism 
will work in a given situation. Therefore, the findings of this research allow to generalise 
causal mechanisms, but the outcome that they produce is based on the context in which 
mechanisms operate. This study contributes to the identification of specific mechanisms 
that are associated with party policy change. Having discussed the ontological properties 
of a mechanism, the chapter proceeds with examination of some examples of causal 
mechanisms that are derived from the literature on causal mechanisms and that can be 
pertinent for explaining party policy change. As the end product of process tracing is the 
production of causal chain, which contains different causes and mechanisms that can 
only be discovered in the process of tracing, all possible causal mechanisms cannot be 
theorised beforehand, therefore, the chapter draws only onto framing. More causal 
mechanisms are unveiled in case study chapters: chapters four, five and six.  
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Framing 
The concept of ‘frame’ originates from the work of Goffman (1974) and was later 
developed by Snow and Benford (1992: 137), who define a frame as an “interpretative 
schemata that simplifies and condenses the ‘world out there’ by selectively punctuating 
and encoding objects, situations, events, experiences, and sequences of action within 
one’s present or past environment”. In other words, framing is the way political parties 
present their policy positions and how they frame immigration through the lens of external 
factors to justify their immigration policy choices. As Rydgren (2005: 426) pinpoints 
frames “function as modes of attribution and articulation. They attribute blame for 
perceived social problems by identifying individuals, social groups or structures that are 
believed to have caused the problem in question (diagnostic framing); they also suggest 
a general line of action (prognostic framing)”. However, political parties do not adopt 
frames randomly, they are careful in selecting which to choose because they are seeking 
to adopt the frame that will resonate with a large number of voters in order to attract new 
voters and prevent the old electorate from alienating. Some prominent researchers 
(Kitschelt, 1995; Ignazi, 1996, Rydgren, 2003) posited that in the past the politicization 
of immigration played a role in decreasing the salience of frames connected to economic 
cleavages and contributed to the increased salience of sociocultural cleavages. This 
research argues that right-wing parties in power in three country cases did not increase 
the salience of one issue over another, rather they reframed the socio-cultural frame 
through the lens of the economic one. In a way immigration issue became surrounded 
by so-called ‘welfare chauvinism’, which boils down to the support for the welfare state, 
that is only available to nationals, denying access to foreigners (Andersen and Bjørklund, 
1990; Alesina and Glaeser, 2004; Crepaz and Reagan, 2009), advocating that “social 
policy should be directly linked with an ethnic and sovereign nation state” (Nordensvard 
and Ketola 2014: 16), meaning that access to social services should be based upon the 
nationality rather than just residency requirement. The thesis demonstrates that such 
framing of immigration through social welfare lens became popular with the right-wing 
parties because of the pressure from the radical right parties (Schumacher and van 
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Kersbergen, 2014: 2). Reframing of the welfare discourse in a nationalist way and 
changing nature of immigration policies present a danger for immigrants by creating 
further tension in a society, contributing to increasing xenophobia. 
 
This chapter presented a theoretical framework of the thesis by examining theories of 
party policy change that focus on external factors that lead political parties to alter their 
policy positions. It highlighted that for answering posed research questions, structural 
explanations provide a more complete insight, although agency related explanations are 
not completely disregarded. The chapter also operationalised some of vague exogenous 
factors into more specific variables. It described how POS theory is suitable for 
explaining the degree of variation in the outcome in three cases. The chapter concluded 
with the examination of theories on causal mechanisms and their understanding in this 
research. The next chapter proceeds with methodological discussion, drawing on 
methods, different sources of data, data collection and data analysis techniques and 
ethical considerations. It is the last introductory chapter before the empirical discussion 
on cases starts.   
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Chapter 3  
Methods  
 
This chapter sets out the methodological framework that was selected to find the 
answers to the research question on why conservative parties change their immigration 
policies and what are the mechanisms responsible for that. First, it examines the case 
study approach as the most suitable one for this research, by highlighting its strengths. 
It points to the added value of the comparative case study design for providing 
explanations of why parties change their immigration policies. Second, the chapter 
proceeds by describing different types of data used in the research, the process of data 
collection in three countries and the data analysis technique. Third, it elaborates on 
ethical issues considered before data collection took place. Finally, the chapter finishes 
with an examination of process tracing as a method of within case analysis, arguing that 
it is the only possible method that allows for the exploration of causal mechanisms in 
three cases. 
 
 
3.1. Case-study method 
The case study method is chosen as a methodology for this research as it gives the 
strongest test to the hypotheses as to why particular decisions have been taken by right-
wing parties in power because it allows to investigate the question in the context, which 
is crucial in explaining the outcome. Furthermore, case studies are central to explaining 
decision-making processes, as they “illuminate a decision or sets of decisions: why they 
were taken, how they were implemented, and with what result” (Schramm, 1971 cited in 
Yin, 2003: 12). Context, which is given a crucial examination in case study research is 
important in explaining why certain decisions are made (Hall, 2003). As this research 
explains the immigration policy change from a structuralist perspective, emphasising the 
role of external factors in producing the change, the case study method permits to 
examine the context in which political parties operate and the influence of that context 
on party’s immigration stance and decisions to change it. Following Yin (2003: 13), a 
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case study method is used when the researcher believes that contextual conditions are 
important in explaining the outcome. Furthermore, context is important for the 
establishment of the causal chain, which explains how a specific outcome occurred: 
“case study research usually relies heavily on the contextual evidence and deductive 
logic to reconstruct causality within a single case” (Gerring, 2007: 172). Context is 
operationalised through factors exogenous to a party that are derived from theories on 
party policy change, which were previously described in chapter two.  
 
As this research explains the logic of the decision-making of the right-wing parties in 
power on immigration, case study method is crucial for pointing to motivations that actors 
have, motivations that explain why do political parties change their minds.  
  
Case studies are superior to large-N studies in helping the researcher to 
understand the perceptions and motivations of important actors and to trace the 
process by which these cognitive factors form and change. (Blatter and Haverland, 
2012: 6) 
 
One of the goals of the research is to uncover those causal factors that lead to the 
change in immigration rhetoric and to the subsequent policy change of the conservative 
parties. Case study research design has an advantage as “one of the most visible and 
important contributions of case study methods has been to identify casual variables left 
out earlier in analysis” (George and Bennett, 2004: 254). Case study is also particularly 
useful for unveiling causal mechanisms through which causal factors have an influence 
on the outcomes because it allows researchers to “examine the operation of causal 
mechanism in individual cases in detail” (George and Bennet, 2004: 21). 
 
Case study requires the researcher “to collect information from multiple sources, but 
aimed at corroborating the same fact or phenomenon” (Yin, 2003: 99). It “relies on 
multiple sources of evidence, with data needed to converge in a triangulating fashion” 
(Yin, 2003: 14). Interview data are triangulated to check for corroboration of the evidence. 
Party manifestos, policy papers and other documents related to immigration policy 
change are used to triangulate the information obtained from the interviews.  
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The case study approach helps to establish the causes of certain phenomenon and aims 
to detect: “whether and how a variable mattered to the outcome, rather than at assessing 
how much it mattered” (George and Bennett, 2004: 25). In other words, the purpose of 
the research is to explore the factors that trigger the change and the mechanisms that 
account for it (George and Bennet, 2004: 31), rather than to examine whether one factor 
was more important than the other. Even though it is not the purpose of this section to 
discuss strengths and weaknesses of the case study approach and large-N studies, it is 
necessary to pinpoint how a case study approach is a more suitable method for finding 
the answer to the proposed research questions. Unlike statistical methods, case studies 
cannot determine the strength of one factor over another, but its advantage is that it is 
able to trace causal mechanisms, while statistical methods are not able to do that. They 
can only help to find the causes of certain processes, while the investigation of causal 
mechanisms is only possible with the case study research (Gerring, 2007: 44-45). Here 
the question of causality and the intersection of variables comes into play. It is argued in 
this thesis that immigration policy-making is not a result of linear causation, it is a result 
of what Ragin (1987: 23) calls ‘multiple conjunctural causation’, which means that the 
changes occur because of a combination of different factors. Thus, in chapter five it will 
be demonstrated that immigration policy change would not have occurred simply 
because one factor - the Eurozone crisis, but rather the combination of the Eurozone 
crisis with the free movement of people led to the launch of the Initiative Against Mass 
Migration by the SVP. The analysis of data demonstrates that immigration policy change 
in three cases is not always a result of linear causation, meaning that one factor or 
another is responsible for the change, but that the outcome is a result of the interaction 
of certain factors. Having stressed the importance of the case study method for 
explaining how exogenous factors lead to the change in immigration stances of the 
conservative parties, it is equally important how the change occurs, specifically, what 
causal mechanisms are responsible for the change.  
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The aim of this research is not simply to produce three different explanations on why 
right-wing parties in power changed their immigration policies, but to provide certain 
grounds for generalisation that can be applicable to the population of cases. By 
comparing the findings across three cases, the research points to the variation in right-
wing parties’ responses. Explaining this variation is in a nutshell a point of comparison 
(Ragin, 1987: 2) as by pointing out the explanation of why the variation occurs, we are 
able to provide causal inferences to other cases that share similar traits. While within-
case inferences on why the immigration policy change occurred in the UK, Switzerland 
and France are important for scholars who study these countries, the aim is to suggest 
grounds for generalisations that are important for scholars who study party policy change 
and immigration policy change in general.  
 
 
3.2. Data 
 
This section examines the data that have been used in this research, more specifically 
the data that describe the process of immigration policy change in three cases and the 
data that have been used to find the answer to the proposed research questions. 
Furthermore, it describes data collection process and data analysis technique. It explains 
how different codes were constructed and the coding process that elite interview data 
underwent. 
 
The data used in this research is both existing and newly collected. Existing data are the 
data accessible in public domain, which consists of electoral manifestos of the three 
right-wing parties and these countries’ immigration legislation and policies. The change 
in SVP’s position on immigration is evidenced by examining 2007, 2011 and 2015 federal 
elections manifestos, immigration initiatives launched by the SVP or by its national 
councillors, immigration laws and referendums. The evolution of the UK Conservative 
Party immigration stance is demonstrated with the reference to 2005, 2010, 2015 general 
election manifestos and by examination of immigration policies under 2010-2015 
Coalition government. Finally, French immigration policy change is explored through 
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Sarkozy’s immigration laws, when he was the minister for the Interior, his 2007 and 2012 
presidential programmes, integration legislation on headscarves and laws that were 
adopted under his presidency between 2007 and 2012. This constitutes the descriptive 
data, which demonstrates how immigration policy has changed in three cases and is a 
first step towards the explanation of policy change. As they do not explain the change, 
more data were generated to provide an explanation for the change. Thus, semi-
structured elite interviews were conducted in three countries to explain why did parties 
change their policies on immigration. The following subsection focuses on the process 
of data collection as elite interviews were crucial type of data that had an explanatory 
power to provide the answer to the research question on what drives the parties to 
change their policies. While, the decision to select existing data that allows to describe 
position and policy change is in partly self-explanatory, the clarification of elite interview 
data collection needs to be addressed as this type of data were the key to opening the 
black box of immigration policy-making. 
 
 
 
3.2.1 Data collection 
The choice of semi-structured elite interviews was made as this is the only way to 
understand the logic underpinning immigration policy change. Elite interviews allow us 
to establish the underlying causes of certain processes and allow to “interview first hand 
participants of the process they are investigating and obtain accounts from the direct 
witness to the events in question” (Tansey, 2007: 767). Furthermore, elite interviews help 
to uncover the real explanation(s) of certain choices because they allow “interviewers to 
probe their subjects, thus moving beyond written accounts that may often only represent 
an official version of events to gather information about the underlying context and build 
up to the actions that took place” (Tansey, 2007: 767). “[E]lite interviews offer political 
scientists a rich, cost-effective vehicle for generating unique data to investigate the 
complexities of policy and politics” (Beamer, 2002: 86). This research defined elites as 
those, who have decision-making authority and exert an influence on immigration policy-
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making. Semi-structured interviews are preferable to structured ones as they allow the 
researcher to focus on a particular topic, address specific issues and to increase cross-
case comparability of the research (Bryman, 2008: 439-440).  
 
Overall, thirty-six semi-structured elite interviews were conducted in the UK, Switzerland 
and France between October 2015 and July 2016. More precisely, twelve interviews 
were conducted in the UK, eighteen in Switzerland and six in France. As the main goal 
of the research was to understand and explain the logic underpinning conservative 
parties’ decision-making process on immigration, the interviewees were chosen by 
targeted sampling. I targeted those elites, who belonged to the conservative parties and 
those, who were part either part of the immigration policy-making process, like members 
of the Coalition government, civil servants or special advisors, and those, who exerted 
certain influence on political elites or on immigration decision-making, namely, interest 
groups. Interviewees were contacted mostly by email, sometimes via the phone and in 
person during party events. While understanding that targeted sampling can cause a 
selection bias (King et al., 1994), it is the best strategy to explain the logic of the right-
wing parties’ positions on immigration, as “certain categories of individuals may have a 
unique, different or important perspective on the phenomenon in question and their 
presence in the sample should be ensured” (Robinson, 2014: 32). Snowballing technique 
was employed at a later stage to increase the number of interviews. In Switzerland 
selection yielded good results, while in the UK and in France the response rate was 
lower, which was an obstacle to generalising data and had a potential to introduce 
“significant systemic error” (Goldstein, 2002: 669). This problem was to a certain extent 
offset by concentrating on the “degree to which non-respondents are likely to differ from 
those sampling units who are successfully contacted and interviewed” (Goldstein, 2002: 
670). Thus, many non-respondents and refusals belonged to the same cohort of 
successfully targeted interviewees. Across three cases interviews were conducted with 
conservative politicians, civil servants, ministers, members of the Coalition government, 
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special advisors, high rank officials, and pressure group representatives. All interviews 
were recorded and supplemented by the notes taken during the interview.  
 
First tranche of the interviews (twelve) was conducted in the UK between October 2015 
and February 2016. Interviewees included civil servants from the Home Office, 
Conservative Party MPs and members of the Cabinet, former secretary of state for 
Business, Innovation and Skills (Vince Cable), former special advisor to the Conservative 
minister, chair of the Migration Advisory Committee (Sir David Metcalf), pressure groups: 
Universities UK (UUK) and the Migration Watch UK (MWUK). In the UK, the majority of 
the interviewees were worried about exposing their identity. Anonymity was requested 
in nine instances and only three interviewees allowed to go public with their names. The 
response rate was quite low, with approximately one third of those, who were contacted, 
replying to the request. Most of those, who replied, agreed for an interview, while some 
refused because of the lack of time or because of the policy not to give interviews to the 
academic researchers. Some of the interviews were obtained through snowballing 
technique. Most of the interviews were conducted face to face in London and in 
Manchester, during the 2015 Conservative Party conference and two interviews were 
conducted over the phone. The average length for the UK interview ranged from forty to 
forty-five minutes to an hour. 
 
Second tranche of the interviews (eighteen) was conducted in Switzerland between 
March and April 2016, which was financially supported by an external grant from 
University Association for Contemporary European Studies (UACES). The majority of 
interviews were established before the travel to Switzerland, however three interviews 
were arranged while in Switzerland thanks to snowballing technique. In total eighteen 
interview interviews in Switzerland with the SVP national councillors (MPs), people, 
working in party secretariats, civil servants from the State Secretariat for Migration, and 
one academic took place. Interviewees in Switzerland were very forthcoming and more 
than a half of those who were contacted, agreed to contribute to the research. 
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Furthermore, all of them were fine with remaining public and were not worried about their 
anonymity. Interviews were conducted in two languages: French and English. 
Interviewees from French speaking part preferred French, while almost all of those from 
German speaking part preferred English. Interviews were longer compared to the British 
and French ones, with the average length varying between an hour and hour and a half. 
Couple of interviews lasted as long as two hours.  
 
The final tranche of interviews (six) was conducted during a two-week trip to Paris in 
June-July 2016. The cohort of interviewees included two MPs from the Republicans (Les 
Républicains), one of whom is a current French prime minister, the director of Jacque 
Chirac’s presidential campaigns, civil servants from the Ministry of The Interior and later 
the Ministry of Immigration, Integration, National Identity and Co-Development. The 
response rate was extremely low, which can partially be explained with the upcoming 
primaries that The Republicans (former UMP) at that time. The number of interviews may 
seem small, yet the discussions with other English-speaking academics, researching 
France, confirmed that, being an outsider and trying to get access to French politicians 
and French senior civil servants is extremely hard, even if the researcher speaks fluent 
French. Originally six contacts were established before coming to Paris, two of the 
interviews were then established via snowballing technique, however they cancelled at 
the same day of the interview. Even though the number is smaller than in Swiss or British 
case, most of the interviews were conducted with the people directly involved and 
responsible for immigration policy making under Sarkozy’s term as a president, which 
offsets the quantity of the interviews. All interviews were conducted face to face, in 
French and only two of the interviewees requested anonymity. The average length for 
the French interview varied from forty to fifty minutes. All the interviews are broken down 
in the table below.  
 
The fieldwork in the UK, Switzerland and France allowed me to gather necessary data 
by conducting the interviews for testing the hypotheses regarding the factors that lead to 
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the immigration policy change in those countries. Overall, the fieldwork in Switzerland 
and the UK has been successful in terms of getting in touch with the interviewees, while 
in France, the success was hindered by the low response rate. I briefly present some 
observations from conducting fieldwork in three countries, which might be useful for 
researchers working on similar topics in these three countries. Sketching out the 
peculiarities of political cultures in three cases can provide an insight into overcoming 
obstacles in getting access to elites and conducting interviews in different languages. In 
the UK, the low response rate was offset by the direct recruitment of the interviewees in 
person, during the Conservative Party conference in Manchester and by networking. UK 
Conservative Party conference was a useful tool in getting access to politicians, with 
some of the interviews established during the conference. Connections and knowing the 
right people also worked well in the UK case because it yielded interviews with the 
people, who were crucial in providing information about Conservative Party’s approach 
to immigration. In Switzerland, there was no problem with a low response rate as Swiss 
politicians were very forthcoming and a majority of them agreed for an interview. Some 
interviews were also established through snowballing technique, which also proved 
useful and successful. The language could be a definitive barrier to speaking to Swiss 
politicians from the French part, as most of them would not speak English or German, 
therefore there is a need to be fluent in French. The situation was better with the 
politicians from the German speaking part, as most of them would speak English or 
French. One could suggest that the forthcoming character of Swiss politicians has 
something to do with direct democracy and openness of Swiss politicians to the people. 
Finally, the success of getting a high number of interviews in France was hindered partly 
because the Republicans were in the middle of primaries for the 2017 presidential 
election and were not particularly interested in giving interviews to academic 
researchers. However targeted sampling successfully worked with French senior civil 
servants, while it failed with French politicians. Overall, getting interviews in France 
presented a bigger challenge than in the UK or Switzerland, even with researcher’s 
fluency in French.  
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Table 1: Location and profession of interviewees 
Category Conservative 
Politicians
Civil 
Servants
Coalition 
Members
Pressure Group 
Representatives 
Academics 
UK 4 4 1 3 - 
Switzerland 14 3 - - 1 
France 2 4 - - - 
 
3.2.2 Ethical considerations 
Before conducting the fieldwork, I ensured that my interviewees understood the purpose 
of the research, that their privacy is respected and that their participation in the interviews 
would not harm their careers. During first email contact, the interviewees were supplied 
with the participant information sheet (See Appendix A), which described the purpose of 
the research, why they were selected and what was expected from them if they agree 
for an interview. Before starting the interview, the interviewee was asked to sign a 
consent form (See Appendix B), which indicated that their anonymity will be assured. 
However, in some cases, when an interviewee did not object for their name to be 
revealed, a note was made on the consent form that an interviewee agreed to wave the 
anonymity. All emails, interviews and transcriptions are stored in the password-secured 
computer. In terms of harm to participant, it is unlikely that the questions that were asked 
during the interview had a sensitive impact on interviewees as it directly related to their 
work. Information coming from a politician or policy-maker could be damaging for his or 
her careers, as might any public expression of views that deviate from the official party 
line. At the start of each interview, interviewees were told that they can withdraw from an 
interview without any reason and that they do not need to provide a reason if they wish 
to do so with all the data collected up to the point destroyed and not used in the research.  
 
 
3.2.3 Data analysis 
This research uses thematic approach to analysing semi-structured elite interviews, 
which requires data coding. Coding helps to analyse big chunks of data and “attributes 
interpreted meaning to each individual datum for later purposes of pattern detection, 
categorization, theory building, and other analytic processes” (Saldaña, 2013: 4). Coding 
is a useful tool for data analysis because it “enables researchers quickly to retrieve and 
collect together all the text and other data that they have associated with some thematic 
 63 
idea” (Gibbs, 2014: 283). Interview data were analysed in two stages, using Saldaña 
(2013) coding approach, with the first stage being descriptive and the second one – 
analytical. First cycle was the initial coding of data, that enabled the organization of data 
into specific themes, while the second cycle of coding allowed to develop categories, 
patterns from the first cycle (Saldaña, 2013: 14, 207).  
 
Descriptive coding method was used as a first coding cycle in order “to build a foundation 
for future coding cycles” Saldaña (2009: 66). Initially, bits of interview data, usually, 
passages, were attributed a specific theme (Saldaña, 2013: 88; DeCuir-Gunby et al., 
2011: 137), which constituted first cycle codes that were “identifications of the topic, not 
abbreviation of the content” (Tesch, 1990: 119). Therefore, the code was attributed not 
based on the content of the passage, but based on the specific theme, which means that 
one code was attributed to the content of a particular topic that was expressed in different 
ways. Thus, the first cycle codes were the independent variables, or, in other words, 
exogenous factors specified in theoretical framework that influence parties’ policies. 
Shifts in public opinion, party competition on the right (where applicable), perceived 
economic and perceived identity concerns, global financial crisis and the effects of the 
EU integration were first level codes that allowed to evidence the change in parties’ 
immigration policies. Also, some of the codes were data driven. While in Switzerland and 
in France there were no data-driven codes, in the UK there were two: the Home Office’s 
ideological dogmatism and influence of interest groups. While theories on party policy 
change did not account for these variables, the analysis of the interview data 
demonstrated that some of the responses did not fall within any theory-driven codes, but 
was an important factor that led the UK Conservative Party to change its immigration 
policy. Quotes with similar themes were put together, which eventually led to the creation 
of two new codes.  Finally, the first level of coding also searched for the codes that 
described the mechanisms that accounted for immigration position and policy change. 
In each of the country cases there was only one theory-driven code: framing and during 
the first cycle of coding I searched for the ways political parties described immigration 
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and the ways they proposed to deal with the issue. Those passages from the interviews 
were taken and attributed to the framing mechanism code. However, as the theory did 
not specify other mechanisms that account for the policy change, other mechanism 
codes were data-driven. In each of the cases, the analysis of elite interviews identified 
one more mechanism that was responsible for immigration policy change.  
 
 
This descriptive coding is an essential step for a second cycle coding, which deals with 
the interpretation and analysis (Saldaña, 2013: 89, Wolcott, 1994: 55). Among different 
second-level coding techniques, this research adopted pattern coding for the second 
cycle as it “is appropriate for the search of rules, causes and explanations in the data” 
(Saldaña, 2009: 152). Through the first cycle of coding evidence of immigration position 
and policy change was generated, while the second cycle of coding helped to explain 
the causes and mechanisms that led to the immigration policy change of conservative 
parties. Thus, second cycle of coding led to the creation of more sub-codes, which 
explained more specifically how certain factors led to the immigration policy change. For 
instance, one of the first cycle codes, the effects of the EU integration, was broken down 
into further codes (code-tree): the necessity of cohesion between the EU law and 
national laws and the effects of the free movement of people or anxieties about EU 
external border. This second level coding allowed to search for explanations why and 
how this particular variable was responsible for influencing right-wing parties’ positions 
on immigration.  
 
Coding is an indispensable tool not only for theory testing, but also for theory 
development (DeCuir-Gunby et al., 2011: 138). It is important to note that codes were 
generated differently: some of the codes were developed from the theory (Boyatzis, 
1998: 33), while other codes were data-driven, meaning that they were not specified by 
the theory, but emerged from the data. A deductive approach was taken to build the 
codes, however, after careful examination of data, it was discovered that theory-driven 
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codes did not account for all possible explanations of immigration position change, 
therefore some of the codes were built inductively, from raw data. Data-driven codes are 
crucial for enriching theories, in this research - the explanations why do parties change 
their policies, and their construction requires constant re-examination of the raw data 
(DeCuir-Gunby et al., 2011: 138). In this research data-driven codes were used to 
complement the existing theories of party policy change by enabling to find additional 
causes that influence party’s position(s) on immigration policy. NVivo software was used 
to analyse the interview data and develop first and second cycle codes. The codebook 
to the UK case is attached in the Appendix 4 of the thesis, which demonstrates the variety 
of codes and under which criteria specific passages of the elite interview data were 
attributed to the first-level codes. The UK case codebook serves as example, while first-
level coding was similar in the other two cases, as it was mostly based on theoretical 
scholarship on party policy change.  
 
 
 
 
 
3.3 Process tracing  
Two reasons underpinned the selection of process tracing as a method of within-case 
analysis. First, process tracing views context as crucial in explaining the outcome and, 
second, it permits to explore causal mechanisms that account for policy change. As this 
research is not interested in measuring causal effects of the independent variable on the 
dependent variable, meaning how the dependent variable (immigration policy change) 
will shift if the value of the independent variable(s) changes, process tracing is 
particularly useful because it concentrates on tracing what has caused a certain outcome 
and how. The aim of process tracing is to uncover is to identify the causal chain and 
causal mechanism (George and Bennett, 2004: 206). Process tracing is chosen as one 
of the three within-case methods (Blatter and Haverland, 2012: 1) because it allows to 
unveil causal mechanisms (Beach and Pedersen, 2013; Beach and Pedersen, 2016, 
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which are central to the process of change and ‘is a key technique for capturing causal 
mechanisms in action (Bennet and Checkel, 2015: 9). Mechanisms uncover how exactly 
causal factors influenced the outcome: how something has changed. The essence of 
process tracing is ‘the analysis of evidence on processes, sequences, and conjunctures 
of events within a case for the purposes of either developing or testing theories about 
causal mechanisms that might causally explain the case (Bennett and Checkel, 2015: 
7). As this research does not only explain what caused right-wing parties in power to 
change their immigration stances between 2002 and 2015, but also to address the 
question of how it happened, process tracing is the best within-case method because it 
searches for evidence about causal mechanisms in temporal sequence (Blatter and 
Blume, 2008: 33). The goal is to document and explain the mechanisms through which 
conservative parties in the UK, Switzerland and France have adopted more restrictive 
immigration positions, which subsequently led to immigration policy change. The aim is 
to explain how these causes lead to specific outcomes because causes per se are not 
sufficient; there needs to be a mechanism through which the causal energy is transmitted 
(Goertz and Mahoney, 2012: 102). Causal mechanisms are defined as “ultimately 
unobservable physical, social, or psychological processes through which agents with 
causal capacities operate, but only in specific context or conditions, to transfer energy, 
information, or matter to other entities” (George and Bennett, 2004: 137). Following the 
logic of George and Bennet (2004: 21), who note that “mechanisms operate only under 
certain conditions”, this research traces the conditions necessary for activation of a 
mechanism. Without getting into too much unnecessary detail about the nature of causal 
mechanisms, it should be said that this research views causal mechanisms from the 
“probabilistic understanding of causality” (Trampusch and Palier, 2016: 442; Bennett and 
Checkel, 2015: 10-11). It means that the outcome of the mechanism “cannot be 
determined a priori by knowing the type of the mechanism that is at work” (Falletti and 
Lynch, 2009: 1147). Therefore, one mechanism would not necessarily lead to the same 
outcome in two cases, because the operation of the mechanism is dependent on the 
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context. This makes mechanisms generalisable across cases, but the importance of the 
contextual condition cannot be disregarded in explaining the outcome.  
 
Process tracing is chosen as a within-case study methods as it “is an indispensable tool 
for causal inference” (Rohfling, 2012: 167). By linking causes of a process to its outcome, 
causal inferences are created. The construction of a causal chain is important in 
evidencing and explaining how the outcome has occurred as process tracing has causal 
and explanatory leverage only when causal chain is constructed (Waldner, 2015: 128). 
Evidence of every step in the hypothesised causal chain needs to be found and thick 
description is crucial here because the failure to describe each step in the causal chain 
leads to the failure in the overall analysis (Collier, 2011: 823) and to the lack of 
“completeness standard” (Waldner, 2015: 128). As mechanisms operate through 
individuals or actors (Beach and Pedersen, 2013), the specification of actors is needed 
to explain the activity that lies in the heart of the mechanism. Contextualising the data is 
crucial in process tracing: “we must be able to characterize key steps in the process, 
which in turn permits good analysis of change and sequence” (Collier, 2011: 824). The 
goal of process tracing is to derive causal process observations (CPOs) at the most 
micro-level possible, at the level of individual actors or groups, in this case – at the level 
of individuals: Conservative MPs, civil servants, members of the Coalition government, 
pressure groups).  
 
As process tracing is about finding the “information about perceptions and motivations 
of actors” (Blatter and Blume, 2008: 32), one should consider their interests, power and 
resources is needed (González-Ocantos, 2016). In the process of assessing the data 
(semi-structured elite interviews), four things are evaluated in tracing the logic of 
immigration position change: interests of the actors, context in which they operate, bias 
(how likely that the same things would be obtained from different types of sources) and 
saturation (how much more inferential leverage is received from this extra piece given 
the number and types of sources already consulted) (González-Ocantos, 2016). In order 
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to establish descriptive and causal inference, diagnostic evidence needs to be found 
(Collier, 2011: 824). Evidence that is highly associated with a given hypothesis is crucial 
for establishing causal leverage. This research looks for the evidence underpinning the 
logic of immigration position change in semi-structured elite interviews, “uncovering the 
stimuli of decision-making” (Trampusch and Palier, 2016: 438). Using process tracing, 
this research explains the logic of conservative parties with regard to their positions on 
immigration.   
 
Because process tracing allows to draw inferences from within-case analysis, the 
findings are generalised in a way, which Bennett and George (2004) call “contingent 
generalization”. 
The findings from process tracing are not used to draw conclusions for a population 
of cases but for a set of potential causal configurations […] The function of case 
studies here is mainly to show exactly whether and how a specific configuration of 
causal factors […] or whether and how a specific mechanism leads to a specific 
outcome. Additional case studies would not strive to prove that this causal 
configuration also works within other cases, but they would try to find out whether 
other combinations of causal factors can also lead to the same or similar outcome. 
(Blatter and Blume, 2008: 29). 
 
The findings of this research are not generalisable to other cases, where right-wing 
parties in power changed their immigration stances in a more restrictive direction, but 
they could be extrapolated to the cases, where similar causal configuration(s) produce 
the same outcome in other cases. Hence, the focus of contingent generalisation is on 
the combination of the operation of exogenous factors in different cases rather than on 
demonstration that these factors lead to a similar outcome in other cases, where parties 
adopted more restrictive immigration stance.  
 
As process tracing is only able to produce within-case inferences, establishing a causal 
chain in a particular case, it is unable to yield cross-case inferences, which are important 
for generalisation of the findings. These limitations of process tracing with regard to 
generalisation of causes and mechanisms of immigration policy change can be 
overcome by comparison. Comparison gives ground to make certain suggestions about 
 69 
generalisations. Unlike statistical research, which enables to make claims about 
generalisation of findings to other cases, qualitative research gives grounds to suppose 
that findings can be generalised, comparing them and examining the contexts in which 
the outcomes occur. The generalisation of mechanisms is possible across cases, but the 
importance of the context should be highlighted as the same mechanism is capable of 
producing different outcomes, depending on the context in which it operates (Faletti and 
Lynch, 2009: 1161). This research aims to add to the existing theories on party policy 
change as process tracing is an indispensable tool for theory building. As highlighted by 
George and Bennett (2004: 217): “process tracing of cases relevant to the theory can 
identify causal processes not yet identified by the theory”. Apart from testing existing 
theories of party policy change, this research uncovers those causal factors and unveils 
those causal mechanisms that have not been theorised previously.   
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Chapter 4  
From detoxification strategy back to ‘nasty party’: explaining the Conservative’s 
turn on immigration between 2005 and 2015 
 
4.1 Introduction  
Since 2005, the Conservative Party has performed a complete U-turn in its immigration 
policy. When David Cameron became leader of the Conservative Party in 2005, he came 
in on a platform of ‘detoxification’, pledging to change the image of the Conservatives as 
the ‘nasty’ party (Partos and Bale, 2015: 2). Cameron’s new approach aimed to expand 
the electoral bases of the Conservative Party to include liberal voters (Gruber and Bale, 
2014: 242). In 2007, after two years of silence on immigration, Cameron, during the 
Conservative Party conference gave a speech on ‘population pressure’, voicing 
concerns over immigration (BBC, 2007), indicating that immigration was becoming a 
salient issue for the party, which coincided with the effects of 2004 EU enlargement, 
when the British labour market was opened to residents of the new members states. As 
soon as the Conservatives returned to government in 2010 and formed a coalition with 
the Liberal Democrats, UK immigration policy underwent a major transformation, toward 
tighter restrictions, despite the Liberal Democrats’ more pro-immigration position. This 
chapter explains this stark change in policy and rhetoric despite the party’s original 
pledge to detoxify its ‘nasty’ image and to identify the mechanisms that accounted for 
the change.  
 
Between 2002 and 2015 immigration has become a salient issue that has received the 
attention of parties on both ends of ideological spectrum, and both mainstream and niche 
parties. The nature of the debate around immigration has changed a great deal, partly 
due to the electoral rise of radical right parties, which have played a major role in 
politicising immigration (Schierup et al., 2006: 97). Yet radical right parties were not the 
only ones who increased the salience of immigration as a policy issue. As Mudde (2012: 
12) pinpoints, right-wing parties in power have greater prominence as they are often 
responsible for immigration policy-making. Therefore, it is crucial to shift the attention to 
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right-wing parties because of their policy importance (Bale 2008: 317). The aim of this 
chapter is to explain the changing immigration stance of the Conservative Party both in 
opposition and under the Coalition government.  
 
This chapter sheds the light on the drivers of the Conservatives’ shift on immigration and 
on the mechanisms that have accounted for this policy change. It explains how UK 
immigration policy has become numbers driven and restrictive by addressing the role of 
the Conservative Party in immigration policy-making under the Coalition government, but 
also briefly examines the change in Conservative's stance on immigration preceding the 
Coalition. The immigration rhetoric captured in this research is further reflected in the 
Brexit debate that has followed. The timeframe of this research does not include Brexit, 
but the examination of the Conservative’s Party changing stance on immigration is useful 
for understanding the Brexit debate, where immigration has been a defining theme. The 
chapter tests theories of party policy change, discussed in chapter two of this thesis, by 
examining whether these factors influenced the Conservative’s immigration policy stance 
between 2005 and 2015. It also operationalises other crucial changes in the social, 
political and economic environment (Fagerholm, 2015: 1), not elaborated by these 
theories, but that have affected the evolution of the British immigration policy. By 
recognising the importance of structural factors in explaining party position change, the 
chapter does not disregard the role of the agency, as the agency of political parties is 
crucial in choosing which factors to take into account in its decision-making process. 
Furthermore, it is demonstrated that in case of the UK immigration policy, certain agentic 
factors were paramount in producing the change.  
 
4.1.1 Argument 
The argument put forth is stemming from hypotheses set in chapter two is that the 
Conservative’s rhetoric on immigration during opposition and the subsequent 
immigration policy change under the Coalition government became restrictive and 
number driven as a response to a number of factors: increasingly negative public 
attitudes toward the issue, UKIP’s electoral rise, the effects of EU integration, perceived 
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economic and identity anxieties of the public about migration. Furthermore, the 
immigration stance of the Conservative Party toughened as a consequence of their 
policy of austerity which allowed the party to frame immigration through a social welfare 
lens. These hypotheses are tested with the elite interview data.  
 
4.1.2 Plan of the Chapter  
The chapter is laid out as follows. The second section gives a brief review on the 
evolution of the UK immigration policy since the Second World War and illustrates the 
change in Conservative’s discourse on immigration by examining 2005, 2010 and 2015 
party manifestos and explores immigration policy change under the Coalition 
government. It proceeds with analysis of the logic of change by shedding the light on the 
causal factors that led the Conservatives to change their immigration stance. Section 
four proceeds with analysis of the logic of the change, namely the discussion of causal 
factors that led the Conservatives to change their approach on immigration. The fifth 
section explains how this change has occurred, by elucidating the mechanisms that 
accounted for the change. The final section synthesises the core findings on causes and 
mechanisms and presents the complete account of the causal chain, which uncovers the 
logic of the Conservative’s transformation on immigration and subsequent UK 
immigration policy change. The chapter concludes with the importance of structural 
explanations for influencing the party’s decision-making, while accounting for the 
significance of agency in activating the mechanisms responsible for the change. 
 
 
4.2 Context  
British immigration policy has undergone major transformations since the end of the 
Second World War. In the aftermath of the War, Britain needed foreign labour to meet 
the demands of the economy and citizens of the British colonies had unrestricted rights 
to move and live in the UK until 1962 (Hansen, 2014: 201). However, this liberalised 
regime ended in 1962, when the British government introduced a work permit system for 
the Commonwealth citizens, which lasted until 1971 (Hansen, 2014: 201). The economic 
crisis of the 1970s shifted the Conservative (the Thatcher and Major) governments’ 
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approach towards a more restrictive immigration policy and towards the integration of 
immigrants that were already in the UK (Ford et al., 2015: 1402). During Thatcher’s era, 
immigration was under tight control, which was evidenced by the number of work permits 
granted between 1973 and 1989: the number of permits issued per year varied between 
10,000 and 20,000 (Wright, 2010: 49). However, with the arrival of Labour government 
there has been a change towards a more open immigration policy: “Labour has 
introduced a number of measures to facilitate the entry of migrant workers, particularly 
from 2001, that have comprehensively changed policy and marked a decisive break with 
the previous model” (Somerville, 2007: 29).  
 
The major shift in British immigration policy happened during the thirteen years of the 
New Labour government. However, the changes did not take place during Blair’s first 
term, with the changes taking place mostly during the second, between 2001 and 2005 
(Cordenstine and Hamshire, 2014: 275, 278). Blair’s government encouraged economic 
immigration, including both skilled and unskilled. 
 
Under Labour […] Britain’s economic immigration policy was transformed from a 
system underpinned by restriction to one of the most expansive in Europe: work 
permit criteria were relaxed, schemes such as the Working Holidaymakers 
programme and the Seasonal Agricultural Working Scheme (SAWS) were 
expanded, new highly skilled migrant worker schemes were launched and 2005 
saw the introduction of a new points-based systems (PBS) modelled on the settler 
societies of Australia and Canada (Cordenstine, 2015: 1434) 
 
The relaxation of immigration policies under the Labour government also included the 
decision not to impose transnational controls on the new EU member states during the 
2004 Eastern enlargement (Geddes, 2014) because of the predictions that immigration 
from these countries would be at the level between 5, 000 to 13, 000 a year (Cordenstine, 
2017: 180, Dustmann et al., 2005). Labour’s liberal immigration stance led to the 
increase in public concern over immigration and led to the alienation of Labour voters 
during 2010 general election (Carey and Gedes, 2010; Cordenstine, 2015: 1433; Bale 
2014). Now the chapter proceeds with the presentation of the Conservative Party 
position on immigration since 2005, when David Cameron became leader of the party 
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and indicated a fresh approach to immigration. Then, it pinpoints the changing nature of 
the Conservatives’ immigration stance before the 2010 general election and during the 
Coalition government.  
  
4.3 Conservatives’ immigration stance in opposition and under the Coalition 
government 
Before proceeding with the explanation of the causes and mechanisms that accounted 
for the immigration position and policy change of the Conservative Party, it needs to be 
demonstrated how it has changed and what are the peculiarities of the UK context, when 
it comes to immigration and the Conservative Party. Therefore, this section has two 
goals. The first goal is to discuss the context of the UK immigration debate with a 
particular emphasis on the Conservative Party. The second aim is to evidence how the 
Conservative’s Party approach has evolved from avoiding immigration as a core issue 
up to 2007 to increasingly restrictive approach on immigration under the Coalition 
government, including changes to family, labour and student migration. It examines 
Conservative Party manifestos and shows which transformations UK immigration policy 
underwent under the Coalition government. The Conservative’s position on immigration 
while in the opposition (2005-2010) was defined by examining relevant parts of general 
election manifestos, while from 2010 onwards, when the party got back to government, 
their positions, were also explored through policy framework of the Coalition government, 
which is given particular attention because of its importance in terms of policymaking.  
 
 
4.3.1 Conservative Party manifestos in opposition  
This subsection gives a brief overview of the Conservative Party positions in 
chronological order, presented in their manifestos for General Elections 2005-2015 and 
the evolution of the British immigration policy under the Coalition. Under the leadership 
of Michael Howard, who led the party to the 2005 general election, the Conservative’s 
approach to immigration was characterised by the infamous phrase: “Are you thinking, 
what we’re thinking? It’s not racist to impose limits on immigration” (The Conservative 
Party, 2005: 1; 17-18). In this manifesto, the Conservative Party proposed the 
introduction of a points-based system for work migration and set an annual cap for non-
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EU migration. The manifesto also recognised the importance of public opinion in 
determining the scope of further immigration. Discourse around immigration started to 
be interconnected with welfare, namely issues around the National Health Service 
(NHS). The manifesto underlined that:  
 
We will introduce health checks for immigrants in order to curb the spread of 
diseases such as TB and to protect access to our NHS. It is, after all, a national 
service, not a world health service. People coming to Britain from outside of the 
EU will be required to undergo a full medical test. And anyone settling permanently 
here from outside the EU will have to demonstrate that they have an acceptable 
standard of health and that they are unlikely to impose any significant costs or 
demands on Britain’s health system. (The Conservative Party, 2005: 13).  
 
As the party lost the 2005 General Election, it was clear that the slogan of the 
Conservative’s manifesto ‘Are you thinking what we’re thinking?’ did not reflect public 
opinion and that the party needed to come up with a new strategy to broaden its 
electorate. With the election of David Cameron as the new leader of the Conservatives 
in 2005, the party had chosen to soften its rhetoric on immigration as it wanted to 
increase its voter support and attract more moderate voters. As mentioned previously, 
the party did not focus on immigration before 2007, but the closer it got to the General 
Election, the approach of the Conservative Party has changed and the 2010 manifesto 
demonstrates that the rhetoric has become more restrictive. The manifesto pledges on 
immigration suggested setting up a cap for the number of immigrants coming to the 
country, by introducing a cap of “tens of thousands, not hundreds of thousands… and 
limiting access only to those who will bring the most value to the British economy” (The 
Conservative Party, 2010: 21). Recognising that the failure of the Labour government to 
introduce transitional controls for Eastern European countries that joined the EU in 2004, 
the Conservatives insisted in the application of ‘transitional controls as a matter of course 
in the future for all new EU member states’ (The Conservative Party, 2010: 21). 
Furthermore, in order to achieve the net migration target of tens of thousands, the party 
proposed to introduce bonds that overseas students pay when they start their degree, a 
bond that will be returned to a student upon the completion of degree and upon departure 
(The Conservative Party, 2010: 21). Finally, in order to apply for a work permit or a new 
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course, students need to go back to their country of origin to reapply and they cannot 
automatically switch inside the UK (The Conservative Party, 2010: 21). Such measures 
targeted reducing numbers of students coming to study to the UK and were intended to 
prevent students from getting access to the British labour market.  
 
4.3.2 Conservative Party’s immigration position in the Coalition government 
Immigration underwent a major transformation over the five-year period of the Coalition 
government. Different pillars of immigration policy, including students, work and family, 
were affected. Student migration had been tightened, when in 2012 home secretary 
Theresa May announced cancellation of the post-study work visa for students, which 
curtailed their right to work in the UK for two years after graduating (Home Office, 2011). 
In order to reduce family migration, in summer 2012, the Home Office introduced a 
financial requirement for British citizens and residents, whose immediate family 
members want to join them in the UK for residency purposes (Home Office, 2014; Home 
Office, 2017). According to the new rules, an £18,600 threshold was put in place, 
meaning British citizens, who want to bring their non-EU family member into the country 
need to earn more than the above-mentioned income threshold per year. At that time, 
immigration minister James Brokenshire commented: “We welcome those who wish to 
make a life in the UK with their family, work hard and make a contribution, but family life 
must not be established in the UK at the taxpayer's expense and family migrants must 
be able to integrate” (Home Office, 2014). Despite the attempts to challenge this 
decision, the Royal Court of Justice rejected the appeal against the Home Office and 
therefore justified the financial threshold of £18,600 as legitimate (Travis, 2014). Work 
migration was not an exception and this route was also affected by the introduction of 
quota and income thresholds for highly skilled migrants from non-EU countries. Thus, a 
limit of 20, 700 people per year for TIER 2 General workers was introduced in 2011, 
while intracompany transfers were not limited by the numbers of people coming in, but 
by minimum pay thresholds, which were set at £24, 000 for those coming under a year 
and £40, 000 for those coming for more than one year (Metcalf, 2013).   
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As the Coalition government could not limit EU migration in terms of numbers because 
of the free movement of persons, it came up with a different route to discourage EU 
immigration to the UK. Thus, immigration became intertwined with welfare issues though 
the change of welfare rules for the EU migrants. The Department for Work and Pensions’ 
new rules were introduced to limit migrant access to out-of-work benefits.  
 
From 1 of July 2014, jobseekers arriving in the UK will need to live in the country 
for three months in order to claim Child Benefit and Child Tax Credit. Migrant 
jobseekers already face a three-month wait before they can claim Jobseeker’s 
Allowance (JSA)’. Furthermore, ‘after 3 months migrants will also-have to take a 
stronger, more robust Habitual Residence Test if they want to claim income-based 
JSA; if they meet the conditions for entitlement, EEA jobseekers will only be able 
to get JSA, Child Benefit and Child Tax Credit for 6 months - after 6 months, only 
those who have a job offer or compelling evidence that they have a genuine chance 
of finding work will be able to continue claiming, and then only for a short period. 
(UK Government, 2014a).   
 
The Coalition government redefined access to benefits from universal to those based on 
the residency period in the UK and on the employment status of an EU citizen. 
Immigration was reframed through a social welfare lens, meaning that the new rules put 
in place were aiming to make the country less attractive for potential migrants and 
subsequently reduce net migration levels. In addition to restricting out-of-work benefits 
for EU and EEA jobseekers, the government announced that starting from April 2014 all 
EU jobseekers will no longer be able to claim Housing Benefit, apart from those EU 
nationals that are self-employed or in employment (UK Government, 2014b). Finally, just 
in a month before the 2015 general election, on the 6th of April 2015, the Coalition 
government introduced the so-called NHS surcharge, which required that non-EEA 
nationals, coming to reside in the UK for more than six months should pay a ‘health 
surcharge’ to get access to the NHS (UK Government, 2015). The surcharge was also 
applicable to those non-EEA nationals already in the UK, who wish to apply to prolong 
their stay. The surcharge was to be paid for the total period of the stay and was set at 
£200 per year and £150 per year for students, with the whole amount paid up front, while 
making visa application (UK Government, 2015). These key examples highlight that the 
detoxification strategy of the Conservative Party was abandoned the closer the party got 
to 2010 general election and when the party entered the Coalition government and 
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translated its discourse into restrictive immigration policies that gradually became 
intertwined with welfare issues. This chapter explains why this happened, exploring the 
factors that led the Conservative Party to change its immigration stance. Even though 
the party was in a Coalition with the Liberal Democrats, where the latter had a say as 
well, the department charged with immigration - the Home Office and, the department 
responsible for welfare policy - Department for Work and Pensions were both headed by 
the Conservative ministers, which allowed the Conservatives to steer immigration policy 
mostly in their direction. 
 
4.3.3 Conservative Party manifesto 2015 
The 2015 general election manifesto shows the continuity of the restrictive immigration 
stance of the Conservative party. Welfare anxieties linked to EU immigration were at the 
forefront of their immigration discourse with the Conservatives pledging to control 
immigration from the EU by “reforming welfare rules” (The Conservative Party, 2015: 
30). More interestingly, for the first time since David Cameron became a leader, the party 
openly stated the importance of putting “British people first” (The Conservative Party, 
2015: 29)2. This nativist rhetoric, which is a defining feature of radical right parties, who 
aim to prioritise the native population (Andersen and Bjørklund, 1990), was now part of 
the Conservative Party’s discourse. The party also promised to further increase the 
financial income threshold for those British citizens, who want to bring their non-EU 
family to the UK (The Conservative Party, 2015: 30). The discourse around family 
migration emphasised the costs of family migrants to a taxpayer.  
  
Hence, both EU and non-EU immigration has continued to be reframed through a social 
welfare lens as the party’s proposals outlined that access to benefits, including tax 
credits, will be based on length of residency (The Conservative Party, 2015: 30). This 
                                                 
2 This rhetoric brings to mind the long history of nativist language in Conservative discourse with 
a famous example of Enoch Powell’s speech ‘Rivers of blood’. However, such discourse was not 
unique to the Conservative Party, this also brings to mind Gordon Brown’s concession on “British 
jobs for British workers” (Summer, 2009), which may have normalised nativist language in British 
political discourse.  
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idea was developed during the Brexit debate, with the party arguing that EU immigrants 
can only claim benefits after four years of residence in the UK and talking about limiting 
child benefit for some EU migrants. Such rhetoric portrays immigrants as benefit seekers 
and downplays or denies their contribution to the society: “Instead of something-for-
nothing, we will build a system based on the principle of something-for-something” (The 
Conservative Party, 2015: 30). The following table presents key positions of the 
Conservative Party on immigration since 2005, derived from their general election 
manifestos and highlights major immigration policy changes of the Coalition government.  
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• set a cap for net 
migration: tens of 
thousands; 
 
• set an annual limit on 
the numbers of non-
EU economic 
migrants; 
 
• selective immigration: 
limit access to those, 
who can bring value 
to the British 
economy; 
 
• apply transitional 
controls for future 
new members of the 
EU; 
 
• make foreign 
students pay a bond 
that will be 
reimbursed once they 
finish their studies 
and return to their 
country; 
 
• students cannot 
switch into a different 
category while in the 
UK, they need to go 
back home and 
reapply for a new 
visa.  
• 24 surveillance at 
border posts; 
 
• points-based 
system for work 
migration;  
 
• annual cap for 
work migration 
(non-EU); 
 
 
• popular consent 
for further 
demographic 
change;  
 
• welfare: introduce 
TB tests to protect 
the NHS. 
• tighter regulations for non-
EU/non-EEA students and 
cancellation of post study 
work visa in 2012, which 
allowed students to stay 
and work in the UK for two 
years after graduation;  
 
• family migration was 
tightened: the financial 
requirement of £18,600 
earning for the UK spouse; 
 
• the Highly skilled migrant 
programme closed;  
 
• the annual limit for shortage 
occupations for non-EU 
migrants set at 20,700; 
 
• increased financial 
thresholds for work 
migration;  
 
• welfare: EU jobseekers are 
no longer able to claim 
housing benefit since April 
2014; 
 
• welfare: a set of measures 
restricting access to out-of-
work benefits, child benefit 
and child tax credit by EU 
and EEA immigrants was 
introduced in July 2014; 
 
• April 2015: NHS health 
surcharge introduced for all 
non-EU/non-EEA 
immigrants coming to 
reside in the UK for more 
than 6 months. 
Table 2: Conservative Party’s rhetoric on immigration from 2005-2010 and immigration 
policy changes under the Coalition government  
  2005 Manifesto                            2010 Manifesto                     Coalition 
government 
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4.4 Causal factors  
The Conservative Party had been out of government for thirteen years, which had an 
impact on their policy positions on certain issues, especially on the issue of immigration. 
While, after losing the 2005 general election, the party tried to detoxify its image and 
become more attractive to the electorate, the approach changed in advance of getting 
into office, when different strands of immigration policy became more restrictive. The 
immigration stance of the Conservative Party and the UK immigration policy underwent 
significant transformations since the election of David Cameron as a party leader, as a 
response to a variety of factors. This chapter points out that despite being a junior partner 
in the Coalition government, Liberal Democrats had little control over immigration policy 
and were overshadowed by the Conservatives, who were effectively running it alone. 
Intensely negative coverage of immigration in the right-wing media led the Conservative 
Party and the Home Office to frame immigration in a more restrictive light and introduce 
policies that would not necessarily be evidence based, but driven by ideological 
inclinations. The arrival of the global financial crisis and subsequent Eurozone crisis led 
to the toughening of immigration discourse, but austerity, brought by the crisis, did not 
lead to the reframing of immigration through social welfare lens. The effects of EU 
integration presented constraints for controlling EU migration, which reinforced the 
Conservative’s stance on EU migration, linking it to social security anxieties and 
eventually leading to the Brexit referendum. 
 
4.4.1 Public opinion 
Public opinion was the backbone of the Conservative’s immigration policy-making 
process. Before the 2010 general election, immigration was one of the top five prominent 
issues and the voters, dissatisfied with the Labour Party, viewed the Conservative Party 
as the most credible on the issue (Carey and Geddes, 2010: 853). As a result of the 
absence of transitional controls with then ten countries that joined the EU in 2004, UK 
had experienced a substantial inflow of labour immigrants from the Eastern states, which 
led to the shift in public opinion in favour of more restrictive immigration policy (Park et 
al., 2012). Public dissatisfaction with the development of immigration policy created an 
 82 
opportunity for the Conservatives to act and to introduce in their 2010 electoral manifesto 
a pledge of reducing immigration to “tens of thousands” (Conservative Party, 2010). This 
vote-winning strategy was not an invention of the Conservative Party itself, but of the 
right-wing interest group MWUK, with the Conservatives having to decide on their 
specific numerical target (Interview with the MWUK, 2015). MWUK successfully lobbied 
the Conservative Party before 2010 general election to include the electoral promise of 
putting a cap on immigration, which was an attempt to reassure the public that 
immigration was taken seriously by the party. As immigration was, in the eyes of 
significant numbers of voters in key constituencies, becoming one of the “main issues 
facing Britain today” (Page, 2009), the Conservatives needed to stress the importance 
of immigration for them. As the party, who had been out of government for thirteen years 
and wanted to get back, their strategy was centred around pleasing the public (Interview 
with a former Special Advisor (SpAD) to a Conservative minister 2015). The attachment 
to the immigration target was an important way of showing that the party cared about 
pleasing the public. Furthermore, it was important to reassure the electorate about this 
commitment as under the Coalition government net migration level was at its highest 
level and in 2013 almost 60 per cent of the population favoured reducing immigration 
(Page et al., 2013).  
 
After the Conservatives were elected and throughout the Coalition government, they 
maintained the hard-line rhetoric on immigration to show that public opinion mattered to 
them. The Home Office was acting as an ideological machine, framing immigration in a 
light that would give the Conservative Party credibility. Fiona Cunningham and Nick 
Timothy, who were May’s special advisors in the Home Office, were acting as framers 
by highlighting that “Immigration numbers are falling because our reforms on immigration 
are working” (Interview with a former Home Office civil servant, 2015). This points to the 
power that special advisors exercised on the Home secretary, even when immigration 
statistics show contrary evidence. The decrease in immigration numbers did not 
correspond to reality and the Coalition government was able to decrease the numbers 
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only in the period between 2011-2013, but since 2013 the net migration level was on a 
steady increase (Office for National Statistics, 2017), primarily due to a lack of control 
over EU migration. The Home Office was a central immigration body of the government, 
which was creating an impression for the public that their policies are directed towards 
reducing the net migration level (Interview with a senior Home Office civil servant, 2016). 
For this reason, the Home Office alongside the Conservative Party only continued to 
reaffirm the attachment to the target, though knowing that they are unlikely to achieve it. 
Virtually all immigration policies adopted under the Coalition government were attached 
to the immigration target (Interview with a senior Home Office civil servant, 2015). 
Throughout the Coalition government, the Conservatives were determined to maintain 
the hardline on immigration because they did not want to repeat the mistake of Liberal 
Democrats, who did not stick to their pledge of opposing the tuition fee rise, and abandon 
their electoral promises.   
 
I think the other factor was that Liberal Democrats, my party, lost a lot of popularity 
because they made the pledge about student tuition fees and abandoned it. And 
Cameron saw what happened and he realised that he has made a pledge about 
immigration numbers and he did not want to be seen to abandon a pledge that he 
made in the election. (Interview with the secretary of state for BIS, Vince Cable, 
2016). 
 
Understanding that abandoning an electoral promise about immigration would not be 
beneficial in a future election, the Conservative Party kept their attachment to the net 
migration target. Thus, because of Clegg’s turn on student tuition fees, in 2015 general 
election Liberal Democrats were completely wiped out by the Tories in South-West 
England (Merril, 2015). The Conservative Party was driven by the public perception on 
immigration, which underpinned their more restrictive immigration stance.  
 
At the moment, it seems that this is about impression rather than about doing 
things that everybody recognises and knows and understands. (Interview with a 
Home Office civil servant, 2016).  
 
The Conservatives had concerns about the alienation of the electorate, especially the 
British working class, as the party spent thirteen years in opposition and hoped for the 
reelection in 2015. With UKIP, who have been increasing the salience of immigration 
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and whose electoral support has been growing, the issue of welfare benefits for EU 
immigrants entered the right-wing agenda. By adopting an accommodative strategy 
(Meguid, 2007) towards UKIP, the Conservative Party increased the salience of 
immigration and reframed it through a social welfare lens, especially during the Brexit 
debate. 
 
The government’s reframing of immigration through a social welfare lens was driven by 
the concerns of voter alienation, especially those working-class voters, who felt 
dissatisfied with the fact that immigrants’ access to welfare benefits was means-tested 
rather than contributory (Interview with a senior Home Office civil servant, 2015). What 
is interesting is that such a position was not unique to the Conservatives, it was a joint 
position of both parties of government and the fears of losing the public led to this 
reframing (Interview with the secretary of state for BIS, Vince Cable, 2016). Despite the 
Department for Work and Pensions’ report (2012) that foreign-born people are less likely 
to claim benefits than British people, the Home Office and the Conservatives continued 
reframing immigration through social welfare lens, portraying immigrants as benefit-
seekers. As the Conservatives were unable to control EU migration, which prevented 
them from achieving the net migration target, their discourse concentrated on pleasing 
the British public and focusing on negative portrayal of immigrants.  
 
It’s more a symbol rather than anything else. I think there is a very strong view, I 
mean the Home Ofﬁce know that there is a very strong view, particularly amongst 
working class English people, British people generally that those, who haven't 
been born here, those, who are not citizens of this country should not be getting 
beneﬁts from taxes raised in this country. (Interview with former Home Office civil 
servant, 2015).  
 
It should be said that such rhetoric was not only coming from the Conservative Party, but 
that it was a joint position of two coalition partners, Liberal Democrats also were of the 
view that public concerns should not be disregarded, especially on the issue of welfare.   
 
People here get very angry when they read that some Polish people have been 
here, working here and then they get back to Poland and they get family allowance 
and it creates a lot of anger. So, and I think you have to deal with that, those kind 
of abuses, otherwise you lose the public. (Interview with the head of BIS, Vince 
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Cable, 2016). 
 
Overall, public opinion was one of the factors that underpinned the adoption of more a 
restrictive approach on immigration by the Conservative Party. The failure to win 2005 
general election resulted in a detoxification strategy that aimed to attract more moderate 
electorate. However, Labour’s decision not to impose transnational controls on the new 
EU member states has considerably weakened Labour’s credibility on immigration, and 
the Conservative Party was able to capitalise on these concerns and present a more 
credible image before 2010 General election. Finally, UKIP’s rise and its linking of 
immigration to welfare concerns, the alienation of the Conservative’s electorate to UKIP, 
the importance of showing credibility on immigration led the Conservative Party to 
reinforce its immigration discourse and policies. Trying to please the public drove the 
evolution of the Conservative Party’s immigration stance and demonstrated that their 
approach to immigration was not evidence-based, with the party framing immigration in 
a negative light on the issue of welfare benefits, despite the evidence to the contrary.  
 
4.4.2 Perceived concerns over economic development 
The global financial crisis presented an opportunity for the party to reinforce its 
immigration position, but austerity, which was a response to the crisis was not the cause 
of the redefinition of immigration through social welfare lens.  
 
Immigration policy is not always founded on logic, it is very much founded on 
politics, so that’s it. People pretend it is founded on logic, but it very often founded 
on politics. (Interview with a senior Home Office servant, 2016). 
 
The evidence from the interviews shows that the changes in the Conservatives discourse 
on immigration and Coalition immigration policies were not triggered by austerity, 
brought by the 2007 global financial crisis. The changes were driven by the political 
dynamics rather than by economic need (Interview with the senior Home Office servant, 
2016). Thus, growing electoral support for UKIP changed party competition on the issue. 
In times of austerity, UKIP had fertile ground to appeal to the electorate, particularly to 
the working-class voters, who felt left out. As Rydgren (2003: 49) pinpoints:  
 
… because of the feeling of anxiety, frustration, and resentment resulting from 
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poverty and unemployment, people finding themselves in situations of absolute 
deprivation have become increasingly susceptible to be attracted by political actors 
using xenophobic themes of welfare chauvinism, i.e., to put the blame of 
unemployment and financial problems of the welfare state on immigrants. 
 
In terms of insecurity, radical right parties are presented with a fertile ground to appeal 
particularly to the working-class voters, who feel left out (Rydgren, 2003: 49). UKIP’s 
‘welfare chauvinist’ discourse and its electoral growth (Clarke et al., 2016) presented 
concerns for the Conservatives, who were becoming increasingly worried about the 
alienation of their electorate to UKIP. Even though the Conservatives have been framing 
immigration through social welfare lens, discourse and policies were rather stemming 
from the Conservative ideology that aims to limit the access to social assistance for 
everyone, irrespective of nationality (Interview with a Conservative MP, 2015). The aim 
was not just to reduce welfare entitlements for the immigrants, but to redefine British 
welfare system in general. The global financial crisis had an impact on toughening of 
immigration stance, but austerity, was not the driving force for reframing of immigration 
through social welfare lens. There was a shared attitude in the Coalition government that 
there was a very indirect connection between austerity and the introduction of more 
restrictive immigration policies (Interview with the secretary of state for BIS Vince Cable, 
2016; Interview with a Conservative MP, 2015). Framing of immigration through austerity 
lens was directed towards pleasing the public and preventing the alienation of the 
Conservative electorate to UKIP (Interview with a senior Home Office civil servant, 2015; 
Interview with a former Conservative minister, 2015).  
 
The Conservative’s tough immigration approach was driven by the economic anxieties 
related to intra-EU migration. The party argued that the Eurozone crisis led to large 
numbers of people coming in, which created a sense of insecurity and called into 
question the ability of the British economy to satisfy the demand (Interview with a 
Conservative minister, 2015; Interview with a Conservative MP, 2015; Interview with a 
senior Home Office civil servant, 2015). The relatively fast recovery of the UK economy 
from the global financial crisis, compared to Eurozone countries, attracted more intra-EU 
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migration, which was an obstacle for the party to achieve tens of thousands migration 
target (Interview with a Conservative MP, 2015). Preoccupation with the net migration 
target was also the logic behind the redefinition of immigration through a social welfare 
lens, despite evidence from the Department for Work and Pensions’ report that foreign-
born workers are less likely to claim benefits than British people (Department for Work 
and Pensions, 2012). Furthermore, the party used global financial crisis to target student 
migration by decreasing the net migration level and limiting the numbers of those 
entering British labour market by introducing the closure of the post-study work visa in 
2011(Interview with the UUK, 2016). The crisis reinforced the Conservative’s discourse 
on the impact of immigration on wages, arguing that it contributed to the suppression of 
wages as a result of increased migration from poorer Eurozone countries. The Home 
Office has been arguing that intra-EU immigration, particularly low-skilled migration from 
Eastern Europe had an effect on social dumping, despite the little evidence to support 
this argument (Interview with the chair of the Migration Advisory Committee (MAC) David 
Metcalf, 2015; Nickell and Saleheen, 2015). This demonstrates another example of the 
Conservative Party not basing its immigration stance on the evidence or manipulating 
the evidence. 
 
On the contrary, the relatively fast recovery of the British economy from the global 
financial crisis presented a structure of opportunities that allowed the Conservatives to 
reinforce their discourse on immigration by claiming that immigrants are coming to the 
UK as they are attracted by the economy and job growth (Interview with a Conservative 
MP, 2015). The preoccupation with achieving net migration target was undermined by 
the numbers coming in and the inability to control intra-EU migration was frustrating for 
the Tories. As one of the interviewees pointed out:  
 
The biggest simple thing that could happen that would enable the British 
government to hit the immigration target would be a widespread recovery of the 
Eurozone and the capacity of the governments of those countries to create jobs 
for the young residents (Interview with a former Conservative minister, 2015). 
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The Conservative Party used the Eurozone crisis as an opportunity to pursue tougher 
immigration discourse on EU migration and to lead to the introduction of more restrictive 
policies regarding non-EU migrants as there was an opportunity to control only non-EU 
inflow. Conservatives developed an immigration discourse around economic anxieties, 
brought by EU migration to reinforce their position on achieving the net migration target. 
They argued that economic recession that came as a result of the global financial crisis 
affected many countries, but particularly southern European states, which resulted in an 
increased inflow of Italian, Spanish, Greeks, who entered the UK labour market 
(Interview with the Conservative MP, 2015; Interview with a senior Home Office civil 
servant, 2015). However, the estimates of the Office for National Statistics (2016: 11) 
show that in the period between 2007-2009 there was no sharp increase in migration 
from the EU countries, but on the contrary, with migration levels falling slightly in the 
middle of 2008 and then dropping even more by the end of the year. The Conservative 
Party argued that Eurozone crisis led to large numbers of people coming in, which 
created a sense of insecurity in the British economy, with the Conservatives becoming 
more cautious about the availability of jobs and the ability of the British economy to 
satisfy the demand (Interview with a former Conservative minister, 2015). However, the 
data on immigration demonstrates that there was no drastic increase in the EU migration 
to the UK, which highlights that the Conservative Party used the Eurozone crisis to 
reinforce their immigration discourse, which was not based on evidence.  
 
4.4.3 The rise of UKIP  
UKIP’s rise over the last few years has alarmed established British political parties, not 
only on the right, but also on the left side of ideological spectrum. Ideological proximity 
makes the Conservative Party vulnerable to the defection of their voters to UKIP and the 
growing concern about UKIP began to accumulate at the time when the Conservatives 
were in the Coalition government. Even though first past the post electoral system kept 
UKIP away from Westminster, electoral support for UKIP grew slowly, but steadily over 
the years from 2001 to 2010, doubling in almost all UK regions (Ford & Goodwin, 2014: 
87). If before 2010 UKIP faced internal conflicts and electoral failures, since then and 
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until the Brexit referendum it has transformed into a significant contender for mainstream 
parties. Indeed, “having overcome a series of false starts and vicious civil wars, it was 
only in 2010 when the party began to emerge as a cohesive and serious political 
organization” (Ford & Goodwin, 2014: 97). The Conservative Party’s stance on 
immigration started to become more stringent, particularly while in government, which 
was partly to do with the concerns about UKIP (Partos and Bale, 2015: 4). The 
Conservatives felt the need to act hard line to prevent its electorate from alienating to 
UKIP. The idea of the net migration target aimed to reassure the public that 
Conservatives were in control of immigration.  
 
And that’s why we thought about the idea of limited net migration for each year, 
just to try to establish some level of control because it felt like immigration was 
uncontrolled and that had very bad social consequences. […] And the other thing, 
is to discourage the growth of parties on the extremes. (Interview with the former 
Conservative minister, 2015)  
 
This fear of UKIP is demonstrated particularly in relation to student migration, there was 
an absence of a unified position with major tensions occurring between the Home Office 
and the Prime Minister on one side, and the BIS and the Treasury on the other side. The 
Home Office’s refusal to take international students out of the net migration target was 
driven by the concern about UKIP (Interview with the secretary of state for BIS Vince 
Cable 2016; Interview with a former SpAD to a Conservative minister, 2015). Removing 
international students from the net migration target would have been detrimental to the 
Conservatives and would undermine the promise of reducing immigration to tens of 
thousands. The Electoral threat from UKIP only encouraged the Conservative Party to 
reinforce their position on the net migration target. The preoccupation of the 
Conservative Party with the net migration target was a response to constant criticism of 
the Tories by UKIP. 
 
…one of the arguments you got back was ‘No, because this will encourage, 
because people who would otherwise vote Conservative would go to UKIP’… 
(Interview with a former SpAD to a conservative minister, 2015). 
 
I think they worried, the Tories, before the last election. They seem to be… In truth, 
in the general election they lost one, but they got the other, but they still have got 
eleven per cent vote. But, I don’t think all the votes are taken away from Tories, 
 90 
but I think more votes were taken away from Tories than from Labour. So, certainly 
that is the part of the factor. (Interview with the senior Home Office civil servant, 
2015).  
 
 
Furthermore, reframing immigration through a social welfare lens was driven by 
concerns about UKIP and by the aim to fulfil their immigration pledge. Being in control of 
non-EU migration, the Coalition government concentrated on limiting this inflow to 
reduce the overall numbers. Thus, by creating a tougher discourse on the issue the party 
and the Home Office were trying to reassure the public about their awareness of the 
concerns and trying to create a credible image. This did not only lead to changes in the 
Conservative discourse, but also resulted in the introduction of a financial requirement 
for British citizens who want to bring their family members to the UK. In July 2012, the 
government introduced a financial threshold of £18,600 for British citizens who want to 
bring their non-EU family members to the UK to decrease the overall net migration 
(Home Office, 2014). 
 
And, I suppose, you know, if you want to bring your family here, should earn 
sufﬁcient income to look after them, so, otherwise, they go on beneﬁts. And it would 
be strong feelings of the British people about things like that (Interview with a senior 
Home Office civil servant, 2016). 
 
The Department for Work and Pensions’ new rules limited EU migrants’ access to 
benefits, by introducing a three-month residency requirement for Jobseeker’s Allowance, 
Child Benefit and Child Tax Credit (UK Government, 2014a). The government also 
announced that since April 2014 all EU jobseekers will no longer be able to claim 
Housing Benefit (UK Government, 2014b). The Coalition government redefined access 
to benefits from means-tested to residency-based to lower the attractiveness of the UK 
for potential migrants. It also introduced an NHS surcharge for non-EU nationals coming 
to reside in the UK for long-term just a month before 2015 general election (UK 
Government, 2015). It should be highlighted that by no means was UKIP the sole factor 
that led the Conservative Party to change their stance on immigration, but, as interviews 
revealed, it had an impact on the positions of the Conservatives regarding student 
migration and the toughening of welfare access for EU immigrants. Trying to prevent the 
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defection of its electorate to UKIP, especially during the Coalition government, when 
UKIP’s popularity grew, the Conservative Party adopted an accommodative strategy 
(Meguid, 2007) towards UKIP in attempt to reassure its credibility on immigration. Finally, 
the announcement of holding the referendum on Britain’s exit from the EU was supposed 
to neutralise UKIP.  
 
And, in truth, once you declare the referendum, it kinda shoots UKIP’s fox because 
UKIP only exists to leave Europe. (Interview with a senior Home Office civil 
servant, 2016).  
 
Overall, the potential defection of the electorate to UKIP was one of the drivers that the 
made Conservative’s discourse and Coalition immigration policy more restrictive and 
also contributed to linking immigration to social security concerns by redefining 
immigration through a social welfare lens.  
 
4.4.4 Effects of the EU integration  
Fagerholm (2015) argues that political parties respond to big socio-economic changes 
and this research has found that widening of the EU community and its effects led the 
Conservative Party to adopt a restrictive immigration approach. Immigration rhetoric 
returned to the Conservative’s party discourse in 2007, when David Cameron gave a 
speech on the alleged population pressure, which was related to Romania’s and 
Bulgaria’s entrance to the EU in 2007. Both EU enlargements had an impact on the 
evolution of British immigration policy and were used by the Conservative Party to remind 
the voters that immigration was still an important issue for the party. The underestimation 
of EU immigration by the Labour government and public dissatisfaction with it was taken 
by the Conservatives as an opportunity to pursue a restrictive approach to EU migration 
(Interview with a former Conservative minister, 2015). The absence of transnational 
agreements with Eastern European countries that joined the EU in 2004 had an impact 
on Labour’s credibility on immigration (Mulvey, 2011: 1486). This enlargement and the 
absence of transitional arrangements with newly accepted countries increased public 
concerns on the issue (Evans & Chzen, 2013: 155). 
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After 2005 the arrival of hundreds of thousands of A8 (Czech Republic, Estonia, 
Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia - author) countries, 
particularly Poles, obviously. These three things came together, so immigration 
became an enormous crisis. (Interview with a former Conservative minister, 2015).  
 
The UK's membership in the EU and the adherence to the free movement of people, 
presented an opportunity for the Conservative Party to reinforce its stance on 
immigration policy and, eventually, to declare the referendum on the UK’s exit from the 
EU. More specifically, concerns about the EU, which manifested themselves in the lack 
of control over EU migration and the necessity of cohesion between the EU law and the 
UK law, allowed the Conservative Party to toughen its immigration discourse and policies 
and reframe immigration through a social welfare lens. Free movement of people and 
the lack of control over EU migration were big obstacles for the Conservatives to achieve 
their migration target. Despite tightening the rules for non-EU migrants, overall net 
migration did not decline because EU migration could not be restricted. Hence, both EU 
enlargements (2004 and 2007) changed the political circumstances and had an impact 
on the development of the Conservatives' rhetoric on immigration and subsequently the 
UK immigration policy under the Coalition government because they structured 
opportunities for the Conservative Party to restrict immigration. First the enlargement of 
ten new states in 2004 and the absence of transnational arrangements with newly 
accepted countries resulted in larger numbers coming in than expected. Having 
underestimated the pace of immigration from Eastern European states from 2004 
enlargement, the Labour government put in place seven-year transitional controls for 
Bulgaria and Romania to access the UK labour market, the Conservatives used this to 
frame immigration discourse around economic anxieties over jobs. The reframing of 
immigration discourse happened through social welfare lens based on the increasing net 
migration levels and the impossibility to reduce EU inflow. The preoccupation of the 
Conservative Party with the target drove their discourse into the social security sphere.  
 
They come here for work and they pay their taxes and contribute… However, if 
you have a small percentage that are not, but that small percentage itself is a large 
number, then it becomes an economic problem. It’s a drain on public ﬁnances. So, 
the numbers do matter and that’s the sort of truth when it comes to immigration 
policy. (Interview with a former Conservative minister, 2015).  
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The necessity of cohesion between the EU law and the British law, essentially EU 
citizen’s access to benefits, was another aspect of the loss of sovereignty that worried 
the Conservatives (Interview with the chair of the MAC, David Metcalf, 2016). The 
intersection between welfare and immigration emerged partly as a response to the 
inability to manage EU migration and more restrictive rules on accessing benefits for EU 
citizens aimed to discourage potential immigration to the UK (Interview with a former 
Conservative minister, 2015). Despite the lack of evidence on the subject of so-called 
EU ‘benefits-tourism’, the Conservative Party ‘switched their attention to it because they 
knew they could do something about it’ (Interview with the head of BIS Vince Cable, 
2016). Reframing immigration through a social welfare lens became a salient point within 
the immigration debate, which is also evidenced by the fact that these points take a 
central role in the Brexit debate that followed. EU enlargements increased 
Conservative’s concerns about the British labour market and the necessity of cohesion 
between British and EU law led to the introduction of more restrictive discourse and 
policies on EU migration.  
 
4.4.5 The influence of interest groups 
The increasing salience of immigration was one of the factors that influenced 
Conservatives’ immigration decision-making, both in opposition and under the Coalition 
government. Different interest groups played a crucial role in increasing immigration 
salience, both negatively and positively. Being outside of government for a long time, the 
Conservatives introduced net migration target of tens of thousands before 2010 general 
election because the salience of immigration was high and the party wanted to show its 
commitment to reducing it (Interview with a former SpAD to a Conservative minister, 
2015; Interview with the MWUK, 2015). During the first two years, the Coalition 
government managed to reduce net migration, but from 2013 onwards immigration 
numbers were on a steady rise reaching its highest level in the UK history (Office for 
National Statistics, 2017). The inability of the government to lower immigration levels 
were continuously exploited by UKIP and by the right-wing media, which kept 
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immigration at the top of the agenda. This led the Conservatives to reinforce their stance 
on immigration because they needed to show their credibility on the issue (Interview with 
the secretary of state for BIS Vince Cable, 2016).  
 
Government is far too inﬂuenced by the Daily Mail, papers like that. I have seen 
the political advisers trying to please the Daily Mail and trying to get the right stories 
and responding to the public concern. And they have far more impact on the 
government that they should, at least on this government. (Interview with the senior 
Home Office civil servant, 2016) 
 
Immigration discourse and policies of the Coalition government became more restrictive 
because right-wing interest group MWUK had leverage to attack the Conservatives 
through British right-wing media, which would damage the party’s image.  
 
No, Cameron was frightened if he got the wrong side of Migration Watch, Migration 
Watch would tell the big newspapers and then who would then attack him. 
(Interview with t the secretary of state for BIS Vince Cable, 2016).  
 
Structural constraints put on the Conservative Party by the MWUK and right-wing media 
and the rise of UKIP steered the development of UK immigration policy in a more 
restrictive way. It has been established that interest groups' lobbying was a way of 
boosting immigration salience in order to influence immigration policy-making. However, 
some managed to exert greater influence on the government, compared to others. 
Because of the Home Office’s preoccupation with the net migration target, only the 
proposals of those interest groups that aimed to limit immigration had more successful 
influence on government’s decisions on immigration, while suggestions of those interest 
groups that did not have such interest were constrained. The attempts of the UUK to get 
international students out of the net migration target were ineffective because of the 
Home Office’s strong attachment to getting immigration down to tens of thousands. 
Despite the support of the BIS, the issue was too politically important for the Home Office 
(Interview with a former SpAD to a Conservative Minister, 2015). Though, UUK efforts 
with the support of BIS were not completely unsuccessful, they managed to get some 
concession from the Home Office and prevent the introduction of a cap on international 
students and introduction of tougher language requirements (Interview with the secretary 
of state for BIS Vince Cable, 2016; Interview with the UUK, 2016; Portes, 2015). 
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4.4.6 Home Office’s ideological dogmatism 
Among structural factors that led to the evolution of British immigration policy, the 
research has found that one agency related variable was crucial in making UK 
immigration policy more restrictive. This finding demonstrates that agency matters, and 
not only the agency of political parties, but also the agency of governmental departments 
like the Home Office that is responsible for immigration policy. It shows that the agency, 
namely the Home Office’s actions, transform the environment, or the structure, in which 
the change is happening, which points out to the importance of not disregarding the role 
of the agency. In pursuing its goals, the Home Office and the home secretary were 
putting ideological beliefs before the evidence. Control over agenda setting and evidence 
were instrumental parts of the Home Office’s ideological dogmatism. Only evidence in 
support of the Home Office’s position, was made public, while any other evidence that 
would contradict the Home secretary’s position and goals would not be commissioned 
or made public (Interview with the secretary of state for BIS Vince Cable, 2016; Interview 
with the UUK, 2016). The inability of certain interest groups like UUK to approach the 
home secretary to present evidence that would be different from the Home Office’s 
position was also a way of controlling evidence channeled for the decision-making 
process. A key role in immigration agenda setting allowed the Home Office to frame 
immigration in a light suitable for the Home office and avoid presenting evidence that 
would be contrary to the Home Office's goals. Control over evidence was a tool that 
Home Office and the home secretary used in advancing their position on immigration. 
More precisely, Home Office’s ideological dogmatism had a profound impact particularly 
on student migration, and the battles between the Home Office and the BIS illustrate the 
importance of putting ideology before the evidence. Control over agenda setting allowed 
the Home Office to argue for keeping students within the net migration target as Theresa 
May would not ask the MAC to conduct any work on the issue. Student migration was 
the biggest migration route and producing any kind of positive evidence on student 
migration would be detrimental for the Home Office because it would limit the chances 
to reduce migration to tens of thousands. 
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And also, the home secretary only asks the MAC the questions that she wants to. 
For example, there are other things that MAC has not been asked to do, but which 
could be really helpful for it to do. So, something like asking the MAC to conduct 
the analysis of the beneﬁts of internationals students for the UK, taking in to 
account the costs as well, but also what is the overall beneﬁt at a national level. 
But this is the question the home secretary is not going to ask because it doesn't 
correspond to her objectives. (Interview with the UUK, 2016).  
 
The Home Office’s ideological dogmatism had a profound impact on student migration, 
labour migration and issues of welfare tourism. The battles between the Home Office 
and the BIS on getting students out of the net migration target, on the so-called EU 
welfare tourism and on the suppression of British wages illustrate the importance of 
putting ideology before evidence. Control over agenda setting allowed the Home Office 
to argue for keeping international students in the net migration target and the home 
secretary would not commission any work on student migration because producing any 
kind of positive evidence on student migration would be detrimental for the Home Office 
(Interview with the chair of the MAC, David Metcalf, 2015; Interview with the UUK, 2016). 
The home secretary argued for the reduction of welfare benefits for EU migrants despite 
the evidence that they were less likely to access benefits than British citizens 
(Department for Work and Pensions, 2012). The Home Office also argued that high 
levels of immigration contributed to the displacement of British workers on the labour 
market, which illustrates how the Home Office’s ideological dogmatism prevailed over 
the evidence.  
 
I think there were ten - twelve studies. One of them showed that there was some 
displacement, in fact, particularly in periods of recession and low-paid workers. 
The others did not show the displacement, in fact. But what happened was 
propaganda war: the Home Ofﬁce released the one study that suited their 
arguments. We had a leaking and…. we got this summary of research and I 
pressed for it to be published. The home secretary refused to allow it to be 
published because it showed the wrong conclusions. Then they leaked to the 
newspapers the one study that showed what they wanted to show. (Interview with 
the secretary of state for BIS, Vince Cable, 2016).  
 
Finally, the lack of communication between the home secretary and other governmental 
actors was another feature of Home Office’s ideological dogmatism, which meant that 
the decisions on immigration were introduced from the top-down and Theresa May was 
not interested in the collective discussion of the policy with the shadow cabinet. Thus, 
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while the Conservative Party was in opposition, there was a lack of collective discussion 
on how migration policy should look like, which created sense of frustration within the 
Conservative Party. 
 
I still remember the day, which was in opposition before we got into government 
and David Willetts came into our office and said: ‘Theresa May just announced a 
new policy on migration reducing to tens thousands…What does it mean for 
students?’. And none of us knew what it meant for students because the policy 
doesn’t seem to have ever been discussed collectively by the Shadow cabinet. 
And I think the whole problem stems partly from that (Interview with a SpAD to a 
Conservative minister, 2015). 
 
Preoccupation with achieving the net migration target was driving immigration policy-
making and the Home Office played a crucial role in defending this electoral pledge 
despite the fact that its position did not always reflect the evidence (Interview with the 
senior Home Office civil servant, Interview with the UUK, 2016; Interview with a senior 
Home Office civil servant, 2015). This did not only put ideology before evidence, but also 
created a sense of frustration within the Conservative Party, because a lot of 
Conservative MPs viewed the target as damaging for the British economy. The idea of 
achieving a net migration target drove the Home Office’s decision to close the post-study 
work visa, despite the suggestions from the MAC of making it more selective rather than 
completely shutting it down (Interview with chair of the MAC David Metcalf, 2015). It led 
to the introduction of more selective approach to work migration, increasing the salary 
threshold for non-EU migrants and threshold for intra-company transfers (Metcalf, 2013). 
Finally, it permitted the Home Office to introduce set of rules, which redefined EU 
migrants’ access to benefits from means-tested to residency-based.  
 
4.5 Causal mechanisms 
The goal of this chapter was not only to provide a causal explanation of the changing 
nature of the Conservative’s stance on immigration and subsequent immigration policy 
change, but also to shed the light on the mechanisms that allowed particular policy 
choices to dominate. The main finding of this section is that two mechanisms account for 
the change, namely framing and departmental competition. While framing of immigration 
in a negative light was a prerequisite for the party to opt for more restrictive policy choices 
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during the Coalition government, departmental competition is a mechanism through 
which certain policy choices dominated over others. While being both in opposition and 
in government, the Conservatives framed immigration in a restrictive way, which 
eventually led the party to take responsibility for its rhetoric and pursue tighter 
immigration policies. However, the Conservative Party was not the only one to have been 
framing immigration in a negative light, there were other governmental actors like the 
Home Office and the home secretary, who contributed to the hard-line immigration 
stance. As actors responsible for immigration matters, they were a significant voice of 
framing the issue negatively. Moreover, non-governmental actors also took the 
opportunity to increase the salience of the issue in the media, forcing the Conservative 
Party to react. Precisely, the right-wing interest group MWUK presented a very specific 
image of the state of UK immigration policy in the right-wing British media, which made 
the Conservatives worried about their image as a credible party to handle immigration. 
Framing of immigration in a specific light was a prerequisite for the party to opt for more 
restrictive policy choices during the Coalition government. Departmental competition is 
a mechanism through which certain policy choices dominated over the other ones. 
Finally, the competition did not limit itself to two Coalition partners, but the differences in 
policy choices occurred between the departments led by the Conservatives.  
 
4.5.1 Framing 
The immigration discourse of the Conservative party between 2005 and 2015 has 
become more restrictive by attributing blame for social problems to immigrants. The 
Conservatives used diagnostic framing (Snow and Benford, 1988: 200-201) to establish 
that immigrants and growing levels of immigration were bad for British society because 
they were bringing more anxieties about social welfare, jobs and security. Diagnostic 
framing was a justification for tougher immigration policies that the Conservatives 
adopted once they got to the Coalition government in 2010. Their 2010 and 2015 general 
election manifestos represented prognostic framing (Snow and Benford, 1988: 200-201) 
of immigration, suggesting the general line of action that needed to be taken to decrease 
immigration levels. Throughout their time in the Coalition government, they have 
 99 
combined socio-cultural and economic frames and did not increase the salience of one 
issue (immigration) at the expense of another (welfare), but reframed a sociocultural 
cleavage through the lens of the economic one. Immigration was politicised by the 
Conservatives through the concepts of social policy like ‘welfare chauvinism’ (Andersen 
and Bjørklund, 1990), which meant restricting welfare access to British citizens. Even 
though the party has not campaigned for complete denial of benefit access for 
immigrants, it has repeatedly argued for restricting access to welfare entitlements based 
on the length of residency and contribution. The Conservative Party was attributing the 
blame to immigrants, by claiming that they are “a drain on the British social welfare 
system” to please the public (Interview with a Conservative MP, 2015; Interview with a 
Conservative minister, 2015). However, the intention to cut benefits for migrants was 
more a sign of conservative ideology, which aimed to restrict access to social assistance 
for everyone (Interview with a Conservative MP, 2015). This was clearly demonstrated 
with their welfare policies that were not only targeting immigrants, but also disabled 
people and low-income families. Former deputy prime minister Nick Clegg in an interview 
to the Guardian newspaper claimed that the Conservatives did cut welfare for the poorest 
to boost Conservative’s popularity (Asthana and Hatterstone, 2016). The Home Office 
was often driven more by politics rather than by evidence (Interview with the senior Home 
Office civil servant 2015; Interview with the secretary of state for BIS Vince Cable, 2016). 
Nick Clegg admitted that the home secretary was framing immigration in a way beneficial 
to the home secretary and her party: 
 
She kept saying there was this terrible ‘abuse’ of freedom of movement, when 
simply describing EU citizens exercising their right to come and work in the UK. 
They tried to insert statistics suggesting the number of UK citizens living and 
working in other EU countries was half a million lower than any other mainstream 
estimate (Clegg cited in Asthana and Hatterstone, 2016).  
 
Within the Home Office, unelected special advisors to the home secretary had enormous 
influence on the framing of immigration and were deciding how the issue would be 
presented to the wider public. Special advisors were acting as framers, who had 
considerable power and were responsible for framing immigration in a light that was 
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showing the successes of the Home Office’s policies even though it was not always the 
case. They were deciding on the content of her immigration speeches and always had 
the last say in them. 
 
Because they were not interested in getting things right, they just wanted to do it 
the way they wanted. A lot of time, I think Theresa May knew directly what they 
were doing and they were thinking they were entitled to the decisions because they 
were working for her. They always wanted me to put the phrase ‘immigration 
numbers are falling because our reforms on immigration are working’. Political 
policies are about trying to persuade people that things are happening when they 
aren’t really happening. (Interview with a senior Home Office civil servant, 2015). 
 
The role of special advisors to the home secretary was crucial in determining how 
immigration was framed for the public (Interview with a senior Home Office civil servant, 
2015). This highlights the importance of the agency in activation of the mechanisms that 
account for immigration policy change. Unelected special advisors to Theresa May 
exercised a considerable amount of power and were responsible for the correct framing 
of immigration, deciding on the content of home secretary’s speeches. It should be said 
that their power with regard to immigration was only on the level of political discourse, 
but did not affect any major policy decisions (Interview with a senior Home Office civil 
servant, 2015).  
 
Apart from the Conservative Party and the Home Office, there was another important 
actor that framed immigration negatively and had an influence on immigration decision-
making process. MWUK also contributed to the negative framing of immigration, by 
lobbying for restrictive immigration policies in right-wing British newspapers (Interview 
with t the secretary of state for BIS Vince Cable, 2016). MWUK was advocating their 
views on immigration and spreading the message across the Conservative Party by 
briefing the special advisors to ministers, because there was more accessibility to 
ministers’ special advisors rather than to those from the Home Office, which was an 
effective way to get the message across (Interview with the MWUK, 2015). Knowing that 
MWUK had leverage on immigration salience in the right-wing media, Conservatives 
took a hard line on immigration to prevent its electorate from defecting to UKIP (Interview 
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with the secretary of state for BIS Vince Cable, 2016). Framing was the only available 
mechanism for the Conservative Party while it was in opposition because the party did 
not have any decision-making powers, but once the party got back to the office and 
formed a Coalition government with the Liberal Democrats, then, in addition to framing, 
the competition among governmental departments shaped British immigration policy.  
 
4.5.2 Departmental competition  
In an important sense the competition between governmental departments was the 
primary mechanism shaping the UK immigration policy under the Coalition government. 
Framing was still present because it shaped their immigration discourse, but 
departmental competition determined to the actual process of immigration policy-making. 
Its essence was that the departments did not have the same views on the content of 
immigration policies and that their views were different from those of the Home Office. 
In the Coalition government the clashes were not only between the Conservatives and 
the Liberal Democrats, but also within the Conservative Party. The explanation for why 
certain ideas won over the others lies within the availability of resources that particular 
departments had compared to others. Resources, it should be said, do not here imply 
simply financial capital that the departments had in their disposition, but rather the 
political authority, support and decision-making powers. 
 
This competition took a shape of consistent security-economy debate between the Home 
Office and the BIS. BIS made numerous efforts to neutralise Home Office’s restrictive 
policies, however with limited success. It prevented the introduction of a cap for 
international students and the introduction of more advanced English language 
requirements (Interview with the secretary of state for BIS, Vince Cable, 2016). The 
institutional constraint of being in a Coalition government restrained the choices of the 
Liberal Democrats on immigration policy, but, at the same time, being a Coalition partner, 
allowed the Liberal Democrats to act as a brake on the policies proposed by the 
Conservatives and the Home Office. With the support of the deputy prime minister Nick 
Clegg, the Liberal Democrats were able to influence immigration policy-making, because 
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the Conservative Party could not completely disregard the view of its Coalition partner. 
The lack of communication between the home secretary and other governmental actors 
and departments led to numerous tensions and misunderstandings, particularly on 
student migration, not only between Coalition partners, but also between the 
Conservative Party MP’s (Interview with a SpAD to a Conservative minister, 2015). 
 
Departmental competition within the government led to the implementation of more 
restrictive immigration policies because the Home Office and the home secretary had 
the prime minister’s patronage in immigration policy making. Previous research has 
arrived to similar conclusion (Hampshire and Bale, 2015). The example of the policy on 
including international students in the net migration target demonstrates how restrictive 
policy choices dominated with institutional constraints influencing the choices of 
departments. The tensions between economic BIS and the Treasury, on one hand, and, 
the political Home Office, on the other hand, indicated the diversity in policy preferences. 
BIS, led by the Liberal Democrat Vince Cable, alongside the Ministry for the Universities 
and Skills, led by a conservative minister David Willetts fought hard to get international 
students out of the net target. But despite the Treasury’s agreement with the argument, 
it did not officially go against the Home Office because of the institutional constraints of 
being outvoted in the cabinet meetings (Interview with a former SPaD to a Conservative 
minister, 2015). The ideas of the Home Office and the home secretary dominated as 
they had prime minister’s patronage, which gave the home secretary the authority to 
pursue a more restrictive approach. Prime minister’s patronage was key in the 
development of the UK immigration policy because it gave the home secretary the 
authority to pursue more restrictive approach. 
 
The Home Office has control over immigration, but actually David Cameron and 
Number 10, he is the prime minister, you know, he could sack Theresa May if he 
wanted to. Number 10 got really frustrated […] saying that “why are you lobbying 
Number 10 not to support the Home Office? It’s prime minister’s job to support the 
Home Secretary”. (Interview with a former SpAD to a Conservative minister, 2015). 
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The prime minister and the home secretary acted as a unified front, and even in the case 
if disagreements between them existed, they were not made public. Despite the 
opposition to some immigration policies not only from the Liberal Democrats, prime 
minister’s patronage allowed the home secretary to pursue her view of immigration 
policy. However, the importance of the prime minister’s ultimate control cannot be 
underestimated and that he always had the last word in immigration policy-making. Thus, 
when originally thought limitation of intra-company transfers (ICT) by quantity was not 
accepted by David Cameron, MAC came up with the idea to limit the ICT by price 
(introducing minimum salary threshold) (Interview with the chair of the MAC, David 
Metcalf, 2015). Immigration policy was driven by the Home Office and the Home 
secretary, but the in case of disagreements, the apparatus of the Number 10 was an 
ultimate decision-making authority. The malfunctioning of control mechanisms allowed 
the home secretary to pursue her line on immigration. Although consequential migration 
policy changes required a collective discussion within the government, the mechanisms 
that could have prevented the implementation of certain policies or ideas were not viable.  
 
And if the Home Ofﬁce wants a really big migration change, it still has to get a 
collective sign off even though it has sole control over policy, there is still a 
mechanism, where it has to tell the other bits of government. […] I spoke to 
someone who used to be on the Home Affairs committee, the former minister and 
he said: “Theresa May would bring those ideas to Home Affairs committee and 
everybody there would say it’s a bad idea and she will just get back to the Home 
Ofﬁce and do it anyway because there isn’t really a mechanism for checking”. 
(Interview with a former SpAD to a Conservative minister, 2015). 
 
It is not strictly true that there was no mechanism for checking, because there was an 
option for the cabinet to outvote Theresa May in collective discussions, but the prime 
ministerial patronage that she had, was making the control mechanisms like full cabinet 
less likely to have been activated. The immigration policies could have been even more 
restrictive if the Liberal Democrats did not act as a consistent brake on the policies the 
Home Office and the home secretary wanted to pursue (Interview with the UUK, 2016; 
Interview with the secretary of state for BIS, Vince Cable, 2016; Interview with the Home 
Office civil servant, 2015). The Conservatives were responsible for the major toughening 
in the UK immigration policy under the Coalition government because they had more 
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leverage, more resources and the Home Office and the home secretary had prime 
minister’s patronage on the issue. Immigration policies under the Coalition government 
could have been even more restrictive if the Liberal Democrats would not have acted as 
a constraint on the Conservative Party and the Home Office. Liberal Democrats’ major 
gains on immigration were in the field of student migration. They prevented the 
introduction of quotas for international students and the introduction of higher English 
language requirement for international students, which the Home Office lobbied for 
(Interview with the secretary of state for BIS Vince Cable, 2016; Interview with the UUK, 
2016). The Home Office compromised on certain issues because it was a Coalition 
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government and the views of the Liberal Democrats could not be completely ignored by 
the Conservatives. However, the main difficulty that the Liberal Democrats faced in 
pushing their position on immigration is that they were the minor partner and could have 
been outvoted in cabinet discussions, which was a major institutional constraint. As it 
was a coalition, certain compromises were made, but the Conservative Party managed 
to change UK immigration policy in a way that was much more suitable for them than for 
the Liberal Democrats. 
 
4.5.3 Causal chain of the change in Conservative’s immigration stance and 
evolution of the British immigration policy 
 
 
The last part of this chapter offers an account of a complete causal chain of 
Conservative’s change on immigration in opposition and within the Coalition government. 
As Beach and Pedersen (2008: 30) highlight for a mechanism to occur, there should be 
a presence of both entity and activity in order to produce an outcome.  
 
4.6 Conclusion 
Changes in immigration stance of the Conservative Party and subsequent UK 
immigration policy change is explained through a set of exogenous factors that 
influenced the Conservative’s decision-making. Shifts in public opinion, the rise of UKIP, 
perceived economic anxieties of the public over immigration, the effects of the EU 
integration and the increasing the salience of immigration by interest groups like the 
MWUK led the Conservative Party to toughen their immigration stance. Process tracing 
established that those factors influenced the Conservative Party’s stance, but did not 
identify which ones played a more important role than others. Hypothesis five, that the 
global financial crisis, was a cause of linking immigration to social security concerns and 
redefining of immigration through social welfare lens was disconfirmed. Immigration 
policy was driven more by political dynamics rather than by economic need and this 
reframing was driven by the lack of control over EU migration and the impossibility to 
achieve the net migration target. Hypothesis six, that perceived identity anxieties 
underpinned Conservative’s logic on immigration policy change was disconfirmed as 
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there was no evidence found in the analysis of the data that supported this claim. 
Furthermore, the analysis of elite interviews pointed to two more factors that led the 
Conservatives to adopt more restrictive immigration stance. First, partial loss of 
sovereignty to the EU on immigration policy and on welfare redistribution for EU migrants 
led to the more restrictive immigration stance on EU migration, which eventually resulted 
in declaring the Brexit referendum. Second, the analysis of interviews revealed that 
Home Office’s ideological dogmatism was one of the agency-related factors that 
underpinned the introduction of restrictive immigration policies. Thus, Home Office’s 
ideological dogmatism put ideology before evidence and manifested itself in the control 
over agenda setting and over evidence. It allowed the home secretary to steer 
immigration policy in the direction suitable for her, which signalled that the Home Office’s 
approach was not evidence based, but was driven by a policy aimed at reducing the net 
migration target by all means. 
 
The Conservative’s approach to social security concerns was not only limited to EU 
migrants, it was about neoliberal preference for the party to limit welfare for everybody, 
including British citizens. Even though structural factors were responsible for the change, 
agency was crucial in choosing particular structures that shaped its choices. The Home 
Office’s control over agenda setting, evidence twisting and lack of communication among 
governmental departments were instrumental in pursuing more restrictive immigration 
stance. This demonstrates that structures are not immune to the influence of the agency 
and that there is a two-way relationship between structure and agency.  
 
Two major mechanisms allowed the Conservative Party to pursue more a restrictive 
immigration discourse. Framing was an argumentative mechanism that allowed the 
Conservatives, the Home Office and the MWUK to argue for more restrictive immigration 
policy. The competition between governmental departments was the mechanism 
responsible for immigration policy making, shaping the UK immigration policy under the 
Coalition government. This manifested itself in numerous tensions between the Home 
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Office on one hand, and BIS, on the other hand, especially on the topic of student and 
labour migration. However, the clashes between did not only affect two coalition 
partners, but also were happening within the Conservative Party. The explanation for 
why certain ideas won over the others lies within the availability of resources that 
particular departments had compared to others. By resources it is not necessarily meant 
financial capital that the departments had in their disposition, but rather political authority, 
decision-making powers and support from other political actors. The Home Office and 
the home secretary were able to pursue their immigration policy stance because they 
had prime minister’s patronage that allowed them to steer the policy in their direction. 
However, Liberal Democrats as a coalition partner had certain leverage on decision-
making, but it was much less than they expected to have had.  
 
The findings suggest that, despite the importance of exogenous factors, agency cannot 
be disregarded by pointing to the Home Office’s ideological dogmatism as crucial in 
shaping British immigration policy in a restrictive direction. The Home Office’s control 
over immigration agenda setting and evidence was possible as the home secretary had 
the prime minister’s patronage on the issue. This finding highlights that theories that 
explain party position change from agency related explanations (Harmel and Janda, 
1994; Janda et al., 1995; Harmel and Tan, 2003) should consider a new dimension of 
political patronage of powerful actors within the party that make some policy choices 
prevail over the other ones. 
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Chapter 5 
Immigration policy and the SVP: resisting the EU and fighting Switzerland’s so-
called ‘Islamisation’  
 
5.1 Introduction  
On the 9th of February 2014 the Swiss people voted in favour of limiting EU migration to 
Switzerland. The Initiative Against Mass Migration, launched by the conservative SVP 
(UDC in French translation, Union Démocratique du Centre), was aimed to restrict 
immigration from the EU and undermine the free movement of people. The result of the 
initiative showed the dissatisfaction with the free movement of people, to which 
Switzerland adhered in 1999. SVP played a key role in the success of the Initiative as it 
has always been a proponent of limiting migration and has maintained its hard line 
Eurosceptic stance since the theme of Swiss accession to the EU came onto the agenda 
in mid-1980s (McGann and Kitschelt, 2005: 152). By a tiny margin Swiss people 
supported the Initiative, with the majority of people (50.3 per cent) and the majority of 
cantons accepting it (Federal Office for Migration, 2014). The result of the Initiative 
became a critical juncture in Swiss immigration policy. Approaching the deadline for the 
implementation of the Initiative, in December 2016 Swiss parliament voted not impose 
quotas on immigration from the EU, but instead opted to safeguard Swiss economic 
interests by prioritising Swiss in the process of hiring for a job (Sécretariat d’Etat aux 
Migrations, 2017). This prioritisation concerns only certain professions, activities and 
economic regions that have average or higher than average unemployment rate 
(Maurisse, 2016). In the last three years the immigration debate was focused on the 
relationship between Switzerland and the EU, particularly on the issue of the free 
movement of persons. SVP’s reaction to the implementation of the Initiative Against 
Mass Migration was negative, with the party accusing the government and the parliament 
for not following the will of the people (Nidegger, 2016). This Initiative was one of the key 
examples of SVP’s attempts to make Swiss immigration policy more restrictive between 
2003 and 2015.  
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The SVP has been a central actor in the Swiss immigration debate in the last twenty 
years, raising the salience of immigration on the national agenda. Immigration became 
a major issue on the party’s agenda only in the 1990s, when the party shifted toward a 
more radical direction, which happened under the leadership of Blocher and yielded 
substantial electoral gains (Mazzoleni and Skenderovic, 2007: 93-94). The electoral rise 
of the SVP gave them the “ability to take control of the national political agenda” 
(Albertazzi, 2008: 100), with immigration becoming a major topic of Swiss political 
debates (Skenderovic, 2009). The party was becoming mainstream among Swiss voters 
and becoming the largest party in the National Council in 2003, by taking votes from two 
major right-wing parties FDP (Liberal party) and CVP (Christian Democratic party of 
Switzerland) (Lutz, 2006: 193). Thus, being the most popular party in Switzerland since 
2003 and having immigration and Euroscepticism at the centre of its political agenda, 
SVP has been a major driver of immigration policy change. 
 
Switzerland stands out from other European countries due to a number of features. First, 
Switzerland, not being a member of the EU cooperates with the Union through a set of 
bilateral agreements, which gives Switzerland more freedom from the EU than if it was 
a member state, but also imposes certain constraints. Second, the uniqueness of the 
Swiss political system of consensual democracy allows for the voices of smaller parties 
and groups to be represented while direct democracy makes the voices of the population 
heard, permitting smaller parties to have an influence on the policy-making process. As 
Afonso (2005: 656) pinpoints: “Every legal change proposed by the government is 
dependent upon the approval of all potential veto players who could launch a 
referendum, which makes the state only weakly autonomous vis-a-vis societal interests”. 
Third, Switzerland has one of the highest shares of foreigners, which equals 
approximately twenty-five per cent to its population (Federal Statistical Office, 2016), 
which makes immigration a prominent topic on the political agenda. Since the 1960s, the 
Swiss population has grown from over five to over eight million people, mostly through 
migration (Nguyen and Mariani, 2014). Finally, the country’s strong economy with 
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relatively its low unemployment rate of four per cent compared to the European average 
(OECD, 2017) is still largely dependent on foreign labour, yet the economic aspect of 
immigration still poses anxieties for the Swiss as it was highlighted by the 2014 Initiative 
Against Mass Migration.  
 
The chapter identifies major exogenous factors that underpinned the evolution of the 
Swiss immigration policy and key causal mechanisms that account for immigration policy 
change in Switzerland between 2003 and 2015. It does this to demonstrate to what 
extent immigration policy change in Switzerland can be explained from a structuralist 
perspective and what role agency related factors play in the Swiss case. 
 
5.1.1 Argument  
Based on the hypotheses, established in chapter two, this chapter argues that between 
2003 and 2015, the SVP contributed to the redefinition of the Swiss immigration policy 
in a more restrictive manner as a response to several factors, which are derived from the 
theories of party policy change. This chapter hypotheses that SVP’s logic on immigration 
policy change was underpinned by the importance of the public opinion, which has also 
been massively engineered by the party over the years. It should be said that the SVP 
did not only respond to public opinion it also influenced it through aggressive and 
professionally set communication campaigns. The goal is not to demonstrate that the 
SVP created public opinion, but to test if the party policies were driven by it. Furthermore, 
the SVP hardened its position on immigration as a response to growing economic 
concerns over immigration, including global financial crisis, anxieties about EU and the 
decrease of Swiss sovereignty to the EU and, finally, unease with the integration of 
Muslims to the Swiss society.  
 
 
 
5.1.2 Plan of the Chapter  
The chapter is laid out as follows. First, it proceeds with a brief discussion of the historical 
context of immigration to Switzerland after the Second World War and the dependence 
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of the Swiss economy on the foreign labour. Then, it considers Swiss-EU relations and 
highlights the cornerstones in their development, as Euroscepticism has been a 
dominant feature of the SVP. It then considers the idiosyncratic features of the Swiss 
political system. It also examines SVP’s manifestos for 2007, 2011 and 2015 federal 
elections. The third section explores causal factors that led the SVP to pursue their 
restrictive stance on immigration. The fourth section sheds light on the mechanisms and 
provides an explanation of the process of policy change. It also revisits the original 
hypotheses and draws a complete causal chain of Swiss immigration policy change 
between 2003 and 2015. The chapter concludes by pointing to importance of exogenous 
factors for providing an insight to the SVP’s restrictive immigration stance and 
subsequent policy change, pointing to the intersection between economic anxieties and 
identity concerns as drivers of change. Finally, the chapter highlights the importance of 
the party’s agency in triggering a direct democracy mechanism, which accounted for 
major policy change.   
 
 
5.2 Setting out the context  
In recent decades immigration-policy making in Switzerland has been restrictive, both 
regarding immigration and integration (Manatschal, 2015: 23). However, this has not 
always been the case and there were times when Switzerland sought foreigners, needed 
as a labour force. Immigration has been a crucial issue for Switzerland since the end of 
the Second World War, when the country was in need of foreign labour during the 
economic recovery (D’Amato, 2014: 310) and later, during the economic boom in 1950s 
(Piguet, 2013: 15). However, large arrivals of labour immigrants, which increased from 
six per cent to 17 in the period following the Second World War and just before the arrival 
of the 1970s oil crisis (Piguet, 2013: 23), started to pose concerns for radical right parties 
in Switzerland. The Movement against ‘Over-foreignisation’, which consisted of radical 
right populist Swiss populist parties, wanted to restrict increased migration into 
Switzerland (Skenderovic, 2009: 57). The culmination of this Movement’s activities was 
the Schwarzenbach Initiative that was voted in 1970 and ‘aimed at reduction of the 
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immigrant share from the 17 per cent to 10 per cent’ (Manatschal 2015: 24). Even though 
this Initiative was rejected by the population, it was done so only by a small margin, with 
fifty-five per cent of population voting against (Riaño and Wastl-Walter, 2006: 1701). This 
demonstrated that anti-immigrant attitudes were quite strong with almost the majority of 
the population voting in favour of restricting immigration. Furthermore, the oil crisis of the 
1970s only added to this, by creating an economic downturn, which led to the outflow of 
economic migrants from Switzerland, keeping the unemployment rate low as Switzerland 
at that time did not have mandatory unemployment insurance (Afonso, 2005: 654). In 
the beginning of the nineties, unemployment became a problem for Switzerland as 
unskilled guest workers faced challenges in finding a job (D’Amato, 2014: 311). During 
the nineties the SVP, whose rhetoric was becoming increasingly anti-immigration, 
started to emerge as a serious contender, becoming a national party and doubling its 
support in the 2003 federal elections (Buhlmann et al., 2006: 3; Kriesi et al., 2005).  
 
Since 2003, when the SVP managed to score the highest number of seats in the Swiss 
federal elections and to achieve the ‘magic formula’ of Swiss government by taking an 
additional seat (Burgos et al., 2011), it has become one of the crucial parties in 
Switzerland. Furthermore, it managed to substantially influence the development of the 
Swiss immigration policy as immigration has been a central theme of its agenda. As 
Ruedin and D’Amato (2015: 10) put it: ‘the debate on immigration and integration in 
Switzerland cannot be separated from the electoral success of the Swiss People’s Party 
(SVP)’. SVP remains a key player on Swiss policy-making arena, especially with regards 
to immigration. A lot of the research on the SVP has been done on the demand side of 
the Swiss conservatism, focusing on SVP’s electoral rise and its support (Albertazzi and 
McDcDonnel 2015; Gottraux and Pechu, 2011; Gottraux and Pechu, 2016; Sciarini et 
al., 2014; Skenderovic, 2009; Mazzoleni et al., 2007; Mazzoleni, 2008; Mazzoleni and 
Skenderovic, 2007). Furthermore, immigration policy-making in Switzerland has been 
extensively studied (Ackermann and Freitag, 2015; Afonso, 2005; Afonso, 2007; Afonso, 
2014; Fischer et al., 2002; Manatschal, 2015). This study combines immigration policy-
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making and the role of the SVP in it by shedding the light on the logic of immigration 
policy change in Switzerland.  
  
5.2.1 Swiss-EU relations  
The Immigration debate in Switzerland is largely based around the country’s relationship 
with the EU, focusing on the bilateral agreements and, particularly the free movement of 
people. Furthermore, examining Switzerland’s relationship with the EU is important in 
understanding the SVP’s Eurosceptic character and subsequent approach to 
immigration. As the 2014 Initiative Against Mass Migration demonstrated, a substantial 
part of the relationship between Switzerland and the EU is indeed about the free 
movement of people. Having close ties with the EU, but not being a member of it has 
both benefits and disadvantages. Not being part of the EU comes for Switzerland as a 
detriment of the participation in the EU decision-making (Lavenex and Schwok, 2015: 
36). Skipping a series of phases of stagnation and multilateral failures, Switzerland and 
the EU eventually came to enhanced unilateral and bilateral integration between 1993 
and 2004 (Kriesi and Trechsel, 2008: 172-180), which produced a series of important 
bilateral agreements, including Switzerland’s accession to the free movement of people.  
 
This enhanced cooperation started after the failure of the Swiss to support joining the 
European Economic Area (EEA). The Swiss have always been reluctant about relations 
with EU and when the question of joining the EEA came on the agenda in 1992, the 
population rejected it “at the polls by a thin majority (50.3 per cent) of the voters and a 
comfortable cantonal majority (eighteen of twenty-six cantons)” (Kriesi and Trechsel, 
2008: 177). The rejection of EEA agreement in 1992 resulted in continuing talks between 
Switzerland and the EU to avoid “economic discrimination and political isolation” (Dupont 
and Sciarini, 2007: 202). As a result of the discussions, seven agreements were signed 
in 1999, called the Bilateral Agreement I, which contained the agreement on the 
introduction of the free movement of people with the EU and opened to Switzerland 
access to the EU single market (Schwok and Najy, 2016: 127). A year later the 
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Agreement was supported by the large majority of the population, with sixty-eight per 
cent voting in favour of it (Federal Department of Foreign Affairs, 2013: 5). This opened 
the Swiss labour market first to the members the EU-15 and, then, to other members 
which joined the EU during subsequent enlargements (Afonso, 2010: 64). The Swiss 
population approved the extension of free movement of people to new Eastern member 
states in 2007 (Department of Foreign Affairs, 2013: 5). With Bulgaria and Romania 
joining the EU in 2007, Switzerland signed Protocol II in 2008 regarding the extension of 
the free movement of people to Romania and Bulgaria, which was also supported by the 
population (State secretariat for migration, 2017). However, as the result of the Initiative 
Against Mass Migration demonstrated, the attitude of the Swiss towards the free 
movement of people changed in a negative direction and became a major issue on the 
national political agenda. As Koch and Lavenex, 2007: 148) underline: “[t]he opening of 
Swiss borders to the free movement of persons from the European Union has often been 
and, with EU enlargement, is once again, probably, the most contentious issue in 
Switzerland’s relationship with the Union”.  
 
Switzerland’s prospects of joining the EU remain very slim, as there is major opposition 
from the public. Even though, every single time the Swiss supported the extension of 
free movement of people to the EU new member states, the question of joining the EU 
was never favoured by the Swiss (Schwok, 2010: 9). The acceptance of 2014 Initiative 
Against Mass Migration highlighted the anxieties about uncontrolled EU migration. In 
2015 the polls indicated that about half of Swiss voters are opposed to any further EU 
integration or the prospect of Switzerland joining the EU (Ackerman and Freitag, 2015: 
42) because they want to keep their sovereignty (Ackerman and Freitag, 2015: 36). 
Signing bilateral agreements was a compromise in the development of the relationship 
between Switzerland and the EU, which aimed to enhance economic cooperation 
between the two (Koch and Lavenex, 2007: 161).  
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The acceptance of the Initiative Against Mass Migration in February 2014 has 
endangered Swiss-EU relations. The relationship has become problematic as the 
Initiative aimed to restrict the principle of free movement of people, which is incompatible 
with the Bilateral Agreement I because of the so-called ‘guillotine clause’, which states 
that if one of the agreements is cancelled, it automatically leads to suspension of others 
(Schwok and Najy, 2016: 128). Approaching the deadline for the implementation of the 
Initiative the Swiss parliament, in December 2016, voted to approve the amendment to 
the constitution, giving national priority to the Swiss in the process of employment and 
not imposing any quotas on EU immigration (Secrétariat d’Etat aux migrations, 2017). 
New provisions to the legislation will give priority to Swiss job seekers and those people, 
including foreigners, who are registered at the Swiss unemployment office (l’Assemblée 
Fédérale, 2016). The European Commission was pleased that no quotas have been 
introduced, but still aims to see how the new law is going to be implemented (Maurisse, 
2016). The SVP has been disappointed with this decision, claiming that parliament has 
not respected the will of the people.  Some party national councillors expressed a view 
that there is a likelihood that the popular initiative will be launched to abandon the article 
on the free movement of persons, which will not come directly from the party, but from 
one of its satellites like AUNS (Campaign for Independent and Neutral Switzerland) 
(Nidegger, 2016). In February 2017 two party branches (Valais and Neuchâtel) launched 
cantonal initiatives that aim to prioritise giving work to Swiss nationals and foreigners 
residing in these cantons (UDC Neuchâtel, 2017; UDC Valais, 2017), which highlights 
the importance of direct democracy in Swiss policy-making.  
 
5.2.3 Idiosyncrasies of the Swiss political system  
Switzerland represents a special case because, unlike in other European countries, 
“policy-making in the Swiss parliament does not happen through stable coalitions where 
the same parties negotiate among themselves prior to any political debate. Parties form 
changing majorities on an issue by issue basis” (Lutz, 2012: 689). The nature of Swiss 
consensus democracy requires major parties to come to an agreement during the policy-
making process. Policy-making does not happen only through parliamentary means, but 
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also through the direct democratic route. Direct democracy serves as a tool for people 
and parties to set the agenda by launching initiatives, their attempts to influence the 
policy-making process. Therefore, political parties have an opportunity to resort to direct 
democracy if they are able to collect 100,000 signatures to launch a federal initiative or 
50,000 to launch an optional referendum (Papadopoulos, 1997). This provides parties 
with a tool to express their concerns if they feel that their position is not taken into account 
– even if they are a member of the government (Mazzoleni and Skenderovic, 2007: 98). 
The Swiss system of consensus democracy allows the SVP to “claim that its preferences 
are ignored by other parties even if they participate in government, and regularly uses 
the tools of direct democracy (initiatives and referendums) to challenge government 
decisions” (Afonso, 2013: 25). Furthermore, the importance of direct democracy to 
immigration policy making is based on the fact that “every legal change in the domain of 
immigration or integration policy is subject to the approval of all significant political 
groups” (Afonso, 2005: 656). It is important to stress that the necessity of cross-party 
agreement does not only refer to immigration, but applies to any other policy domain. 
SVP has been using direct democracy to push for more restrictive immigration policies, 
but also to oppose closer cooperation between Switzerland and the EU. As Albertazzi 
and McDonnell (2015: 121) highlight: “direct democracy played a major role in the SVP’s 
attempts to oppose the federal government on EU-related issues in recent decades”. Not 
only has direct democracy allowed the SVP to pursue their immigration stance, but 
“made it possible for the national SVP to play the role of an opposition party and 
undermine the consensual rules of Swiss governance” (Skenderovic, 2009: 135). Below 
the chapter discusses how these two distinct features of consensual and direct 
democracy affected the evolution of Swiss immigration policy. The importance of direct 
democracy in Swiss policy-making cannot be disregarded, therefore the chapter also 
examines the referendums and the initiatives pertinent to immigration and the EU 
between 2003 and 2015.  
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5.3 SVP’s immigration stance  
 
5.3.1 Manifestos   
SVP’s rhetoric has been more or less consistent since 1980s and was concentrated 
primarily around the protection of Switzerland from immigrants, in particular Muslims, 
criminals, and from international influence, primarily from the EU and its institutions 
(Albertazzi and McDonnell, 2015: 117). Since its electoral rise in 1991, the party has 
been able to redefine the immigration debate and bring this issue to the top of the 
national agenda. Thus, the SVP’s first major victory came in 1992, when the EEA Treaty 
was rejected by the Swiss people in a nation-wide referendum, despite the majority of 
the political elite accepting the Treaty (Linder, 2013: 191). The party “has supported the 
isolation of the country with respect to European integration, the defence of Switzerland’s 
key institutions (neutrality, direct democracy, and federalism) and the tightening of the 
country’s immigration and asylum policy” (Varone et al., 2014: 108). In Switzerland 
immigration is central to its political economy as the country is dependent on the foreign 
labour and hence, immigration policy has been a salient issue on the national agenda 
with the SVP being able to influence its development substantially (Afonso, 2013: 24). 
Furthermore, the party was also able to capitalise on anxieties around national identity 
(Kriesi and Trechsel, 2008: 95). Even though the party’s manifestos have not changed 
much between 2003 and 2015, the SVP’s discourse showed signs of radicalisation 
primarily throughout the visual advertisement campaigns, including infamous ad on 
which white sheep kicking out a black sheep, which was prepared for the Initiative for 
expelling criminal foreigners. The other prominent example of hardening of SVP’s 
rhetoric referred to the Initiative against the construction of minarets, with a poster 
showing a woman in full veil behind the Swiss flag, covered by minarets. This kind of 
visual advertisement has proved to be a successful tactic in convincing the public to 
support the SVP’s initiatives.    
 
The electoral rise of the SVP has had a profound impact on the Swiss party system as 
since 1991 the rise of the party has been steady, with the SVP becoming the most 
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popular party in Switzerland in 2003, primarily on an anti-immigrant and anti-EU platform 
(Skenderovic, 2009). The party more than doubled their seats in the National Council, 
rising from twenty-five seats in 1991 to fifty-four in 2011 (Afonso, 2013: 24). The 2015 
federal election showed that the party only reinforced its electoral success, gaining sixty-
five seats in the National Council and beating its own record of 2007 (Bernhard, 2016: 
882). The chapter does not delve into the discussion of SVP’s electoral success, but 
demonstrates that since gaining major electoral support in 2003, the party has been able 
to exert influence on Swiss immigration policy-making not only through the tools of direct 
democracy, but also, partially, through the parliamentary route.  
 
The importance of showing the electoral success of the party is also pertinent to the 
redefinition of the Swiss political system, which allowed the SVP to have an impact on 
immigration policy-making through governmental channels. Hence, the 2003 election 
result altered the so-called ‘magic formula’ of Swiss government, an agreement between 
four major political parties that fixed the allocation of seats in the federal government and 
which remained unchanged for more than forty years (Burgos et al., 2011). The ‘magic 
formula’ allocated only one seat for the SVP in the seven-member Swiss government, 
but with the SVP becoming the largest party in 2003, it gained a second seat in the 
Federal Council, with the election of SVP’s leader Christoph Blocher (Meuwly, 2010: 
133). Changing of the ‘magic formula’ and Blocher’s role as a chief of the Federal 
Department of Justice and Police (FDJP) allowed the SVP to influence the direction of 
immigration policy-making and bring immigration to the forefront of the governmental 
agenda. However, after Christoph Blocher failed to get reelected to Swiss government 
in 2007, the party became confrontational (Bernhard, 2016: 879), which changed the 
direction of party’s efforts, with the SVP concentrating on direct democratic methods of 
changing Swiss immigration policy. Before proceeding with the examination of the 
initiatives and referendums launched by the SVP, the chapter depicts the SVP’s 
positions on immigration and the EU as the development of immigration policy is 
underpinned by the influence of European integration. It examines electoral pledges on 
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immigration, derived from SVP’s manifestos before 2007, 2011 and 2015 federal 
elections. 
 
 
Immigration policy in 2007 Federal election manifesto 
The 2007 electoral programme concentrated on tackling family migration, integration and 
opposition to the EU. The SVP criticised family migration, by claiming that this route 
represents half of the immigration inflow and does not bring economic benefits. The 
question of integration and national identity appeared in the manifesto with SVP 
reinstating the importance of immigrant’s integration and their respect of Swiss traditional 
values and laws. Although, never mentioned explicitly, anti-Islam sentiment constituted 
a substantial part of SVP’s rhetoric on national identity, picturing two women in 
headscarves with the title under the picture “Are we the foreigners in our own country?” 
(SVP, 2007: 44). On the EU question, the party attributed Switzerland’s success of 
choosing the bilateral route with the EU to itself and demanded the withdrawal of Swiss 
application to join the EU (SVP, 2007: 17). The major opposition to the EU was directed 
against the loss of sovereignty as, according to the party, the EU is a super state, forcing 
political union on its members and imposing foreign policy, security and common 
currency, which Switzerland should not agree to (SVP, 2007: 17). The problems that 
Switzerland faces should be resolved with its own legislation, not the one imposed by 
the EU (SVP, 2007: 18).  
 
2011 Federal election manifesto 
The previously discussed free movement of people appeared in the SVP’s manifesto for 
the first time in 2011. The SVP argued for a renegotiation of the principle stressing that 
people “were promised that the benefits would outweigh the disadvantages, and that 
quotas could be imposed as a safety valve if things got out of hand. We were also 
assured that freedom of movement would be limited to those who had jobs or were 
capable of supporting themselves” (SVP, 2011: 54). Thus, the dissatisfaction with the 
free movement of people was linked to social security concerns, with the party arguing 
that unemployed EU migrants are attracted by Switzerland’s social security provision 
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(SVP, 2011: 54). The rhetoric of blaming immigrants for high unemployment rates, 
particularly in border regions, was also present in the manifesto (SVP, 2011: 54-55). The 
party also linked immigration to the discourse of law and order, by reinstating its position 
on the Initiative on expelling criminal foreigners and its strict implementation (SVP, 2011: 
56). Finally, national identity anxieties were also part of the party’s agenda that wanted 
the Initiative Against the Construction of Minarets to be fully respected, emphasising the 
supremacy of the “Swiss law and traditions” (SVP, 2011: 56). The SVP’s rhetoric on the 
EU remained exactly the same as it was before the 2007 federal election: the primary 
demand was to withdraw the EU accession application because from the SVP’s point of 
view, EU posed a threat to Switzerland’s direct democracy (SVP, 2011: 37). Strong 
opposition to the EU came also from the necessity to co-exist with EU law and EU 
institutions (SVP, 2011: 37).  
 
2015 Federal election manifesto 
The exact same phrase opens the 2015 electoral pledge on immigration as it was in 
2011: “Excessive immigration is detrimental to Switzerland because it has an impact 
infrastructure, unemployment rates, wage pressure and welfare budget” (SVP, 2015: 
31). The party criticised the government’s integration policies that use taxpayer’s money 
on immigrants’ integration, which should be the responsibility of the migrant, according 
to the SVP, not the responsibility of the state (SVP, 2015: 33). After the successful 9th 
of February 2014 vote, the party stressed the importance of the implementation of the 
Initiative against mass migration, that aimed to ensure the introduction of annual quotas 
on EU immigration and the implementation of the national preference for Swiss nationals 
during the employment process (SVP, 2015: 33). Immigration became linked to welfare 
discourse through family migration with the SVP claiming that immigrants have access 
to too many benefits. 
 
The SVP maintained its hardcore Eurosceptic position, demanding to suspend the free 
movement of people, by introducing annual quotas and ensuring the supremacy of Swiss 
law over the EU law. The programme stated that the agreement on the free movement 
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of people should be renegotiated and that in case of failure to do so, the agreement 
should be suspended (SVP, 2015: 34). The SVP threatened to launch a new initiative if 
Swiss government and parliament refuse to apply the new constitutional provision on 
immigration quotas (SVP, 2015: 34). The party’s main criticism was on the necessity for 
Swiss law to adhere to EU law, more precisely the opposition to the adherence to the 
European law on the Swiss territory by opposing the jurisdiction of the European Court 
of Justice (ECJ) on disputes between Switzerland and the EU. According to the SVP 
Switzerland’s independence was being threatened by Brussels (SVP, 2015: 12-13).  
 
Between 2003 and 2015 the main change in the SVP’s immigration rhetoric comes with 
the opposition to the free movement of people in 2011, when it appears in the manifesto. 
However, it should be said that immigration has been rising sharply since 2007 global 
crisis unfolded. Net migration constituted 83, 000 in 2007, rising from almost 50,000 in 
2006 and reaching its highest ever level in 2008 of 103,000 net migration (Office 
Fédérale de la Statistique, 2016). This created concerns for the SVP as the party argued 
that such a high number of immigration could not be absorbed without having a negative 
impact on the system. In the SVP’s discourse, immigration has been linked to law and 
order and to the discourse on social security. Concerns over welfare were linked to family 
migration routes and to intra-EU immigration. The question of integration was also a 
prominent issue on the SVP’s agenda, primarily dominated by anti-Islam sentiments. 
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Their Eurosceptic stance remained the same: there has been consistent opposition from 
the party towards the EU over the years as the SVP viewed it as a threat to Swiss national 
interests and legislation.  
 
5.3.2 Policy change 
Since its electoral rise in 1991, the SVP has been using direct democracy as a tool to 
pursue more restrictive immigration policies and to oppose Switzerland’s integration into 
the EU with its first major success in 1992, when the EEA Treaty was rejected. Despite 
 
 
• tackle family 
migration; 
 
• enhance integration; 
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application; 
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national identity;  
 
• anti-Islamic 
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only to those 
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application; 
 
 
• linking the free 
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to social security 
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position on expelling 
criminal foreigners; 
 
• tougher integration 
requirements, 
focusing on 
Muslims. 
 
 
• integration is a 
matter of individual, 
not of the state, 
reduce state 
expenditure on 
integration; 
 
• implement the 
Initiative Against 
Mass Migration by 
introducing national 
preference on the 
labour market;  
 
• withdraw EU 
accession 
application; 
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free movement of 
people;  
 
• ensure the 
supremacy of the 
Swiss law over the 
EU law; 
 
• limit immigrants’ 
access to benefits; 
Table 3: SVP’s Manifesto pledges, 2007-2015. 
2007 Manifesto              2011 Manifesto    2015 
 123 
being the most popular party in Switzerland since 2003, the SVP presented itself as an 
anti-governmental party and launched numerous initiatives, which increased immigration 
salience over the years and by launching optional referendums, which acted as veto 
instruments for governmental decisions on immigration and EU matters. Often unable to 
persuade other parties and get their support in parliament, the SVP aimed to influence 
immigration-policy making through extra-parliamentary channels. Thus, the SVP 
increased immigration salience and contributed to policy changes by winning some 
popular initiatives. This part of the chapter provides a brief examination of the initiatives 
and referendums pertinent to immigration and the relationship between Switzerland and 
the EU. Furthermore, it gives an overview of the changes to the Aliens law (Loi sur les 
étrangers). Finally, it also depicts the Initiative Against the Construction of Minarets, 
launched by the SVP that touches upon integration matters, particularly integration of 
Muslims into the Swiss society.  
 
Referendum on Schengen/Dublin Agreement 
In May 2005, Swiss people were faced with a mandatory referendum on the Schengen 
and Dublin Agreements, to which SVP alongside AUNS prepared a counter-proposal, 
viewing it as a threat of further integration with the EU (Milic, 2006: 1277). The SVP was 
defeated as the people supported the Agreements by following the recommendation of 
the government (Département Fédéral des Affaires Etrangèrs, 2014). This failure was 
shortly followed by another, when the party supported Swiss Democrats’ proposal to 
deny the extension of free movement of people to citizens of Eastern European countries 
that joined the EU in 2004 (Albertazzi and McDonnell, 2015: 195). Unsuccessful in 
influencing enhanced cooperation between Switzerland and the EU, the party was able 
to make some gains on the parliamentary arena by changing the Aliens law in 2005, 
when parliament accepted the proposals of the FDJP to introduce more restrictive rules 
for family reunification, and to tighten integration practices by requiring to possess 
sufficient knowledge of the local language as a confirmation of successful integration 
(Albertazzi and McDonnell, 2015: 196).  
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Referendum on modifications to the Aliens law  
In September 2006 the Swiss largely approved the modifications to the Aliens law with 
sixty-eight per cent of the population voting in favour of it (Secrétariat de l’Etat aux 
Migrations, 2007). Major amendments to the Aliens law included the introduction of more 
restrictive rules for non-EU immigrants, including conditions of admission to the country 
and integration process (Secrétariat de l’Etat aux Migrations, 2007). The new law made 
the admission of non-EU workers to the Swiss labour market harder, by requiring 
evidence of the impossibility of hiring a Swiss or an EU worker instead, that is employers 
had to give priority to Swiss or EU candidates over non-EU candidates. (Secrétariat de 
l’Etat aux Migrations, 2007). The law introduced a requirement for non-EU workers to 
evidence sufficient financial means to stay in Switzerland (Pauchard, 2006). The law also 
introduced the issuance of the residence permit based on the integration success, 
primarily the knowledge of the local language and also envisaged an evocation of a 
permit in cases of long-term prison sentence and dependence on social assistance for 
prolonged periods of time (Pauchard, 2006).  
 
The Initiative Against the Construction of Minarets  
The Initiative Against the Construction of Minarets, which was not a party initiative, but 
came from certain members of the party, namely social conservatives Walter Wobbmann 
and Ulrich Schlüer, was designed to prohibit the construction of minarets on Swiss soil. 
This initiative was not only about anti-immigrant sentiment, but was primarily directed 
towards the spread of Islam as a threat to Switzerland (Mayer, 2011: 11). Even though 
the initiative was only supported by the SVP and by Christian Federal Democratic Union 
(UDF) party and rejected by all other parties, on 29th of November 2009 Swiss voters 
accepted the Initiative by saying a firm ‘yes’ with a substantial majority of fifty-seven per 
cent in favour (Hirter and Vatter, 2009).  
 
The Initiative for Expelling Criminal Foreigners 
The initiative, launched by the SVP, was an example of the ‘law and order’ discourse 
that has been central to the party’s platform. It called for the automatic expulsion of non-
Swiss offenders, who committed different types of crimes, including social security fraud, 
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who independent of seriousness of the crime should be stripped of residence and should 
banned from entering Switzerland (SVP, 2010). The initiative was accepted by fifty-three 
per cent of voters and the majority of the cantons on the 28th of November 2010 
(Chancellerie fédérale, 2009). The Federal Council and the Parliament rejected the 
Initiative and came up with a counter project, which aimed to unify the practice of 
stripping a foreigner, who had committed a serious crime, from entitlement to a residence 
permit. According to the counter-project, the right to reside in Switzerland was to be 
based on the seriousness of the crime, but not predetermined in the catalogue of crimes 
(Conseil fédéral, 2010). The SVP, who wanted deportation to be automatic, criticised the 
government's counter-project because it contained the so-called ‘hardship clause’ that 
enabled judges to intervene in the case if the deportation is a threat to a person.  
 
The Initiative Against Mass Migration  
This initiative did not only concern immigration per se, but also undermined Switzerland’s 
relationship with the EU. The SVP launched a petition in support of the Initiative in 2011 
with the vote taking place on the 9th of February 2014. The only party that supported the 
SVP’s Initiative, was the Ticino League, a regional party from Italian speaking canton 
Ticino. The core issues of the initiative included: to decide who is coming to the country 
and for how long; to limit immigration and to impose the introduction of quotas on all kind 
of foreigners coming to Switzerland including cross-border workers and asylum seekers; 
to give priority to Swiss nationals when hiring for a job; and finally, to restrict foreigners’ 
access to social benefits (SVP, 2013). Both government and parliament firmly rejected 
the initiative (Bettinelli, 2014), but it was nevertheless accepted by a tiny majority of the 
population, with 50.3 per cent voting in favour and accepted by a majority of the cantons 
(Chancelliere fédérale, 2014). As Ackerman and Freitag (2015: 36) underline: “This 
voting outcome has triggered wide-ranging debates about both the policy on immigrants 
as well as the future of Switzerland within the European context”. In December 2016, the 
Swiss parliament implemented the Initiative not by imposing quotas on EU immigration, 
but instead introducing a preference for Swiss workers during the process of job hiring 
(Sécretariat d’Etat aux Migrations, 2017).  
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The Initiative for Expelling Criminal Foreigners (Implementation) 
This initiative was the SVP’s response to the existence of the ‘hardship clause’, which 
gave the judge the leverage to decide not to expel a foreigner that committed a crime in 
certain cases (Stephens, 2016). As the party was not satisfied with how the parliament 
proceeded with the implementation of the original initiative voted in 2010, the new 
Initiative was launched. The initiative was rejected by both majority of people and by a 
majority of cantons to automatically deport foreigners, who committed certain crimes 
(Chancellerie fédérale, 2016).  
 
With their electoral rise, the SVP were able to increase the salience of immigration and 
Euroscepticism. In the period between 2007 and 2015, the party’s discourse on 
immigration and the EU remained by and large consistent with a tough stance on both 
issues. As the SVP mostly disagreed with the other political parties on these matters, 
parliamentary ways of influencing immigration policy-making mostly have not proved to 
be effective. Despite being the most popular party in Switzerland since 2003, the SVP 
was not able to pursue its restrictive immigration stance through parliamentary channels 
due to the lack of agreement between political parties. Failure to do so resulted in 
numerous initiatives and referendums launched by the party in order to help achieve its 
electoral pledges and defend its ideological positions. This tactic proved to be successful 
and resulted in certain important policy changes on immigration, the EU and integration 
matters. Now the chapter proceeds with the exploration of causal factors that 
underpinned the SVP’s logic on immigration between 2003 and 2015.  
  
 
 
5.4 Causal factors  
The analysis of the interviews found that a variety of factors underpinned the change in 
the Swiss immigration policy. First, the SVP took public opinion into account when 
deciding on certain aspects of immigration policies, while it did not follow public opinion 
on the issue of Euroscepticism and closer cooperation between Switzerland and the EU. 
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The importance of public opinion varied depending on the nature of the issue in question. 
Second, anxieties about the EU, namely the lack of control over EU migration and the 
necessity of the cohesion between Swiss law and the EU law led to the introduction of 
more restrictive immigration policies. Furthermore, the research has found that the global 
financial crisis per se was not the underlying cause, leading the SVP to adopt a tougher 
immigration stance, rather its combination with the free movement of people produced 
economic concerns about labour market anxieties, which led to the more radical 
approach to immigration. In the SVP’s rhetoric, immigration was reframed through the 
social welfare lens and was linked primarily to the EU migration, but not exclusively. 
Finally, integration policies have been substantially tightened with the use of direct 
democracy by the SVP because of identity anxieties about integration of Muslims and 
fear of Islam.    
  
5.4.1 Public opinion  
Public opinion was an important factor for the SVP in their pursuit of tougher immigration 
policies, however it was also used by the SVP in their populist rhetoric. The Eurosceptic 
stance of the SVP has been consistent between 2003 and 2015, but this has not always 
reflected the public opinion on the issue. Despite being unsuccessful in preventing the 
Europeanisation of Swiss immigration policy, the SVP continued to pursue its 
Eurosceptic stance. However, the success came in 2014, when the SVP claimed a 
significant victory regarding EU migration, when the Initiative Against Mass Migration 
was accepted by the Swiss electorate. Public hostility to immigration, brought by the 
effect of free movement of people combined with the Eurosceptic rhetoric of the party 
was a major driving force for the Initiative. The effects of the free movement of people 
shifted public opinion on immigration and the majority of people wanted immigration 
reduced (Ackermann and Freitag, 2015: 37). 
 
The effects of freedom of movement. We only saw the real effects later and then 
we saw a pressure on jobs and then when the public opinion began to shift, giving 
us solutions. (Interview with a co-president of the Valais cantonal branch, Jéromê 
Desmeules, 2016).   
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Since the Agreement of the free movement of people between Switzerland and the EU 
came into force in 2002, immigration was increasing every year (Office fédérale de la 
statistique, 2016), which created an opportunity for the SVP to take use this in their 
Eurosceptic discourse. The sharp increase in immigration after the 2007 Global financial 
crisis, which almost doubled since the introduction of the free movement (Office fédérale 
de la statistique, 2016), triggered the SVP to launch the Initiative Against Mass Migration, 
which would be both anti-EU and anti-immigration. Direct democracy allowed the party 
to present itself as an opposition to the political elite, despite being the largest party in 
the National Council. By using the instruments of direct democracy, the party aimed to 
highlight the hostility of public opinion to the government and present itself as a defender 
of public opinion, which was not always supportive of the SVP’s position on immigration 
and Europe, though, as the results of referendums demonstrate.  
 
Direct democracy makes it more difficult as the politics that the government wants 
come directly in opposition to the politics that people want. This is a big problem 
for us because normally there is an agreement between the popular will and the 
government. But in the last twenty years the government by and large wants to 
adhere to the European Union. Swiss do not want this. There is a divergence and 
this makes it more difficult because the will of the government is curbed by the 
popular will (Interview with the secretary general of the Vaud cantonal branch, 
Kevin Grangier, 2016). [translated from French by the author] 
 
Direct democracy allowed the SVP to engineer public opinion by highlighting its 
commitment to defend the interests of ‘the working man’ against the elite, which is typical 
of populist parties (Nordensvard and Ketola, 2014: 362). However, despite high prices 
on rent, the argument that SVP makes is populist and does not make much sense 
because when the party attacks cross-border commuters from France and other 
bordering countries in their anti-immigration discourse, border commuters do not have 
an impact on the rent prices as they do go back to their countries every day.   
 
Yes, yes, and you see if you live in Geneva. You go there with your car, you see 
French plates everywhere. For the working man - what does he see? That his rent 
is increasing, his salary is decreasing, it takes a long time to go to work. (Interview 
with a co-president of the Valais cantonal branch, Jéromê Desmeules, 2016). 
 
Unlike in other countries, mechanisms of direct democracy equip political parties and 
various groups to have discussions on policy issues. This serves two purposes: first, it 
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lets the party understand public opinion on the issue, which was also massively 
engineered by the SVP since its electoral rise in 2003.  But, at the same time it gives the 
party a platform to popularise its positions across the electorate, trying to convince the 
public on accepting their position on the issue.  
 
It was obvious in the discussion we had, it was very engaged discussion. Not in 
parliament, before we had to vote, you see - a lot of meetings everywhere in 
Switzerland you could feel how people thought about the problem and it was both 
the political situation and the economic situation, it was the cultural situation. 
People, you see 80, 000 people is a city like Luzern or St. Gallen. For Switzerland, 
these are rather big cities, not like New York or London, but for Switzerland it is a 
lot. And people thought it is too much (Interview with a former national councillor 
and initiator of the anti-minaret movement within the SVP, Ulrich Schlüer, 2016).  
 
This is not to say that these discussions served as a definitive answer to the attitudes of 
the whole population, but it gave the party the opportunity to voice their concerns and to 
discover public perceptions of the issue and to persuade the public to vote in a particular 
way. Thus, the effects of the free movement of people were the reason given by the SVP 
for launching the collection of signatures for the Initiative Against Mass Migration in 2011 
(Interview with the vice-president of the SVP, Thomas Aeschi, 2016; Interview with a 
former national councillor, Ulrich Schlüer, 2016; Interview with a national councillor and 
former vice-president of the SVP, Luzi Stamn, 2016). It was a continuation of the 
ideological commitment of the party to reduce immigration and prevent further 
Europeanisation of Switzerland, but it was also supported by the shift in public opinion 
towards the free movement of people. The immigration issue cannot be examined 
without reference to European Union, as free movement of people with the EU frames 
Swiss immigration debate to a great extent. Thus, Euroscepticism represents another 
angle through which the party defends the public. The SVP has continuously stressed 
the importance of defending the interests of the Swiss people and maintaining Swiss 
sovereignty in its opposition to the EU.  
 
And I think that what really prevent politics to go straight to… or orient itself too 
much on Brussels, and it is always again brought back by the population, when the 
population says, no, we have a different view, we do not want to become a part of 
this big thing. The skepticism by the average citizen is higher towards European 
Union, towards Euroscepticism than it is by the average politician here in Bern. 
(Interview with a co-president of the SVP, Thomas Aeschi, 2016) 
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The Initiative for Expelling Criminal Foreigners (implementation), which was voted in 
February 2016 illustrated that public opinion was also important for logic of immigration 
policy-making of the SVP. Hence, after the Initiative was rejected by the people, the SVP 
indicated that they will not pursue changes to the law by launching another initiative, but 
the party will pursue the attempts to change the law within the parliamentary arena 
(Interview with Geneva’s municipal councillor, Eric Bertinat, 2016). Rejecting the idea of 
launching another initiative demonstrates that public attitudes remain a salient factor in 
SVP’s immigration decision-making. 
 
Public opinion was important for the party in toughening its position on the issue, but it 
was not decisive. The importance of public attitudes varies when it comes to different 
aspects of immigration policy. Thus, the party has always maintained its strong 
Eurosceptic position despite its failures to convince the public of its anti-EU stance for a 
long time. The SVP has always been too extreme on immigration, compared to other 
parties, maintaining its hardline rhetoric. Thus, the SVP’s attempts to change immigration 
policy through the direct democratic route has not always found public support. The party 
has had a consistent view on immigration and the EU, despite its several defeats on 
these issues on the direct democratic arena. However, the decision of the party to launch 
the 2014 Initiative Against Mass Migration was driven by the shift in public opinion 
towards EU migration. Furthermore, the importance of public opinion is highlighted by 
the rejection of the 2016 Initiative for Expelling Criminal Foreigners (implementation), 
when the party respected the result of the vote and decided not to pursue further 
endeavours to push for this legislation. The SVP’s attempts to change immigration policy 
were more a result of the ideological and populist nature of the party to represent itself 
as a defender of the people against the decisions taken by the elite. Direct democracy 
provided the party with an institutional opportunity not only to understand the attitudes of 
the public on immigration, but also served as a tool to popularise the party’s positions. 
 
5.4.2 Enhanced Europeanisation of the Swiss immigration policy 
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The SVP has always been a hard line Eurosceptic party, opposing closer ties with the 
EU, which has been at the heart of its political programme. The party had its first major 
success in 1992, when the EEA treaty was rejected by the Swiss voters. Continuously, 
the SVP argued against the free movement of people and the extension of this principle 
to the new EU member states. Despite transitional agreements on the free movement of 
people with the new EU member states, the SVP continued to resist this enhanced 
integration between Switzerland and the EU, trying to block the extension of free 
movement of people to EU newest members. EU enlargements created fertile ground 
for the SVP to pursue its Eurosceptic position. Switzerland's participation in the free 
movement of people with the EU presented an opportunity for the party to reinforce and 
to combine its anti-immigration and anti-EU discourse.  
 
We started collecting the signatures because of the effects of the free movement 
of people because Bern has lied to us again. Suddenly we were forced to accept 
40, 000 people per year (Interview with Geneva’s municipal councillor, Eric 
Bertinat, 2016). [translated from French by the author] 
 
Eventually, the SVP’s attempts to resist the Europeanisation of the Swiss immigration 
policy led to the launch of the Initiative Against Mass Migration. This was only possible 
through the direct democratic route, as the party faced institutional constraints by not 
having a consensus with the other parties, who were in favour of the free movement of 
people. With the adherence to the free movement of people, Switzerland abolished its 
strict quota system of work permits. Since the Agreement on free movement of people 
came into force in 2002 (State Secretariat for Migration, 2017), net migration figures have 
slightly increased. If before the introduction of the agreement, in 2001 net migration was 
approximately at the level of 43,000 people, by the end of 2002 it was roughly around 
51,500 immigrants, remaining around that level until the arrival of the global financial 
crisis in 2007, when the numbers rose sharply to 83,000 people (Office fédérale de la 
statistique, 2016). The abolishment of quotas and the impossibility of controlling 
immigration was the main trigger for the SVP in launching the Initiative.  
 
You know, I think that’s the main reason is the growth of immigration. I think before 
the free movement we had a strong limitation for immigration and till this time 
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immigration was more or less under control and with the introduction of free 
circulation of people, immigration was growing extremely (Interview with a national 
councillor, Heinz Brand, 2016). 
 
From the SVP’s point of view, uncontrolled immigration from the EU to Switzerland 
presented labour market concerns, which were linked to the higher competition on the 
labour market and to the ability of the economy to provide enough jobs for newcomers. 
The party kept arguing that free movement of people brought imported unemployment, 
which was detrimental to the Swiss economy (Interview with a national councillor, Alice 
Glauser, 2016). While in the past, Switzerland was able to export unemployment by 
having ‘strict annual quotas’ on both regular workers and seasonal workers 
(Skenderovic, 2007: 162), the introduction of the free movement of people ended that. 
The absence of limits on EU migration posed constraints on the numbers of highly skilled 
non-EU migrants. This reinforced the SVP’s discourse on the free movement of people 
that allows for the inflow of unqualified labour force from the EU, while highly skilled non-
EU migrants face a quota system for coming to Switzerland (Interview with the vice-
president of the SVP, Thomas Aeschi, 2016). The SVP linked free movement of people 
to the unemployment discourse, arguing that low skilled intra-EU migration imports 
unemployment to Switzerland and prevents the hiring of the highly qualified third country 
nationals.  
 
The SVP's Eurosceptic discourse manifested itself through a loss of sovereignty, which 
included the free movement of people and the necessity of cohesion between Swiss law 
and the EU legal framework. 
 
We don’t decide anymore ourselves, somebody else decides, be it the US, UN, 
the EU, be it the huge companies like Google or Apple, or whatever. So, what we 
feel - that we loose sovereignty, we loose the possibility to control our lives, and 
we want back that control. The whole idea of the nation state is that we decide 
what is happening. And in the meantime is not any longer true. (Interview with the 
head of the Federal Commission on Migration, Walter Leimgruber, 2016). 
 
EU enlargements and subsequent extensions of the free movement of people created 
an opportunity for the SVP to reinforce its Eurosceptic stance. The lack of sovereignty, 
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which manifested itself in the lack of control over EU migration and the necessity of 
cohesion between Swiss law and the EU law presented an opportunity for the party to 
reinforce the welfare anxieties around EU migration. According to the SVP, free 
movement of people was detrimental to Switzerland as it allowed EU citizens to come to 
Switzerland to claim welfare benefits. Thus, in the party’s view enhanced integration with 
the EU was one of the causes behind the SVP’s logic on immigration policy change.  
 
Partial loss of sovereignty to the EU, which manifested itself in the lack of control over 
EU migration and in the cohesion between Swiss law and EU law in the area of the free 
movement of people. The SVP constructed its position on the EU not simply through a 
political lens, but also through a legal one. As previously mentioned, the relationship 
between Switzerland and the EU is developed through a set of Bilateral agreements, 
with the second set of Bilaterals bound by a guillotine clause, which means that if the EU 
or Switzerland cancel one of the seven agreements, the other ones will automatically be 
terminated (Sciarini et al., 2015: 272).  
 
European Union says if we cancel certain things, we cancel everything. This I 
understand. Today there is a decision of the European Court of Human Rights and 
this decision is above the decision of the Swiss court. This is unacceptable. 
(Interview with a co-president of Valais cantonal branch, Cyrille Fauchère, 2016). 
[translated from French by the author] 
 
It means Switzerland needs to accept the evolution of the European law and apply 
it in Switzerland, and if it does not, then it is the European tribunal that decides if 
this is fair to not apply the European law in Switzerland. Mr. Barroso finished the 
exceptional regime for Switzerland and now the rules of the European Union 
prevail. So, the debate became legal, not only political. (Interview with the 
secretary general of the Vaud cantonal branch, with Kevin Grangier, 2016). 
[translated from French by the author] 
 
Thus, it is important to underline that the effects of the EU integration did not only 
manifest themselves through an economic lens, which concerned labour market 
pressures, but also involved a legal lens, which was equally important. The necessity of 
Swiss law to comply with the EU law was unacceptable for the SVP and was another 
reason for the opposition towards the EU.  
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The Europeanisation of the Swiss immigration policy, namely the free movement of 
persons also meant that “EU workers (employed or self-employed) enjoy the right to 
social assistance benefits under the same conditions as nationals of that member state” 
(Fernandes, 2016: 11). Even though limiting welfare access only to Swiss citizens has 
always been a part of the SVP’s rhetoric, the free movement of people within the EU only 
reinforced this trend. Lack of control over EU migration, which led to labour market 
concerns was a primary reason for the SVP to launch the collection of signatures for the 
Initiative Against Mass Migration in 2011. The SVP’s discourse on labour market 
anxieties particularly concentrated around cross-border migration from the neighbouring 
EU countries: France, Italy and Germany, which was one of the reasons why the party 
launched the Initiative. The SVP argued that cross-border workers contribute to higher 
unemployment levels and to the suppression of wages by taking the jobs for lower 
salaries than the Swiss (Interview with the vice-president of the SVP, Thomas Aeschi, 
2016; Interview with a national councillor, Claudio Zanetti, 2016). Free movement of 
people that brought welfare and labour market anxieties was an opportunity for the SVP 
to eventually launch the Initiative Against Mass Migration in 2011. While the party was 
previously unsuccessful in blocking the extension of the free movement of people to new 
member states, it was able to score major success only once the free movement of 
people was in full swing. The effect of the free movement of people was the key driver 
behind the Initiative Against Mass Migration (Interview with a former national councillor, 
Ulrich Schlüer, 2016; Interview with the vice-president of the SVP, Thomas Aeschi, 2016; 
Interview with a co-president of the Valais cantonal branch, Jéromê Desmeules, 2016). 
 
Overall, effects of the EU integration were one of the causal factors that shaped the 
SVP’s hard line immigration stance., The party has been consistent in its opposition to 
the free movement of people and its extension to the new member states. The opposition 
to the EU was centred around the loss of sovereignty, which manifested itself in the lack 
of control over EU migration and the necessity of cohesion between the Swiss law and 
the EU legal framework, particularly on the free movement of people principle. The 
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impossibility to control EU migration raised labour market and welfare anxieties, which 
eventually led to the Initiative Against Mass Migration, which aimed to stop free 
movement of persons.  
 
5.4.3 Perceived concerns over economic development  
This research found that perceived concerns of the public over the economic 
development of Switzerland led the SVP to drive Swiss immigration policy in a more 
restrictive direction. Economic anxieties brought by the free movement of people were 
the main driver behind the Initiative against mass migration. The party decided to launch 
the Initiative in 2011 as the impact of the free movement of people put pressure on the 
Swiss labour market by creating competition for Swiss jobs with the whole Europe 
(Interview with a co-president of the Valais cantonal branch, Jéromê Desmeules, 2016). 
Economic anxieties were brought forward by the lack of control over EU migration.  
 
This was an economic perspective, the fear of losing a job, the fear that foreigners 
will be privileged because when companies are hiring, they always want to 
import… it’s cheaper, this was the fear. Primarily it was an economic perspective. 
(Interview with a former national councillor, Hans Fehr, 2016). [translated from 
French by the author] 
 
These economic concerns were primarily about the competition on the labour market, 
which was also linked to unemployment concerns. Furthermore, from the party’s 
perspective, free movement of people did not only create labour market concerns for low 
skilled immigration, but also affected highly skilled migration. The party viewed 
uncontrolled intra-EU migration as a threat to both low- and highly-skilled Swiss 
population, which the SVP used to argue about the bigger impact of EU immigration on 
Swiss society, thus, appealing not only to the working-class, but also to middle class 
voters.  
 
Unemployment, is the other concern. What is interesting, is that it creeps in some 
better paid jobs. In the beginning immigration was really low qualiﬁed, but now you 
have higher qualiﬁed immigration, which is no longer limited in the European 
Union. And they start to compete directly with average paid people, people with a 
salary of 60-70 thousand CHF a year. And this becomes a bit threatening. Before, 
it was only very low qualiﬁed labour, which nobody wanted to do and very high 
qualiﬁed personnel, which Switzerland did not have. But now it touches the middle 
class and this affects more people, so I think the economic factor is also a big one. 
(Interview with a vice-president of the SVP, Thomas Aeschi, 2016).  
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On the other hand, the global financial crisis was not used as an opportunity to reinforce 
SVP's rhetoric on immigration, as economic anxieties around immigration have already 
been a significant topic on the SVP's agenda (Interview with a national councillor, 
Andreas Glarner, 2016; Interview with a national councillor, Alice Glauser, 2016; 
Interview with Geneva’s municipal councillor, Eric Bertinat, 2016; Interview with the 
secretary-general of Vaud cantonal branch, Kevin Grangier, 2016). Relatively speedy 
recovery of the Swiss economy from the global financial crisis (Interview with a social 
policy professor at the University of Lausanne, Giuliano Bonoli, 2016) resulted in the 
increased migration to Switzerland from poorer Eurozone countries, which led to the 
feelings of insecurity on the labour market (Interview with co-president of the Valais 
cantonal branch, Jéromê Desmeules, 2016). Indeed, with the arrival of the Global 
financial crisis in 2007, net immigration rose sharply from 49,000 in 2006 to 83,000 in 
2007 and plummeting in 2008, by reaching its highest ever peak of 103,000 people 
(Office fédéral de la statistique, 2016).  
 
Evidence from the interviews demonstrates that the global financial crisis and 
subsequent Eurozone crisis by themselves were not a sufficient cause per se to pursue 
a tougher immigration line as SVP’s immigration rhetoric was not intensified during that 
time. Rather, the combination of the Eurozone crisis with the effects of the free 
movement of people led to the immigration policy change. Increased migration from the 
Eurozone countries during the crisis under the umbrella of free movement of people not 
only reinforced SVP’s anti-immigration and Eurosceptic stance, but also led to the launch 
of the Initiative against mass migration. The party used economic concerns around the 
free movement of people as an opportunity to change Swiss immigration policy by 
launching the Initiative against mass migration.  
 
However, by 2011 we could see that promises were not true and that, in fact, it 
was ten times higher, but executive promised different numbers to the people 
before the vote on the European Union, so once we realised that during the 
financial crisis of 2008, immigration did not go down, but it was at extremely high 
level, we decided that it was time to act. We could not tolerate this situation, the 
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situation was still too attractive, even in the times of crisis, to immigrate here. 
(Interview with the vice-president of the SVP, Thomas Aeschi, 2016). 
 
Immigration was reframed through social welfare lens because Eurosceptic attitudes of 
the SVP have been intensifying with the effects of the free movement of people. Even 
though the discourse has not been as profound as it was in the UK during the Brexit 
debate, it exists in Switzerland and SVP has been using this sort of rhetoric to reinforce 
its Eurosceptic position, reframing immigration through social welfare lens (Interview with 
a social policy professor at the University of Lausanne, Giuliano Bonoli, 2016). SVP’s 
welfare rhetoric, which aims to protect social assistance for Swiss citizens and to create 
a welfare nation state (Nordensvard and Ketola, 2014) has been a distinct feature of the 
party for a long time before global financial crisis happened. EU migration is not the only 
kind that is linked to welfare anxieties, the discourse on welfare concerns is quite 
profound in SVP’s rhetoric when it comes to non-EU migration and is also country-based. 
If in the case of EU migration, there is no focus on a particular EU country, while in case 
of non-EU migration, African and migration from former Yugoslavia is portrayed as 
benefit oriented in SVP’s discourse (Interview with a national councillor, Claudio Zanetti, 
2016). Finally, in terms of type of migration, welfare concerns were particularly linked to 
family migration as the party argued that free movement of people permits unrestricted 
family migration, which was not possible at the times, when Switzerland had strict work 
permit system for certain categories of migrants.  
 
In SVP’s 2014 Initiative Against Mass Migration this is very clearly the 
phenomenon of family reunification that we have to tackle because before the 
acceptance of the agreement of free movement of people in 2000, we had a permit 
of a seasonal worker in Switzerland. These were delivered primarily to the people 
from Eastern Europe, they came to Switzerland for nine-twelve months and the 
family reunification was not possible. It was possible for them to live in Switzerland, 
but nor for their families that lived in Romania, Poland. These were tough jobs and 
they were able to benefit from holidays that took couple of months. And this, this 
was abolished with the free movement of people and now it is possible because 
we accepted the agreement. Family reunion is a big chunk of the overall migration. 
In Switzerland, because of the family reunion we are forced to provide social 
assistance for the people that do not intend to integrate into the Swiss labour 
market. (Interview with a secretary-general of the Vaud cantonal branch, Kevin 
Grangier, 2016). [translated from French by the author]. 
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Thus, the Initiative Against Mass Migration was designed to tackle different kinds of 
anxieties, including economic ones, such as creating more competition on the Swiss 
labour market and legal ones, such as necessity of cohesion between EU law and Swiss 
law. Furthermore, as the analysis of interview data demonstrates, SVP was also 
concerned about welfare issues and the necessity to provide welfare assistance to 
higher number of foreigners, which was a result of the family reunification possible under 
the free movement of people. Anxieties about economic development underpinned 
SVP’s logic of immigration policy change, yet the global financial crisis, and subsequent 
Eurozone crisis were not sufficient per se in producing more restrictive immigration 
stance of the SVP. The combination of Eurozone crisis with the free movement of people 
were at the origins of the Initiative.  
 
5.4.5 Perceived threat from Islam  
Identity plays a key role in immigration debate in Switzerland and comes to the forefront 
of the agenda when it comes to integration matters. Even though Switzerland is culturally 
and linguistically heterogeneous, integration of immigrants is crucial for the Swiss and 
Switzerland’s citizenship regime can be described as ethnic-assimilationist (Guigni and 
Passy, 2004). Alongside economy, identity anxieties are also crucial for the explanation 
of the Swiss immigration policy change.  
 
[…] immigration is not only about economics, it is also about identity, and fear and 
like factors that cannot that easily be said or described. (Interview with a personal 
secretary to the State secretary of the State Secretariat for Migration, Stefan Däpp, 
2016). 
 
As safeguarding Swiss identity has been at the core of the SVP’s agenda, the party led 
to substantial change in the Swiss immigration policy arguing that Swiss national identity 
and its existence have been threatened by the presence of foreigners, particularly 
Muslims. In the context of Switzerland, identity concerns were linked to a particular 
migration inflow, namely from Middle Eastern and some African countries. The fear of 
Islam and Islamisation of Switzerland was leading the SVP to toughen the cultural 
component of the Swiss immigration policy. 
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I think we make a distinction, particularly in the current context, where we have a 
big wave of migration from the Middle East, from countries that bring their own 
cultures with them, different values, Islam. (Interview with a co-president of the 
Valais cantonal branch, Cyrille Fauchère, 2016). [translated from French by the 
author] 
 
The fear of others (Delanty, 2008), in the Swiss case - Islam and Muslims, as a threat to 
Swiss national identity, led to the infamous Initiative against the construction of minarets 
in 2009. The initiative, which was launched by two prominent social conservative party 
members Ulrich Schlüer and Walter Wobmann, and aimed to safeguard Swiss identity 
and culture, which has been central to party’s rhetoric on immigration, alongside 
economic anxieties. The fear of losing religious Christian identity and the presence of 
minarets in Switzerland as symbols of power were at the essence of the Initiative 
(Interview with a former national councillor, Ulrich Schlüer, 2016; Interview with the vice-
president of the SVP, Thomas Aeschi, 2016). 
 
Minaret is a real presence of Islam; the territory of minaret is the territory of Islam. 
This is significant. We wanted to give a very clear sign that Switzerland will remain 
independent. (Interview with Geneva’s municipal councillor, Eric Bertinat, 2016). 
[translated from French by the author] 
 
The aim of the Initiative was, however, broader than just to prohibit the construction of 
minarets, it was about resistance to Islam in general and its principles that allow religion 
to interfere with the public sphere. The absence of the recognition between public and 
private sphere in Islam is incompatible with the Swiss way of life, according to the SVP.  
 
The goal we wanted to achieve was that we have to put one, there was one 
principle that was important - the civil laws of Switzerland are above religious 
principles. (Interview with Jéromê Desmeules, 2016, co-president of Valais 
cantonal branch).  
  
The incompatibility between Swiss civil laws and Islam religious principles lies in the 
heart of the SVP’s position. While Swiss civil laws demand strong separation between 
public and private spheres, Islam does not accept this separation and this underpins the 
SVP’s argument of creating tougher integration policies. The launch of the Initiative 
Against the Construction of Minarets is an example of how assimilationist views towards 
cultural integration are spearheaded by the SVP. Though, it should be underlined that 
assimilation of immigrants has been a distinctive feature of the Swiss citizenship regime, 
 140 
which is defined as ethnic-assimilationist and “pushes towards assimilation to the norms 
and values of the national community on an ethnocultural basis and tends to exclude 
those who are not entitled to sharing its norms, values and symbols” (Guigni and Passy, 
2004: 58). Assimilation to the Swiss norms and the way of life is primordial for 
understanding SVP’s logic on launching the Initiative against the construction of 
minarets. The nature of Swiss citizenship regime, which favours assimilation of 
immigrants explains the logic of resistance to foreign cultures and to certain extent SVP’s 
success in appealing to the voters using Islamisation of Switzerland as a perceived 
identity threat. 
 
But the problem is that there are non-integrated foreigners and Swiss people 
wanted to explain themselves that they are not happy with nonintegrated 
foreigners. Because these people, in general it is not a problem to build a minaret, 
because who cares, but for many people this is a sign of non-integration. (Interview 
with a national councillor, Sebastian Frehner, 2016). 
 
Despite Switzerland being ‘pluralist towards the cultures officially recognised within the 
context of federalism and the existing informal procedures for the integration of national 
minorities, it is much less pluralist towards the ethnic minorities of migrant origin’ (Guigni 
and Passy, 2004: 58). It is less tolerant towards the migrants who do not share the same 
cultural practices as the Swiss, primarily immigrants from Middle East and former 
Yugoslavia, mainly from Albania and Kosovo, who are by and large Muslims. The fear 
of different cultures that bring different cultural and religious practices, which interfere 
with the public sphere and do not recognise the distinction between public and private is 
one of the underlying causes of anti-Islam attitudes of the SVP.  
 
On the other hand, the person, who lives with the wife and the children, a different 
tradition… the person, who demands that we construct the mosques, that we have 
a different menu at school, the separation in swimming pools, the right to wear the 
veil and the removal of the crucifix, this we will not accept. (Interview with a co-
president of Valais cantonal branch, Cyrille Fauchère, 2016). [translated from 
French by the author] 
 
The attacks in Paris in 2015 and Brussels in 2016 are outside of the scope of this 
research, they should be mentioned as they only strengthened anti-Islam sentiment 
through security lens on the agenda of the SVP (Interview with a national councillor, Alice 
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Glauser, 2016). Identity discourse continues to be dominated by anti-Islam sentiment 
with the SVP collecting the signatures for the new initiative “Yes to the prohibition of 
covering face in public”. If the party succeeds in collecting enough signatures by 
September 2017, the initiative will be put for a public vote (Chancellerie fédérale, 2016). 
Following France, which banned covering face in public in 2010, SVP is reframing 
integration through a security lens not only in its discourse, but also on the level of 
legislation. While French legislation on prohibiting to cover the face in public was directed 
against Muslim women, it did not explicitly use language that targeted them. In 
Switzerland SVP’s proposals contained the words ‘burqa’ and ‘nigab’ in the text of the 
initiative and was primarily directed towards face covering by Muslim women 
(L’interdiction de dissimuler le visage, 2017). Terrorist attacks in France and Belgium 
presented an opportunity structure for the SVP to reinforce anti-Islam sentiment through 
security lens and to launch the Initiative ‘Yes to the prohibition of covering face in public’. 
SVP’s discourse on Islam is becoming increasingly security-oriented, linking Islam as a 
religion to terrorism. It makes generalisations about Islam, Muslims and their integration 
based on the events that happened in France and Belgium, which creates further unease 
in the field of citizenship in Switzerland.  
 
If you see now the situation in Europe with these terrorist attacks. I think we can 
say and we must say. Nobody is prepared to come and not see whether it is a 
good willing person or not? Is this person armed or not? I think it is no longer 
acceptable in the situations we have now in Europe… (Interview with a former 
national councillor, Ulrich Schlüer, 2016).  
 
Identity anxieties over Islamisation of Switzerland underpinned the logic of SVP’s 
position on integration and led to subsequent immigration policy change – The Initiative 
Against the Construction of Minarets, which was accepted by the Swiss electorate in 
2009. Swiss assimilationist citizenship regime characterised by the necessity of foreign 
culture to assimilate in the Swiss society has been conducive to the popularisation of the 
SVP’s rhetoric on integration. SVP’s anti-Islam discourse became increasingly 
connected to the security lens after Paris and Belgium attacks, which led the party to 
launch a new anti-Islam initiative against covering face in public places in March 2016. 
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In SVP’s discourse identity concerns about Islam are presented not only through the 
difficulty in integration to the Swiss society, but also through a security lens as the party 
was building on the perception that Islam is a threat to Swiss security by linking Islam to 
terrorism. 
 
5.5 Causal mechanisms  
Understanding what are the underlying causes of immigration policy change constitutes 
only the first part of the explanation why the change occurred. Equally it is important to 
explain what were the mechanisms responsible for the success of the change. The main 
finding is that two mechanisms: framing and direct democracy permitted the SVP to 
pursue more restrictive immigration policies. First, framing was an argumentative 
mechanism that allowed the party to use not only anti-immigrant rhetoric, but, in 
particular, anti-establishment rhetoric in order to provide a fundament for further political 
action. This criticism of governmental position enabled the SVP to use direct democracy 
to set the agenda on immigration, by launching the initiatives and leading to immigration 
changes from bottom-up rather than top-down angle. Thus, the dissatisfaction with the 
government and its immigration stance led to the (ab)use of the mechanism of direct 
democracy by the SVP, which was a procedural mechanism that aimed at implementing 
the argumentation into policies, and resulted in the adoption of more restrictive 
immigration policies between 2003 and 2015.  
 
 
5.5.1 Framing  
In the studied period, immigration stance of the SVP has been restrictive and 
Eurosceptic, focused on opposing immigration, opposing enhanced integration with the 
EU and popularising anti-Islam sentiment. The SVP has continuously repeated the need 
for limiting and controlling migration, both from the EU and from the third countries. The 
essence of the SVP’s Eurosceptic position was in blaming intra-EU migration to 
Switzerland for creating unemployment and labour market concerns. Certain 
intensification of the hard line Eurosceptic stance became more evident, when 
Switzerland extended on numerous occasions the principle of free movement of people 
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to the new EU member states. With regard to integration and identity, the SVP has been 
engineering anti-Islam sentiment, which it linked to the discourse on law and order. 
Finally, immigration was reframed through social welfare lens in SVP’s discourse as the 
party attributed blame for welfare abuse to immigrants (Interview with a national 
councillor, Claudio Zanetti, 2016; Interview with a national councillor, Andreas Glarner, 
2016; Interview with a national councillor, Heinz Brand, 2016). SVP viewed immigrants 
as a drain on the Swiss welfare system, especially intra-EU immigrants, which exercised 
the right to welfare access under the free movement of people principle. SVP’s rhetoric 
portrayed migrants as benefit scroungers, accusing them of coming to Switzerland 
because of its generous welfare assistance. Prognostic framing (Snow and Benford, 
1988: 200-201), which proposed the solution to the above mentioned issues, included 
the restriction of welfare entitlements for immigrants. By linking immigration with welfare 
anxieties, SVP combined economic and socio-cultural frames and used economic 
cleavage (welfare) to reinforce the socio-cultural one (immigration). In sum, prognostic 
framing of immigration has been consistent between 2003 and 2015 with SVP blaming 
immigrants for various problems, including cultural and economic ones. This prognostic 
framing, which aimed to restrict immigration and enhance the integration of immigrants, 
particularly Muslims, served as a rationale for pursuing tougher immigration policies.  
 
It is important to highlight that framing of immigration in a restrictive way did not always 
result in the successful implementation of the pledges. Thus, when the mastermind of 
the party Christoph Blocher was elected into the Swiss government in 2003 and 
subsequently became the head of the FDJP, the party was able to influence immigration 
policy through parliamentary and governmental routes. Thus, during the 2005 autumn 
parliamentary session, an amendment that was designed to tighten rules for family 
reunification, was supported by other parties (Albertazzi and McDonnell, 2015). Other 
parties supported the amendments because they were concerned about party 
competition and the electoral success of the SVP (Interview with Andreas Glarner, 2016). 
SVP’s positions were able to be translated into policies through top-down approach, 
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when the representative of the party (Blocher) was in charge of the federal department 
responsible for immigration matters: FDJP. However, when Blocher failed to get 
reelected to the Swiss government in 2007, subsequently losing FDJP, the SVP lost its 
primary role in immigration agenda setting. The party was unable to fully influence 
immigration policy-making through parliamentary and governmental routes. However, it 
should be emphasised that being in charge of the FDJP does not automatically result in 
the implementation of the SVP policies, because in the end, decision-making process in 
the government is collective, but the FDJP sets the direction of immigration policy-
making (Interview with a personal secretary to the State secretary of the State Secretariat 
for Migration, Stefan Däpp, 2016; Interview with the vice-president of the Federal 
Commission on Migration, Etienne Piguet, 2016).  As the SVP lost an opportunity to 
influence immigration policy-making from within the government as much as they 
wanted, the party resorted to the use of direct democracy, which is a second mechanism 
that enabled the SVP to redefine Swiss immigration policy in a more restrictive way.  
 
5.5.2 Direct democracy  
The inability to find consensus with major political parties in parliament on immigration 
and EU drove the SVP to the use of direct democracy, which referred to the actual 
immigration policy change. The party continued its anti-immigration framing, which was 
necessary for popularisation of the SVP’s positions via direct democracy. The absence 
of agreement on immigration with other major political parties and the consensus 
character of decision-making process in Switzerland enabled the party to resort to direct 
democratic instruments to shape Swiss immigration policy. The analysis of the interviews 
points to the two primary reasons that led the SVP to use the mechanism of direct 
democracy to pursue its restrictive immigration stance. First, the absence of the political 
will (la volonté politique) and second, the anti-establishment rhetoric with a particular 
opposition to governmental stance on immigration. The lack of political will of the Swiss 
government to pursue more restrictive immigration policies, to adopt more Eurosceptic 
position drove the SVP to opt for other means that would allow the party to implement 
tougher immigration policies (Interview with a national councillor, Alice Glauser, 2016; 
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Interview with a former national councillor, Hans Fehr, 2016; Interview with Geneva’s 
municipal councillor, Eric Bertinat, 2016). The use of anti-establishment rhetoric on 
immigration permitted the party to resort to direct democracy in their attempt to introduce 
tougher immigration stance (Interview with a former national councillor, Ulrich Schlüer, 
2016; Interview with a secretary general of Vaud cantonal branch, Kevin Grangier, 2016; 
Interview with a national councillor, Claudio Zanetti, 2016).  
 
The lack of the political will of the elites to defend the interests of the people and the 
critique of governmental policies are the distinctive features of populist parties. Because 
of the specificity of the Swiss political system, the mechanism of direct democracy 
resulted in a bigger success for the SVP in shaping Swiss immigration policy, than the 
one the party had on parliamentary arena. SVP managed to translate this populism into 
more restrictive immigration policies. As the party has always had a distinct stance on 
immigration, which was rarely supported by other major parties in the parliament, it was 
unable to advance its view on immigration through parliamentary route. The distinct 
feature of the Swiss political system, which is a consensual democracy, requires major 
political players to reach an agreement during decision-making process. The failure to 
do so permits any dissatisfied political party to pursue a different position by launching a 
popular initiative, which acts as an agenda-setting tool (Papadopoulos, 1997). The 
peculiarity of the Swiss political system of consensual democracy allowed the SVP to 
pursue anti-establishment rhetoric despite being the most popular party in Switzerland 
since 2003 (Interview with a personal secretary to the State secretary of the State 
Secretariat for Migration, Stefan Däpp, 2016) and to resort to the instruments of direct 
democracy. As, by and large, the SVP has been a lone wolf on immigration, it was the 
key mechanism through which they managed to change Swiss immigration policy.  
 
Anti-establishment rhetoric justified the use of direct democracy as the latter one 
emphasises the role of the people in decision-making process and corresponds to the 
populist nature of the SVP, which consistently accentuated its rhetoric on the importance 
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of defending people’s interests. This was highlighted in the case of the Initiative for 
Expelling Criminal Foreigners (implementation) that was launched to correct the 
implementation of the initial Initiative that was accepted in 2010. 
 
If the government does not respect the decisions of the people, this is bad. For 
instance, the removal of foreign criminals, the government took some time, the 
parliament did not respect erectly the decisions of the people and that is why we 
made a second initiative on foreign criminals (the implementation). (Interview with 
a former national councillor, Hans Fehr, 2016). [translated from French by the 
author].  
 
When parliamentary channels of decision-making do not work, any party can resort to 
the instruments of direct democracy, which the SVP has been consistently using 
especially since its electoral breakthrough in 2003. Though, direct democracy has been 
a more successful route for the party to redefine Swiss immigration policy, it is, 
nevertheless, a lengthy process that usually takes couple of years before an initiative 
can be presented a popular vote. The SVP resorted to direct democracy as it is the 
people, who decide, not the elites: “If we look at the other countries in Europe, it’s the 
government who is creating the immigration policy. But here in Switzerland there is a 
possibility to have an initiative.” (Interview with a national councillor, Heinz Brand, 2016). 
Despite the opposition of other major parties to the SVP’s initiatives, the party managed 
to score some major victories.  
 
If you look at France, when the president wants to decide something, if he has the 
majority then it is done. But we have direct democracy in Switzerland, many parties 
and everyone needs to be more or less satisﬁed. You don't have make alliances 
to pass legislation, but if you feel that it goes against the people - you collect 
signatures for the referendum or for the initiative. And what has changed in the last 
ﬁfteen years that the opinion of the government is not any more the word of God. 
Before that it was an extremely rare case that the initiative would be accepted if 
the government says no, now it’s not the case anymore (Interview with a co-
president of Valais cantonal branch, Jéromê Desmeules, 2016). 
 
Between 2003 and 2015, SVP also used optional referendums as a veto tool to stop 
enhanced integration between Switzerland and the EU in the area of the free movement 
of people. On this battleground SVP has been less successful as the people supported 
the principle and its subsequent extensions to the new member states. Eurosceptic 
positions of the SVP did not find much support on direct democratic arena as the party 
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failed to prevent the extension of the free movement of people to new EU member states 
twice and failed to block the adoption of Schengen and Dublin Agreements in 2005. 
However, with regard to immigration policy more generally, the party had three major 
successes. First, the adoption of the Initiative against the construction of the minarets in 
2009, the Initiative for Expelling Criminal Foreigners in 2010 and the Initiative Against 
Mass Migration in 2014, which aimed to limit EU migration to Switzerland. Therefore, 
direct democracy has been more effective mechanism for the SVP in Swiss immigration 
policy change compared to parliamentary route as the party failed to make political 
alliances with other parties on immigration and the EU.  
 
5.5.3 Causal chain of the change in SVP’s immigration stance and evolution of the 
Swiss immigration policy  
The last part of this chapter draws a causal chain, which incorporates causal factors that 
were behind the SVP’s immigration stance and sheds the light on causal mechanisms 
that accounted for this change. The mechanisms occur when there is a presence of both 
entity and activity, which together produce an outcome (Beach and Pedersen, 2008: 30). 
This research found two mechanisms that accounted for immigration policy change in 
the Swiss case: framing and direct democracy. The following figure presents a complete 
causal chain of immigration policy change in the context in which the change has been 
happening. 
 
The outlining of the mechanism is not sufficient to explain why change occurred as only 
“the interaction between mechanisms and context is what determines the outcome” 
(Faletti and Lynch, 2009: 1151). For a mechanism to be triggered context is explanatory 
(Pawson, 2001: 5), therefore one needs to explain how the context affected the activation 
of the mechanism. This research found that framing of immigration in a negative light by 
the SVP was possible as the context of immigration positions of the other major parties 
and Swiss government, which presented an opportunity for the criticism and advancing 
contrary positions on immigration. Furthermore, in the context of pro-EU attitudes of the 
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government and in the context of enhanced cooperation between Switzerland and the 
EU with regard to the free movement of people and Schengen and Dublin agreement, 
this enabled SVP to pursue an anti-establishment position on the issue, by presenting a 
contrary view on immigration. The success of framing, in other words, the ability of the 
party “to shape behaviour […] about appropriate, desirable political actions” (Faletti and 
Lynch, 2009: 1150) was dependent on whether the SVP was in charge of the FDJP. 
Thus, during 2004-2007, when Cristoph Blocher was the head of the FDJP, SVP had 
more leverage in influencing the direction of policy-making more than when it lost control 
of this department. Hence, being unable to influence immigration-policy making from 
within the government, the party has focused its efforts on launching popular initiatives 
on immigration, which was possible through a second mechanism of direct democracy. 
The mechanism of direct democracy was activated because of the absence of 
agreement among political players and the SVP on immigration. The mechanism partially 
accounted for immigration policy change depending on whether popular initiatives were 
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accepted by the population. However, optional referendums, which SVP launched as a 
veto instruments to the closer cooperation between the EU and Switzerland on the issue 
of the free movement of people, were a failure and the party was not able to prevent the 
change of immigration policy in that area.  
 
5.6 Conclusions  
This chapter traced causal factors that underlie SVP’s logic in immigration policy-making 
and identified and explained the mechanisms that account for Swiss immigration policy 
change between 2003 and 2015.  Three hypotheses set in the introduction of the chapter 
were confirmed. SVP’s stance on immigration, which subsequently led to the evolution 
of the immigration policy in a more restrictive direction, was based on the importance of 
public opinion on the issue, partial loss of sovereignty to the EU on immigration policy, 
perceived economic anxieties of the public, closely connected to the free movement of 
people and, finally, identity concerns about the Islamisation of Switzerland and 
integration of Muslims. Though, the hypothesis that SVP pursued restrictive immigration 
stance as a response to public opinion on the issue is only partially confirmed as, on one 
hand, the party has always had strong anti-immigration and Eurosceptic stance, but 
public opinion was used more as a justification for defending the right of the people 
against the elite, which is a distinct feature of populist parties. Furthermore, the party 
massively engineered public opinion on immigration and the EU over the years, 
campaigning for limiting migration, reinforcing anti-Islam sentiment and arguing for less 
integration with the EU. Even though it was not the aim of the chapter to demonstrate 
this, it should be mentioned, nevertheless, to highlight that the party did not only respond 
to public opinion, but also, ultimately created it. The analysis of interview data also tested 
the hypothesis about the influence of the global financial crisis on immigration stance of 
the SVP and found that it was not a sufficient cause per se for the SVP to adopt tougher 
immigration stance. However, the combination of the Eurozone crisis, that was a result 
of the global financial crisis, with the effects of the free movement of people led to the 
launch of the Initiative Against Mass Migration. 
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Two mechanisms that accounted for immigration policy change pursued by the SVP 
were framing and direct democracy. SVP, first, used diagnostic framing (Snow and 
Benford, 1988: 200-2010) to present and justify their anti-immigration view-point, and, 
second, used prognostic framing (Snow and Benford, 1988: 200-201) to propose the 
actions needed to be taken to curb immigration. Thus, framing served as a discursive 
mechanism for the SVP to translate their anti-immigration stance into policies. Framing 
permitted the party to influence the direction of immigration-policy making through 
governmental route (top-down approach), when Christoph Blocher was the head of the 
FDJP. However, Blocher’s failure to get reelected to the government in 2007 and 
subsequent loss of control over the FDJP, led to the absence of control over the direction 
of immigration policy-making. Hence, the party resorted to the use of direct democracy, 
which led to the evolution of Swiss immigration policy. The lack of consensus on 
immigration between the SVP and other political parties led to the immigration policy 
change through direct democratic route (bottom-up approach). The ab(use) of direct 
democracy enabled the SVP to redefine immigration policy in a more restrictive way. 
This highlights the importance of the agency in the Swiss case as the activation of direct 
democracy mechanism was not possible without the agency of the SVP. Therefore, while 
structural factors provide an insight into the logic of political parties’ stances, agency 
related explanations explain how subsequent policy change happens. The findings that 
agency is important in explaining immigration policy presents a different perspective on 
the role of mainstream political parties in a change, thus complementing the theories that 
examine contextual factors as triggers of party policy change. The next chapter proceeds 
with the French case of immigration policy change and the role of the UMP in it. 
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Chapter 6 
Immigration during Sarkozy’s era: economic orientation and cultural backlash  
 
6.1 Introduction 
Between 2002 and 2012 immigration policy in France has experienced major tightening, 
which is closely associated with the policies pursued by Nicholas Sarkozy since he 
became minister of the Interior in 2002 until the end of his presidency in 2012. Not only 
immigration policies, which are associated with the management of various immigration 
inflows, but also integration policies, which primarily focused on the incorporation of 
Muslims and immigrants from a North African background, became more restrictive. 
Sarkozy adopted a more restrictive approach for family reunification, arguing for a more 
selective approach, that would focus on bringing highly skilled migrants instead of family 
migrants. Furthermore, he considerably toughened the entire integration paradigm, by 
reinforcing integration of migrants and making it a condition for obtaining a long-term 
residence permit in the future. Finally, he framed his integration discourse through a 
Muslim frame (Tiberj and Michon, 2013: 586), which led to the adoption of the law 
prohibiting the wearing or headscarves in French public schools and the ban of full veils 
in French public places. The chapter traces the causes behind the changing nature of 
his immigration stance and the mechanisms that accounted for this change. French 
immigration policy has undoubtedly been influenced by the electoral breakthrough of 
Front National’s (FN) leader Jean-Marie Le Pen in 2002 during the presidential elections 
and the FN’s subsequent electoral growth, especially after his daughter Marine Le Pen 
became leader of the party in 2010. However, this chapter is not going to focus solely on 
the impact of the radical right FN on the immigration stance of the right-wing parties, but 
it will explain how the FN had a significant indirect impact (Schain, 2006) on the evolution 
of the French immigration policy. As the French right-wing UMP has been in power for 
ten years from 2002 until 2012, Sarkozy and his party  have been responsible for a 
decade of immigration policy-making. The chapter argues that the main causal factors 
that have led to introduction of more restrictive immigration policies among the French 
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conservatives are negative public opinion on the issue, increasing pressure from the FN, 
economic concerns over immigration, identity anxieties about Islam and integration of 
Muslims into French society. Furthermore, it argues that the global financial crisis 
impeded the successful implementation of Sarkozy’s electoral pledge on increasing 
highly skilled labour migration. The chapter argues that while framing and institutional 
reshuffle were two mechanisms that accounted for this change, departmental 
competition, which stemmed from the institutional reshuffle explained the failure of 
certain promise Sarkozy gave to be translated into policy outcomes.  
 
France presents a particularly interesting case for two reasons. First, it has a high 
proportion of immigration and immigrant origin population, making France the biggest 
country in terms of the number of Muslim population in Europe (Adida et al., 2014), which 
makes integration and the question of national identity a prominent issue in French 
political debates. As a former colonial power France has experienced a large intake of 
immigrants arriving from its former colonies - Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia, but also from 
other countries of North Africa. The socio-economic status of immigrant and immigrant 
origin French population still remains disadvantageous with higher unemployment rates 
and unfavourable fiscal positions of immigrant households (OECD, 2013: 147). 
Moreover, as a high percentage of North African immigration is Muslim, the integration 
debate is mostly focused on Islam and the co-habitation of Islam with the republican 
principles liberté (liberty), égalité (equality) and fraternité (fraternity) (van Houdt et al., 
2011: 417). As Simon (2013: 210) highlighted in the integration debate the problem of 
integration of immigrants is referred to as African migration, from former colonies, rather 
that of Turkish or Asian origin. Muslim immigration in secular France, where the principle 
of laïcité (secularism) dominates the French way of life poses numerous challenges 
(Vaisse, 2004: 3), including the debates on headscarves and veils that have long 
dominated French society and political circles (Guiraudon, 2005: 166).   
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Second, the presence of strong and growing electoral fortunes of radical right FN that 
has been successfully politicising immigration and presenting a challenge for 
mainstream political parties to address the issue. Since 1980s, the presence of the FN, 
whose rhetoric focused largely on immigration, increased the salience of the immigration 
issue in France to the extent that “by the 1997 legislative elections, it could legitimately 
be described as France’s third biggest political force” (Drake, 2011: 75). Since then, the 
party has been gaining popular support, as it has been seen in 2002, when its then-
leader Jean-Marie Le Pen got to the second round of the presidential election. The latest 
2017 French presidential election saw Marine Le Pen gaining almost forty per cent of the 
second-round vote, confirming that FN’s Eurosceptic and anti-immigrant stance has 
been penetrating into the French society that has become more acceptable of such 
ideas. 
 
6.1.1 Argument  
The argument put in this chapter is that under the UMP’s and Sarkozy’s governance, the 
party’s immigration stance and subsequent immigration policy have become increasingly 
restrictive as a response to shifts in public opinion, threat from the FN, perceived identity 
anxieties and perceived economic concerns of the population, including the 2007 global 
financial crisis and, finally, the effect of the EU integration. The presence of these causal 
factors is tested through the analysis of elite interview data.  
 
6.1.2 Plan of the Chapter  
The chapter is laid out as follows. The second section sets out the context of immigration 
politics in France by providing a brief history of French immigration and by examining the 
importance of a semi-presidential regime, which outlines power-relations when it comes 
to policy-making. Furthermore, it addresses the importance of laïcité which is crucial for 
the development of integration policies as integration occupies a salient niche in the 
French immigration debate. The third section proceeds with the elaboration of 
immigration laws that were modified and adopted during Sarkozy’s period as a minister 
of the Interior between 2002-2004 and 2005-2007, Sarkozy’s electoral programmes for 
2007, 2012 presidential elections and immigration policy changes taken during his 
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presidency period from 2007 until 2012. The next section identifies causal factors that 
led Sarkozy and his party to tighten French immigration policies. The final section draws 
a complete causal chain explaining the logic of immigration policy change in France, 
setting out causes and mechanisms responsible for the change. The chapter concludes 
by discussing the importance of structural factors in shaping immigration policy in France 
and the significance of the agency in activation of the mechanisms such as institutional 
reshuffle, which led to the departmental competition.  
 
6.2 Setting out the context  
 
6.2.1 Immigration in France  
It is crucial to sketch out the fabric of immigration to France to understand and explain 
the direction of French immigration policy between 2002 and 2012 and to explain the 
debate around integration as majority of the French immigrant population and population 
of immigrant origin comes from former colonies. France is known as the oldest country 
of immigration in Europe (Carvalho and Geddes, 2012: 1) and it is estimated that “at 
least one in five French people is deemed to have at least one foreign ancestor in their 
family tree” (Drake, 2011: 54). As a former empire France has experienced a large inflow 
of immigrants arriving from its former colonies, primarily Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia 
(Maghreb countries), but also from other countries in North Africa and Asia (Hollifield, 
2014). To understand French immigration statistics, some conceptual clarification of 
terms is needed. In France, there is a distinction between a foreigner and an immigrant. 
According to the definition adopted by the High Council of Integration (Haute Conseil 
d’Integration), an immigrant is a person, who was born abroad of foreign nationality and 
resides in France, and the status of immigrant is permanent, even after the acquisition 
of the French nationality, and the status of being an immigrant is based on the country 
of birth (INSEE, 2016a). A foreigner is a person that resides in France, but does not 
possess French nationality, and a foreigner is not necessarily an immigrant, this person 
could have been born in France (usually in case of minors) and, contrary to the immigrant 
status, foreign status can be changed and the person, born in France would become 
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French by acquisition (INSEE, 2016b). Therefore, immigrant population numbers 
comprise of both foreigners and immigrants.  
 
The share of immigrant population in France relative to its population size has increased 
from 8.1 per cent in 2006 to 8.9 per cent in the beginning of 2014 (INSEE, 2016c). In the 
latter half of the twentieth century, the French population has experienced major 
transformations, both in terms of numbers, and in terms of nature and origins of those 
immigrating to France. As a former empire that had colonies on the African continent, 
France has received substantial colonial immigration before and after the collapse of its 
empire. Thus, a lot of French nationals are descendants of immigrants, and around sixty 
per cent of those who acquire French nationality per year are of African origin 
(Guiraudon, 2005: 154). After the Second World War, colonial migration to France was 
explained by the need for foreign labour to rebuild the country (Edminston and Dumenil, 
2009: 228; Guiraudon, 2005: 154). The economy was largely dependent on the foreign 
labour force during the trente glorieuses, the three-decade period of economic flourishing 
that followed the end of the Second World War (Hollifield, 2014: 164). However, the 
changes in the global economy changed the direction of French immigration policy. Once 
the oil crisis hit the Western Europe and the US in the 1970s, France revisited its policy 
on foreign workers and the direction of French immigration policy changed, halting of 
foreign labour recruitment, except for highly skilled and seasonal workers (Guiraudon, 
2005: 154). 
 
French immigration approach changed by constraining labour migration, while family 
reunification was not restrained. It was relatively easy to slow labour migration as a 
response to economic difficulties, but it was not so simple to halt family migration, which 
was “humanitarian in nature and constitutionally protected” (Hollifeld, 2014: 165). Family 
migration, primarily from the former colonies has constituted a large part of the 
immigration to France in 1970s. In that period, the government of Valéry Giscard 
d’Estaing tried to stop and prevent further family migration by deporting the majority of 
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North Africans, especially Algerians (Weil, 2005: 18). The government wanted to 
forcefully deport Algerians, who have legally entered France and have been living in 
there for years, but due to the big public outcry from civil society, churches, syndicates, 
left-wing parties and the Council of State, the policy was later abandoned (Weil, 2005: 
18). During the presidency of Valéry Giscard d’Estaing, France experienced major 
tightening of immigration policies, which was largely a result of the economic crisis, but 
under the leadership of the left-wing François Mitterand, France has seen a certain 
liberalisation of immigration policies. Hence, it was in 1984 when France allowed all the 
immigrants, who legally entered the country and who established their life there to stay 
(Weil, 2005: 17). This led to increases in family reunification from former French colonies 
in Maghreb.  
 
Restrictions on labour migration and the increased family reunification arrivals during the 
decolonisation process posed an integration challenge, as the majority of North African 
immigration to France was Muslim (Freedman, 2004: 128). It became a “major 
preoccupation in French politics since the mid-1980s” (Gastaut, 2012: 333), when the 
question of integration entered political agenda. The government reconsidered its 
attitude towards immigration and integration following the long-term settlement of 
millions of Muslims (Hollifield, 2014: 166). Thus, recognising the importance of 
integration, left-wing François Mitterrand announced the politics of integration in 1981 
(Edminston and Dumenil, 2009: 231). The slight relaxing of immigration policies by the 
socialists was interrupted in 1983 with the first electoral success of the radical right Front 
National (Guiraudon, 2005: 156). Since then, the radical right has heavily influenced the 
positions of mainstream parties on immigration policies (Guiraudon, 2005: 156). 
Integration became a prominent issue, when the rightist government  returned to office, 
in 2002, under Chirac’s and Sarkozy’s presidencies. The headscarf affair (l’affaire du 
foulard) that sparked a heated debate in 2003-2004, reminded political elites of the 
importance of integration. Even though Muslims represent only seven and a half per cent 
of the total French population, compared to sixty-three per cent of Christians (Pew 
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Research Center, 2015), the presence of Islam in France and integration of Muslims 
remains a contentious issue as Muslim immigration in a strongly secular France poses 
certain challenges. French society is multicultural in nature, but it rejects multiculturalism 
per se.  With a large proportion of French immigrant population and population of 
immigrant origin, particularly from Magreb countries, and Islam being the second religion 
in France in terms of numbers (Hollifield, 2014), the issue of integration and Islam 
remains one of the core in the French immigration debate.  
 
6.2.2 France and the EU 
As this chapter, among other exogenous factors, traces whether EU has shaped 
immigration debate in France, a brief account of the relationship between France and 
the EU is laid out. The European project, that France was a cofounder of, aimed at 
restoring French power and exerting influence on European countries (Drake, 2005: 11). 
France has always supported the idea of l’Europe puissance (power Europe), which 
gave France an opportunity to reinstate its influence (Grossman, 2007: 985). However, 
the EU’s increasing impact on French immigration policy-making yielded the growth of 
negative public attitudes towards the EU: 
 
France and Europe have, indeed, become entangled in terms of the policy-making 
process, to the extent of having a significant and increasingly negative impact on 
French public opinion, to a degree that has damaged contemporary France’s 
reputation and influence among the EU’s member states. (Drake, 2011: 209).   
 
The rejection of the EU’s constitutional treaty in the 2005 referendum was a big blow for 
the French establishment, with the public being concerned with the EU expansion and 
the safeguarding of Europe’s borders that might be extended in the future (Drake, 2011: 
210). Unfavourable attitudes of the public towards the EU continued with one of the 
recent polls indicating that support for the EU in France is one of the lowest in Europe 
with sixty-one per cent of the French population having a negative attitude towards the 
EU, while only thirty-eight approving of it (Stokes, 2016). Understanding of public opinion 
towards the EU is important for the explanation whether the EU was one of the factors 
that led to the evolution of the French immigration policy between 2002 and 2015. 
Because the salience of the EU as an electoral issue has changed, political elites needed 
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to accommodate their positions to public attitudes. Even though, a decade ago the 
salience of EU affairs was quite low in comparison with the domestic issues (Flood, 2005: 
63), the situation has undoubtedly changed. Despite the fact that domestic concerns still 
remain a priority, political leaders cannot disregard the EU, its concerns and challenges 
and brush the issues under the carpet. Before the 2007 presidential election, both 
mainstream candidates - Sarkozy and Royal avoided discussions on Europe (Grossman, 
2007: 989), but the picture has changed since, with the arrival of Eurozone crisis and 
increasing electoral fortunes of the radical right FN, who has been a strong advocate of 
Euroscepticism. The chapter traces whether concerns over the EU have undermined 
Sarkozy’s and UMP’s logic on immigration.  
 
6.2.3 Idiosyncrasies of the French political system 
There are three characteristics of the French political system that deserve special 
mention when explaining immigration and integration policy change. They are semi-
presidentialism, assimilationist citizenship regime and French republicanism. First, the 
importance of semi-presidential regime is primordial in understanding policy change in 
France as the president is central to the agenda setting. Second, understanding of the 
French integration debate and policies is largely based on the assimilationist type of 
citizenship regime, which does not recognise cultural differences and prioritises 
migrants’ acceptance of the French societal values. Finally, secular setup of the France, 
which is underpinned by adherence to the Republican values, help to explain integration 
policy changes.   
 
Semi-presidentialism  
The French semi-presidential regime is crucial in explaining the significance of the 
agency in French immigration policy-making. Unlike Switzerland and the UK, which are 
parliamentary democracies, where the head of state, the president or the Queen, play 
more of a formal role, rather than determine policy-making, France belongs to a semi-
presidential regime with considerable powers confided to the president. It is important to 
address this as later this chapter examines immigration stance and policy changes under 
Sarkozy’s presidency, as he was a crucial actor that shaped French immigration debate 
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and immigration policy between 2007-2012. Despite having a strong executive, the 
president still retains more power and France is described as a semi-presidential state, 
where:  
 
[A] politically powerful President is grafted onto a Westminster-type parliamentary 
democracy, and where the executive branch of government is top heavy […] The 
1958 French Constitution provides the simultaneous political leadership by both 
President and Prime Minister. In this system, a directly elected president coexists 
with the Prime Minister appointed by the President […] The stronger of the 
executive duo in terms of the overall policy-making agenda - and certainly in terms 
of public visibility - is usually the President. (Drake, 2011: 95-96). 
 
President and prime-minister relations are decisive for the development of policy-making 
and their affiliation to the same party and the alliance between the two makes the policy-
making process easier.  
 
Traditionally, the linkage between presidential power and the party system took 
the form of the emergence of the presidential party […], the heart of the presidential 
majorité to support governments named by the President. (Cole, 2013: 70). 
 
In France, the president is in charge of policy-making, when he has a parliamentary 
majority in the National Assembly (Togman, 2002: 120). As during Sarkozy’s presidency, 
UMP held a majority in parliament, French immigration policy was largely driven by him. 
Thus, the next subsection discusses immigration positions in Sarkozy’s 2007 and 2012 
presidential election manifestos as well as the immigration policy change that has taken 
place during his presidency. Furthermore, immigration policy change has also been 
associated with Nicholas Sarkozy, when he was minister of the Interior during second 
Chirac’s presidency (2002-2007), therefore the following sections of this chapter also 
incorporates immigration policy change of this period.  
 
Republicanism and laïcité 
One of the underlying principles of French republicanism is the concept of laïcité (Drake, 
2011: 66), which means that the state does not favour any confession or any particular 
conception of the good life, while guaranteeing the free expression of every confession, 
with certain limits (Haarscher, 2011). It embraces “the removal of the religious factor in 
public life and in exchange, French citizens have the right to uphold any and every creed 
(with the exception of certain banned sects) in their private life, with some material 
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support from the state” (Drake, 2011: 66). Laïcité comes as a particular challenge for 
Islam because of Islam’s failure to recognise the separation of church and state. In this 
way, the conflation of private and public sphere of religious expression has entered 
French immigration debate. With Islam being the second religion in France in terms of 
adherents, the integration of Muslims into a French society poses a challenge of the 
conflict between Islam and French republican tradition, which does not officially 
recognise the exposure of cultural and religious differences (Marthaler, 2008: 70). 
Furthermore, “the perception that migrants, particularly Muslim migrants, are no longer 
assimilable has been a predominant issue in the immigration debate since the mid-
1980s” (Marthaler, 2008: 70). While French republicanism requires strong separation 
between private and public spheres, especially when it comes to religion, Islam fails to 
accept that separation, which creates tensions in the French society. Republicanism is 
important because it explains how the issue of Islam in France has become central in 
the French political debate, which led to the substantial changes in integration legislation 
with republicanism becoming “the dominant discourse in all discussions of laïcité” 
(Chabal, 2015: 69). Therefore, the changes in integration policy, debate around Islam 
and integration of Muslims are explained through the lens of republicanism.  
 
Assimilationist model of integration  
France belongs to the civil-assimilationist model, which entails “giving up ethnic-based 
identities in favor of accepting the republican ideal of the state” (Guigni and Passy, 2004: 
39). Emphasising equality, universal and secularism, French integration model prioritises 
assimilation of immigrants (Marthaler, 2008: 70; Hollifield, 1994). Assimilation to the 
French republican values of liberté, égalité, fraternité lies at the heart of French 
citizenship (van Houdt et al., 2011: 417). The emphasis of the French citizenship regime 
is primarily on the cultural acceptance of French values: “France combines short 
residence requirement and the allowance of dual nationality with fairly strong linguistic 
and cultural integration requirements and a strong jus soli for the second generation” 
(Ersanilli and Koopmans, 2010: 779). In addition to residency and citizenship 
requirements, the Contract of Welcome and Integration (CAI - Contrat d’Accueil et de 
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l’Intégration) requires new immigrants to adhere to the republican principles and to follow 
civic and linguistic education, which later serves as the basis for the issuance of a long-
residency permit (Chambon, 2006: 28). The identity aspect remains crucial in 
understanding French immigration policies and this chapter explores whether identity 
anxieties have been instrumental in the change of French immigration and integration 
policy between 2002 and 2012.   
 
6.3 Immigration under Sarkozy and the Evolution of French immigration policy 
 
6.3.1 Politics of immigration under Sarkozy as minister of the Interior  
This subsection discusses immigration policy change in France under Sarkozy, first, 
when he was the minister of the Interior and, second, under his presidency.  As “since 
2002, French immigration policy has been largely driven by Nicolas Sarkozy” (Marthaler, 
2008: 382), the chapter does not examine the immigration stance of the UMP for 
legislative elections, but instead focuses on Sarkozy’s discourse as he was the leader of 
the UMP from 2004 till 2007 and largely determined immigration stance of the party. As 
in France the president plays a central role on the agenda setting if his party has the 
majority in parliament, the chapter focuses on the examination of Sarkozy’s presidential 
programmes for 2007 and 2012 presidential elections. The chapter examines major 
transformations in French immigration policy since Sarkozy became the minister of the 
Interior in 2002 and till the end of his presidency in 2012. 
 
2003 Law on immigration, residence of foreigns and nationality (Loi relative à la maîtrise 
de l’immigration, au séjour des étrangers en France et à la nationalité)  
This law was adopted in 2003, a year after Sarkozy was appointed the minister of the 
Interior. The main objective was to decrease illegal immigration, by introducing longer 
terms for detention of foreigners, the introduction of the digital finger prints when applying 
for a visa, the stricter control of accommodation proof (attestation d’accueil), and the 
cancellation of the double peine (double sanctions) for those foreigners, who have been 
born in France and have lived there before turning thirteen (Legifrance, 2003). Double 
peine refers to those foreigners, who have committed a crime in France, who can be 
deported and who face both prison and expulsion despite having no connections in their 
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country of origin (Guiraudon, 2005: 156). The goal of the new law was to reduce illegal 
immigration, which subsequently “would facilitate the integration of immigrants already 
settled in France” (Marthaler, 2008: 73).  
 
By trying to appeal to Le Pen’s electorate and introduce a tough position on immigration, 
Sarkozy, nevertheless, made certain proposals that many would view as non-republican, 
by supporting positive discrimination of ethnic minorities and foreigners’ right to vote in 
local elections, that distanced him from the positions of the majority of his party 
(Marthaler, 2008: 75). This was an example of challenging the republican principles of 
egalité and laïcité, which undermined “the principles of strict neutrality governing the 
relationship between the French state and organised religions” (Marlière, 2013: 37). 
However, such rhetoric did not last for long and in 2004 Sarkozy took a restrictive stance 
on headscarf affair, which led to the creation of infamous law on banning the religious 
symbols in French public schools. 
 
Headscarf affair (l’affair du foulard)  
The headscarf affair has been a contentious topic for French society for nearly thirty 
years. First debates around headscarves started in 1989 in the suburbs of Paris, in Creil, 
where three French girls refused to take off their headscarves in the public school 
(Bauberot, 1996: 9). At that time, the Council of State decided that the wearing of 
religious symbols at school is not, by itself, incompatible with secularism, provided that 
it is not ostentatious and the decision to refuse admission may be taken, if necessary, 
on a case-by-case basis (Conseil d’Etat, 1989). Fifteen years later, in 2003 the expulsion 
of two female students in the Parisian suburb of Saint-Denis brought the debate back 
(Van Eeckhout, 2007). To respond to the concerns, French president Jacques Chirac 
established the Stasi commission, which examined the application of the principle of 
laïcité and issued a recommendation to ban wearing of headscarf in public schools (Le 
Monde, 2003). This recommendation was voted in March 2004, when both chambers of 
the French parliament voted in favour of the legislation banning religious symbols in 
French state schools (Loi encadrant, en application du principe de laïcité, le port de 
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signes ou de tenues manifestant une appartenance religieuse dans les écoles, collèges 
et lycées publics) (Legifrance, 2004). This legislation targeted primarily headscarves, 
worn by Muslim girls, but it, nevertheless, was not limited to them and also included 
symbols of other religions: Christian crosses, Sikh turbans and Jewish kippahs (BBC, 
2004). The French public was largely in favour of the law, with sixty-nine per cent of the 
French population supporting it and almost half of the Muslim population being in favour 
of it (CSA: 2005). Opinion polls show that the public was concerned with the possibility 
that the arrival of new immigrants from different cultures would threaten French national 
identity (Martigny, 2009: 27).  
 
The debate around headscarves in France and the introduction of the 2004 law are 
significant for the development of integration politics because it touches upon the 
integration of the largest religious minority in France - Muslims. The headscarf affair will 
see its development and toughening in due course, in 2010, when the French parliament 
will pass legislation on the prohibition of covering faces in public, more known as a ‘burqa 
ban’. The chapter addresses this question later on. This demonstrates the gap between 
Sarkozy’s political demands of positive discrimination towards foreigners, proposals to 
finance mosques and the creation of French Muslim Council (Marthaler, 2008: 75) and 
his policy outcomes, namely the ban of religious symbols in French public schools in 
2004.  
 
The 2006 Law on immigration and integration (Loi relative à l’immigration et 
l’intégration) 
The second immigration law was passed during Sarkozy’s second term as a minister of 
the Interior. He left the government in 2004 to become a leader of the UMP and he was 
asked by Chirac to return into a new government to head the Ministry after the rejection 
of the proposed EU constitution by French voters (Buchan, 2015). The year following his 
return, the second immigration law was passed on the 24 of July 2006 and has been 
known as: “his latest effort to open France for high skilled migration, stem illegal 
immigration, restrict family migration and promote integration into French society” (The 
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Migration Policy Institute, 2007: 6). The law addressed different types of immigration, 
including family, work, student and illegal immigration. Furthermore, it also tackled the 
integration of immigrants on the French territory. 
 
The law reinforced the selective immigration approach, by welcoming highly qualified 
migrants whose skills were needed for the French economy. Selective migration 
(immigration choisie) was the priority, rather than imposed immigration (immigration 
subie), which referred mostly to family migration. The list of sectors has been 
established, where the employers could recruit foreigners, who can be given a temporary 
one year residence permit, which can be renewable according to the duration of the work 
contract (Vie publique, 2006). Furthermore, the card of ‘competences and talents’ (carte 
competénces et talents) was introduced for highly skilled third country nationals and was 
given for the period of three years with the possibility of renewal (Ministère de l’Intérieur, 
2014). While highly skilled migrants were given priority, the politics towards low-skilled 
non-EU migrants and EU migrants from new member states continued to be based on 
the occupation list and temporary work permits (Carvalho and Geddes, 2012: 283).  
 
To limit imposed migration (immigration subie), the rules for family migration were 
considerably toughened. Thus, an immigrant, who wanted to bring his family to France, 
needed to have lived in the country for eighteen months instead of one year as it was 
before and had to justify that he or she had enough means to support the family without 
touching social assistance (Legifrance, 2006). Furthermore, integration of migrants was 
reinforced with migrants and family members bound to sign the Contract of Welcome 
and Integration, with making a promise to learn French and to respect French values 
(Marthaler, 2008: 77). The new law made it harder for spouses of French nationals to 
receive permanent residence, increasing the number of marriage years required: from 
two to three (Chou and Baygert, 2006: 5). It can be seen that immigration was reframed 
through social welfare lens by requiring immigrants to possess enough financial 
resources, which would prevent any possibility of claiming benefits.    
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During Sarkozy’s term as a minister of the Interior, between 2002 and 2007, French 
immigration and integration policy have been considerably tightened. Immigration has 
become more selective, encouraging highly skilled migration, discouraging family 
migration, introducing tougher integration rules and linking immigration to welfare 
concerns. The following section demonstrates how Sarkozy’s approach has shifted, once 
he became the president, focusing on the reduction of the overall migration numbers and 
on national identity concerns, stepping on the territory of the radical right FN.  
 
Sarkozy’s presidential programme 2007  
With economy and employment being the core themes of Sarkozy’s electoral campaign, 
immigration was still at the forefront of his agenda. He continued stressing the 
importance of a selective immigration approach, which welcomed only those immigrants 
that France needed. Furthermore, Sarkozy promised the introduction of controversial 
annual immigration quotas, which contradicted the republican paradigm. His programme 
stressed the importance of integration into French society by learning French before 
coming to France, respecting republican values of laïcité and equality between men and 
women (Sarkozy, 2007: 14). Finally, Sarkozy promised to create the Ministry of 
Immigration, Integration and National Identity (Sarkozy, 2007: 14), which would 
incorporate all immigration matters under the umbrella of one ministry. Associating 
immigration with the crisis of national identity and portraying immigration as a danger 
was comparable with the rhetoric of the radical right FN (Carvalho and Geddes, 2012: 
283) and aimed to attract part of the FN’s electorate (Carvalho, 2017). The rhetoric on 
family migration was reframed through social welfare lens, limiting family migration only 
to those, who have a house and who are employed, which eliminates the possibility of 
access to family benefits (Sarkozy, 2007: 14). Sarkozy considered that cooperation 
between the countries in immigration domain was necessary as Europe enables 
countries to perform better together, where without cooperation countries would cope 
worse. Yet, at the same time Sarkozy expressed strong opposition to Turkey’s entry to 
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the EU as it would lead to the increase of migration to European states and support for 
strengthening of the European borders (Sarkozy, 2007: 10).  
 
6.3.2 Immigration under Nicholas Sarkozy’s presidency  
The salience of the immigration issue under Sarkozy’s presidency has been extremely 
high (Carvalho, 2014: 53: Gastaut, 2012: 333). Immigration policy has undergone major 
transformations with two immigration laws adopted during his presidential term: one in 
2007 and the other one in 2011. The headscarf debate resulted in the adoption of the 
infamous law that prohibited the wearing of full veils in public places. Finally, there was 
an attempt to tighten student migration, which was later reversed.  
 
Sarkozy’s presidency is characterised by increasingly restrictive immigration rhetoric, 
with integration and national identity given prominent attention. When Sarkozy became 
the president in 2007, he started with fulfilling his electoral promise by creating the 
Ministry of Immigration, Integration, National Identity and Co-Development (Ministère de 
l’Immigration, de l’Intégration, de l’Identité nationale et du Co-Développement).  
 
The intended role of the new ministry was to curb migration flows, to foster co-
development, to improve the social integration of immigrants, and to promote 
national identity. (Duelund, 2016: 213).  
 
Linking immigration to national identity provoked criticisms from leftists and academics 
(Ocak, 2016: 83) because of “the institutionalisation of the association between the two 
issues, which legitimised perceptions of immigration representing a threat to national 
identity, as proposed by the FN ever since its creation” (Carvalho, 2015: 6). The rhetoric 
around the creation of this ministry was a sign of ‘soft nationalism’ (Noiriel, 2007) and 
aimed at targeting FN voters during the presidential campaign with stressing the 
importance of national identity and integration (Marlière, 2013: 33). Despite the criticism, 
the Ministry began operating and, shortly after its creation, prepared its first law on 
immigration, integration and asylum.  
 
2007 Law on Immigration, integration and asylum (Loi relative à la maîtrise de 
l’immigration, à l’intégration et à l’asile) 
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This law was passed in November 2007 and brought in some significant changes. This 
law has focused on family migration and integration of family members, and on making 
labour immigration more selective, implementing Sarkozy’s approach of selective 
immigration. It aimed to encourage highly skilled migration, by increasing the share of 
labour migration by fifty per cent, and by decreasing low-skilled and family migration 
(Sarkozy, 2007). It was an ambitious plan, as at that time labour migration represented 
only seven per cent of the total long-term residence authorisations (Carvalho, 2015: 7). 
The new law introduced the card of ‘competences and talents’ (la carte de competences 
et talents), allowing highly qualified immigrants to get long-term settlement (Carvalho, 
2016: 7) and increased the power of national authorities to decide who to let in the 
country (Challof and Lemaître, 2009). 
 
The new law targeted family migration by toughening integration requirements. Thus, 
anybody, who would be applying for family reunification or for the long-term visa, needed 
to show knowledge of French and if need be, the applicant can be asked to follow a 
short, maximum two-month course in the country of application and to present an 
appropriate level of French after the completion of the course (Vie Publique, 2007; 
Legifrance, 2007). In addition, CAI was introduced, which linked access to family benefits 
with the success of integration (Vie Publique, 2007). Apart from the knowledge of French 
and the acceptance of the values of the Republic, the law introduced tougher financial 
requirements for family reunion (Legifrance, 2007). During the parliamentary debate on 
the law, one of the UMP MPs, Thierry Mariani, proposed a controversial DNA test on 
family reunion, but this was met with strong opposition from the left-wing parties and the 
Constitutional Council has ruled that this proposal would be unconstitutional, and it was 
later dropped (Carvalho, 2016: 8). 
 
2010 Law prohibiting the covering of faces in public places (Loi interdisant la 
dissimulation du visage dans l’espace public) and the debate on national identity  
Six years after the prohibition of the wearing of headscarves in French public schools, 
the question of Muslim integration and secularisation returned to the forefront of the 
political debates. The debate originated from the request of the deputy of French 
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communist party in 2009 to create a “Commission on the practice of the wearing of niqab 
and burqa on the national territory” (Commision d’enquête sur la pratique du port du 
niqab et de la burqa sur la territoire national) (Roger, 2010). It is estimated that around 
2000 women wear the full veil in France and represent a tiny minority of the four million 
Muslim population in the country (Camus, 2013). However, French president Nicholas 
Sarkozy has endorsed the proposition and expressed his view on the ban of the full veil 
in France saying that: “Burqa is not welcome on the territory of the republic, […] it is not 
a religious problem, but a problem of liberty and dignity of a woman” (Robine, 2010: 43). 
This led to the adoption of the law in September 2010, which prohibited the coverage of 
the face in public places (Gabizon, 2010). Even though the text of the law did not 
explicitly mention the word ‘burqa’ or ‘veil’, and did not refer to any religious belonging, 
it was implicitly directed against Islam and Muslim women wearing full veil. The law, 
which is more commonly known as the ‘burqa ban’, envisaged a 150 Euro fine for women 
for wearing a full veil and one year prison sentence and 30,000 Euros fine for men, who 
would force female members of their family to wear a full veil (Legifrance, 2010). This 
law was later upheld by the International Court of Human Rights, which indicated that 
French authorities have the legal right to preserve the idea of “living together” (Jamet 
and Ceilles, 2014). 
 
Alongside the debate on the full veil, on Sarkozy’s demand, the debate on national 
identity was launched by the immigration minister Eric Besson. In October 2009 Besson 
announced: “I want to launch the grand debate on the values of national identity, on what 
does it mean to be French” (Besson, 2009). He expressed the view that burqa is 
unacceptable and goes contrary to the values of national identity (Le Monde, 2009). 
However, contrary to the aim, the debate did not find much support within the French 
public and was viewed negatively by the majority of the population (Libération, 2010). 
With the pressure not only from the left-wing camp, but also from within his own party, 
this debate was abandoned in February 2010 when, after three months of discussions 
on Islam and xenophobia, Sarkozy was forced to halt the debate because the public 
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viewed it as in-constructive (Lemarié, 2012). Soon after the this, in November 2010, the 
Ministry of Immigration, Integration and National Identity was dismantled and immigration 
affairs again returned under the umbrella of the Ministry of the Interior. Thus, “Sarkozy 
admitted that he had been wrong to create a ministry responsible for immigration and 
national identity, and that a nationwide debate on what it meant to be French had led to 
tensions and misunderstandings” (Duelund, 2016: 213). Shortly after immigration affairs 
returned under the jurisprudence of the Ministry of the Interior, the new immigration law 
was enacted.  
 
2011 Law on immigration, integration and nationality (Loi relative à la maîtrise de 
l’immigration, à l’intégration et à la nationalité) 
The French parliament adopted the new immigration law in June 2011, primarily with the 
intention of decreasing immigration numbers by allowing for deportation of both EU and 
non-EU citizens. For the first time, EU immigration has been reframed through a social 
welfare lens. First, the law introduced the blue European card (carte bleu européenne) 
for highly skilled migrants, which facilitated access to the French labour market and the 
right to identical residence in any EU country. Second, it allowed for the deportation of 
EU citizens that have abused the free movement of persons principle and have abused 
social welfare system. Third, it authorised the deportation of both EU and non-EU citizens 
that have been in France for less than three years, but have presented a danger for the 
public order (Legifrance, 2011). Furthermore, in the context of this immigration law, then 
minister of the Interior Claude Guéant proposed to reduce legal immigration to France 
by twenty thousand people, which was quite a radical change from 2007 proposals to 
increase labour migration by fifty per cent (Carvalho and Geddes, 2012: 291). Such 
change of direction was an electoral attempt to appeal to the FN voters before the 
upcoming 2012 presidential election (Vincent, 2012).  
 
Guéant circular (Circulaire Guéant)  
Student migration had never been under the attack during Sarkozy’s presidency, but this 
changed when the minister of the Interior Claude Guéant promised to limit legal migration 
before the 2012 presidential election. He, together with the minister of Labour Xavier 
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Bertrand, co-signed the circular that made professional immigration more restrictive 
(Pellet, 2015). The circular aimed to decrease the numbers of non-EU migrants on the 
French labour market by toughening the criteria for the issuance of residence permit to 
non-EU graduates. This was met with widespread criticism not only by the socialist party, 
but by the UMP because it endangered France’s influence in the education sphere. But 
the government backtracked its position on the issue only in January 2012, when it 
presented an additional document that allowed foreign students with a master degree 
and above to stay in the country and search for a job (Floch, 2012). The text of the new 
circular emphasised that “the necessity to manage migration should not be done as a 
detriment of the attractiveness of the French higher education and certain firms, who 
require highly qualified personnel” (Floch, 2012). Thus, in addition to family and labour 
migration, student migration became the target of the conservative government as a 
means to limit migration inflow into France, which manifested itself in the protectionist 
politics of the French economy from foreign labour. 
  
Sarkozy’s presidential programme 2012  
Sarkozy’s electoral programme ‘La France forte’ (strong France) for the 2012 
presidential elections was brief and contained thirty-two short proposals on different 
policy issues. It suggested decreasing current immigration levels by half, tightening 
family migration to those who speak French and accept republican values. On Europe, 
Sarkozy demanded better control of external borders and in the case of failure to do so, 
France would reinstate its own borders (Sarkozy, 2012: 3). Sarkozy repeated his 2007 
electoral pledge on selective migration, arguing that there should not be an automatic 
family reunion, but a selective one (Le Monde, 2012). Even though the Ministry of 
Immigration, Integration, National Identity and Co-developement was abolished in 2010, 
integration still remained a priority issue for Sarkozy alongside the reduction of overall 
migration numbers (Carvalho, 2017: 10). Even though the programme itself only included 
short proposals, the development of immigration policies under Sarkozy’s 2007-2012 
presidency gives a broader view on immigration stance of the right-wing candidate 
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before 2012 presidential elections. Table 4 presents a comparison between Sarkozy’s 
2007 and 2012 presidential programmes.  
 
After Sarkozy’s appointment as a minister of the Interior in 2002, French immigration 
policy has experienced considerable tightening. The concept of selective immigration 
dominated the political debate, and aimed to increase highly skilled labour migration and 
decrease family migration. Closer to the 2012 presidential elections, the politics of 
Nicholas Sarkozy shifted towards the reduction of the overall immigration inflow, which 
subsequently led to the more restrictive policy towards non-EU graduates of French 
universities. Finally, national identity, integration, Islam and republican values were at 
the forefront of the agenda, especially when Sarkozy became the president of the 
Republic. The chapter proceeds with the exploration of causal factors that led to the 
 
 
• selective immigration approach, 
increasing highly-skilled labour 
migration; 
 
• integration into the French society, 
acceptance of the Republican 
values;  
 
• creation of the new Ministry of 
Immigration, Integration and 
National Identity; 
 
 
• allow family migration only to 
those, who are employed and 
possess enough financial means;  
 
• necessity of cooperation between 
European countries in immigration 
domain. 
 
 
• decrease current immigration 
levels by half; 
 
• tighten family migration to 
those who can speak French 
and who accept the 
Republican values;  
 
• Europe: better control of 
external borders; 
 
 
• no automatic family reunion;  
 
• reinforce selective immigration 
approach. 
Table 4: Comparison of Sarkozy’s 2007 and 2012 presidential programmes  
2007 Presidential programme   2012 Presidential programme  
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introduction of more restrictive immigration discourse and subsequent immigration policy 
change between 2002 and 2012.  
 
6.4 Causal factors  
This research found that Sarkozy’s immigration approach underwent major 
transformation in response to a variety of factors. The importance of public opinion on 
immigration and integration, increasing pressure from the radical right FN, the worsening 
of the economic situation in France had an impact on the evolution of the French 
immigration policy in a more restrictive direction. Global financial crisis accounted for the 
existence of policy gaps between Sarkozy’s political demands of increasing the share of 
highly skilled migration and the failure to do so. Furthermore, the analysis of the 
interviews identified that identity anxieties, focused on Islam and integration of the 
immigrants from North Africa and French of immigrant origin from former colonies, were 
instrumental in the redefinition of integration policies under Sarkozy. Finally, the research 
traced that the EU had an impact on the immigration discourse through the security 
angle, presenting concerns about the external border of the EU and reinforced anxieties 
about third-country illegal immigration. But overall, the research found EU was not a 
sufficient factor that shaped the development of French immigration policy by Sarkozy 
and his party, who were more preoccupied with managing third-country migration inflows 
and with integration matters.   
 
6.4.1 Public opinion 
Public opinion was a causal factor that led Sarkozy and his government to redefine 
integration policies, particularly on the co-existence of Islam with French republican 
values. Furthermore, the importance of public opinion on student migration has changed 
the approach adopted by the minister Guéant in 2011, which was modified after the 
disapproval of the Circular by the public. Finally, public attitudes towards the creation of 
the new Ministry of Immigration, Integration, National Identity and Co-development and 
public dissatisfaction with 2009 national identity debate led to the u-turn on immigration 
policy, halting the national identity debate and dissolving of the Ministry. 
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Decolonisation and increased family migration from North Africa and beyond, together 
with unfavourable public opinion on immigration, led to the introduction of the new 
paradigm of selective immigration (l’immigration choisie). Sarkozy’s special advisor on 
immigration confirmed that the change in immigration approach from imposed to 
selective immigration was dictated by the open-door policy on family migration, which 
was creating concerns within the French public (Interview with Sarkozy’s special adviser, 
2016). The selective immigration approach explains the introduction of the new card of 
competences and talents (la carte de competences et talents) for highly skilled 
immigrants, which aimed to increase highly skilled migration. The change of paradigm 
also led to the changes in the bureaucratic system, namely to the creation of the small 
Interministerial Committee on Immigration control (Le Comité Interministeriel de contrôle 
de l’Immigration), which was created during the presidency of Jacques Chirac on a 
proposal from a senior civil servant, who directed Chirac’s presidential campaigns and 
who was Sarkozy’s immigration advisor during his presidency (Interview with a senior 
civil servant and a former head of Interministerial Committee on Immigration Control, 
Patrick Stefanini, 2016). This committee aimed to coordinate immigration matters, which 
were split between the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ministry of the Interior and Ministry of 
Integration and Social Affairs, but also served as a platform for developing Sarkozy’s 
ideas on selective immigration (Interview with a senior civil servant and a former head of 
Interministerial Committee on Immigration Control, Patrick Stefanini, 2016).  
 
The importance of public opinion to Sarkozy and his government is shown with the 
establishment of the Ministry of Immigration, Integration, National Identity and Co-
development, a fulfilment of his 2007 electoral pledge as immigration was becoming a 
major concern for the French (Interview with a senior civil servant and a former head of 
Interministerial Committee on Immigration Control, Patrick Stefanini, 2016). In December 
2006, in his speech during the press conference, Sarkozy highlighted that, according to 
a SOFRES study, sixty-three per cent of the French think that there is too much 
immigration in France (Sarkozy, 2006). More precisely, at the same time almost forty 
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percent of voters said that immigration is very important in influencing their vote and thirty 
per cent said that it is important enough for them to decide who they will be voting for 
(Brouard and Tiberj, 2007: 2). Another example that shows the importance of public 
opinion on immigration for Sarkozy is the halt of the debate on French national identity, 
which was disapproved by the public and which subsequently led to the dissolution of 
the Ministry in autumn 2010 (Wihtol de Wenden, 2012: 326).  
 
The failure to implement his selective immigration approach by increasing highly skilled 
migration at the expense of other inflows made Sarkozy reinforce his immigration 
position before the 2012 presidential election. In order appeal to the electorate, 
Sarkozy’s immigration discourse gets more restrictive and he promises to cut overall 
immigration numbers by reducing immigration in half (Sarkozy, 2012). This was 
impossible, but instrumental in attracting the electorate (Interview with Sarkozy’s former 
special adviser on immigration, 2016). As Sarkozy during his presidency failed to 
decrease the non-EU migration (Héran, 2017; Tribalat, 2017), other ways to decrease 
migration were adopted. The minister of the Interior Claude Guéant aimed to reduce 
overall migration numbers by targeting student migration. In May 2011, Guéant issued a 
Circular, which prohibited foreign non-EU graduates from staying in France looking for a 
job upon the completion of their degree. However, the unpopularity of this decision with 
the public forced Guéant to modify the Circular, allowing graduates to remain in France. 
The modification came from the large opposition of civil society and political actors, 
including politicians from within the UMP because it became detrimental to the French 
educational system and French influence (rayonnement) in the world (Interview with a 
senior civil servant and a former head of Interministerial Committee on Immigration 
Control, Patrick Stefanini, 2016).  
 
Guéant says that soon the government is supposed to present itself to the Council 
of Immigration and that we should act quickly to decrease the inflow. He takes the 
decision to enact the Circular on students, which results in criticism and is forced 
to modify it. (Interview with Sarkozy’s former adviser, 2016).  
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For the first time since 2002 student migration became a target of the right-wing UMP 
because Guéant had concerns over high immigration numbers and their effect on 
Sarkozy’s success before the 2012 presidential election. But public opposition to this 
restrictive policy made Guéant amend his circular a year later in order to allow students 
who have at least master qualification to look for a job.  
 
When Claude Guéant became the minister of the Interior, and his former adviser, 
whom I know very well, told me what happened. So, when he became the minister 
of the Interior, he saw the immigration statistics since 2007 and he saw that it has 
increased. So, at the time we are in the midst of presidential campaign and the 
president is going to tell the people that he increased immigration. This is 
impossible. And at that particular time he had a brutal politics regarding 
immigration. (Interview with Sarkozy’s former adviser, 2016). 
 
Public opinion towards integration also had an impact on the evolution of the immigration 
policy. The electoral success of the FN in 2002 presidential election signalled the fact 
that radical right ideas were entering the mainstream political space. The importance of 
addressing public anxieties about integration and Islam were crucial in showing the 
French that Sarkozy and his party are responding to the concerns of the public and in 
insuring that right-wing UMP holds the ownership of the issue (Interview with a senior 
civil servant and a former head of Inter-ministerial Committee on Immigration Control, 
Patrick Stefanini, 2016). Muslim frame (Tiberj and Michon, 2013: 585-587) was 
instrumental in Sarkozy’s politicisation of integration, and the national identity debate 
only increased the intolerance towards North-Africans. As Tiberj and Michon (2013: 586) 
pointed such “systematic use of the Islamic frame promotes and reinforced the theme of 
a class of values between minorities and the receiving society”.  
 
It is hard to disentangle the influence of public attitudes from party competition with the 
FN, because the change in public opinion on immigration and integration is partly 
affected by the politicisation of the issue by the radical right FN. Responding to 
integration anxieties of the public about the incompatibility of Islam with the republican 
values, primarily, laïcité, led to the introduction of more restrictive integration policies. 
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Sarkozy “succumbed to public pressure to set up a commission to investigate the 
wearing of religious symbols at schools” (Chabal, 2015: 66). Despite being a contentious 
issue, the Law on banning religious signs in public schools in 2004 was supported by 
more than three quarters of the public (IFOP, 2015: 9). Sarkozy’s continued the debate 
on Muslim integration, supporting the Communist party’s MP proposal to investigate the 
wearing of full veils in public (Laxer, 2017). After parliamentary discussions, the law that 
prohibited the wearing on full veils was passed in 2010, aiming to please the public, but 
only by treating the symptom of integration failure, not the problem itself (Interview with 
Sarkozy’s former special adviser on immigration, 2016). By introducing this discourse, 
Sarkozy politicised the issue of Islam, and by recognising strong attachment of the 
French to laïcite, not only on the right, but also on the left side on the political spectrum 
(Interview with a former head of the Office for territorial, social and cultural integration in 
the Ministry of the Interior, Marie-José Bernardot, 2016), Sarkozy supported the so-
called ‘burqa ban’. Despite controversy, this law was overwhelmingly supported by the 
public with eighty-two per cent approving of the ban (Pew Research Center, 2010).  
 
Thus, the cultural aspects of integration were dealt with, but the problem with integration 
or the socio-economic status of immigrants and French of immigrant origin remained. It 
has not undergone major changes because of the absence of political will, as the right-
wing UMP worried that increasing the economic investment into integration will not find 
widespread public support. The former head of the Office of territorial, social and cultural 
integration in the Ministry of Integration and Social Affairs, and later the head of the Office 
of territorial integration in the Ministry of Immigration, Integration, National Identity and 
Co-development, and later in the Ministry of the Interior Marie-José Bernardot pointed to 
the absence of the political will to improve integration: 
 
If we talk about the politics of integration of immigration, that we should do 
something positive for the immigrants, but politically there is no courage to do it. 
There is no wish to really do it. (Interview with Marie-José Bernardot, former head 
of the Office for territorial, social and cultural integration in the Ministry of the 
Interior, 2016).    
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6.4.2 The rise of Front National 
The striking result of the 2002 presidential election was an electoral breakthrough for the 
radical right FN with Jean-Marie Le Pen making it to the second round. It showed the 
growing support for radical right ideas in France. Despite losing to the right-wing 
candidate Jacques Chirac in the second round, Jean-Marie Le Pen and his rhetoric have 
had indirect effects on immigration stance and policies of the right-wing UMP, who by 
using an accommodative strategy were making FN’s stance more palatable. Even 
though the majoritarian system kept the FN away from the Assemblée Nationale, where 
the party only had couple of seats, FN’s rhetoric has entered mainstream political space. 
FN's impact on right-wing parties is centred around two important issues of the French 
immigration policy: first, national identity and integration and, second, the management 
of migration inflows. As admitted by several MPs from the former UMP, the politicisation 
of the immigration debate by the FN has forced mainstream parties to redefine their 
immigration stances and policies:  
 
There is an influence in a sense that FN neutralises two principal parties of the 
government. It neutralises or, in other words, simplifies the debate. All the 
decisions that are close to those of the FN become impossible because of the 
danger to appear like FN. So, all the stakes are at addressing the debate and leave 
the FN aside. (Interview with the UMP MP, 2016). 
 
The danger of the right-wing’s electorate defecting to the radical right FN and the 
constant politicisation of immigration, national identity and integration by the FN led to 
the re-examination of right-wing UMP immigration positions. Thus, the UMP and Sarkozy 
have adopted an accommodative strategy (Meguid, 2007) towards the FN by arguing for 
the reduction of immigration and by relaunching integration debate and policies.  
 
The electorate of the Front National pushed other parties to modify their 
immigration position, in any case, at least to push them to make an impression that 
they did that. (Interview with Edouard Philippe, current French prime minister, 
2016). 
 
Integration also became one of the major concerns of Sarkozy and his Ministry of the 
Interior after Le Pen’s electoral breakthrough in 2002 presidential election. This was also 
acknowledged by Marie-Jose Bernardot who suggested that: 
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There is a direct connection between the electoral success of the FN in 2002 
presidential election and the re-launch of integration policy in 2003, 2004 and 
2006, the will to re-launch instruments of integration in France. (Interview with a 
former head of the Office for territorial, social and cultural integration in the Ministry 
of the Interior, Marie-José Bernardot, 2016).  
 
Furthermore, the promise of creation of the Ministry of Immigration, Integration, National 
Identity and Co-Development before 2007 presidential election and the subsequent 2009 
debate on the national identity was another example of Sarkozy’s accomodative strategy 
(Meguid, 2007) towards FN.  
 
The debate on national identity arose under the pressure from the FN. There would 
not have been the debate of we did not have such strong FN. The defence of 
national identity is the electoral question of the FN. And Nicholas Sarkozy knew 
that and used that. (Interview with former regional  director of FASILD and ACSE, 
Frederic Callens, 2016).  
  
While there was sufficient discourse about the intention to improve integration, there was 
a lack of political will to finance the integration policy and to improve socio-economic 
situation of the immigrants and the French of immigrant origin (Interview with a former 
head of the Office for territorial, social and cultural integration in the Ministry of the 
Interior, Marie-José Bernardot, 2016; Interview with a former regional director of FASILD 
and ACSE, Frederic Callens, 2016). Governmental policy towards integration of Muslims 
had more of an assimilative character, which led to the prohibition of ostentatious 
symbols in French public schools following the ‘headscarf affair’. The 2005 riots in 
Parisian suburbs (banlieues), which were a public backlash against the electrocution of 
two teenagers of immigrant origin followed by the French police (Mucchielli and Goaizou, 
2007), signalled about the marginalisation of the French citizens of immigrant origins by 
the French authorities and triggered integration to become a primary preoccupation for 
Sarkozy as a presidential candidate. In 2006 the new immigration law was adopted, 
which reinforced integration and made the CAI mandatory for all newcomers (Loi du 24 
juillet 2006 relative à l’immigration et à l’intégration). Furthermore, the 2005 riots in 
Parisian suburbs and the FN’s rhetoric on integration and law and order led to the change 
 179 
in the integration paradigm of Nicholas Sarkozy. Hence, his approach changed from that 
of anti-discrimination to the equality of chances, where the emphasis was put on giving 
everyone equal chances, which is one of the fundamental principles of the French 
republicanism instead of condemning discrimination (Van Eeckhout, 2005). Former 
regional director of the FASILD and ACSE described this approach as a step back as 
such change led to the loss of legal mechanisms responsible for anti-discrimination 
(Interview with a former regional director of FASILD and ACSE, Frederic Callens, 2016).  
 
Because of the enormous pressure of the national identity debate, triggered by the rise 
of the FN, integration and identity became key concerns that right-wing UMP needed to 
address (Interview with a former regional director of FASILD and ACSE, Frederic 
Callens, 2016). National identity was one of the major topics of Sarkozy’s 2007 
presidential campaign with the promise of the creation of the Ministry of Immigration, 
Integration, National Identity and Co-Development to tackle the crisis of national identity 
(Ivaldi, 2008). The analysis of the electoral results demonstrates that such 
accommodative strategy towards Le Pen’s discourse proved to be successful and that 
Sarkozy managed to attract FN’s electorate (Mayer, 2007). After the creation of the 
Ministry in 2007, Eric Besson launched the debate on national identity in order to fulfil 
Sarkozy’s electoral pledge, but shortly after the start of the debate was viewed 
unconstructive by the public (Wihtol de Wenden, 2012). This led to the dissolution of the 
Ministry of Immigration, Integration, National Identity and Co-Development and the return 
of immigration under the umbrella of the Ministry of the Interior: 
 
This was a political sign for the FN’s electorate to reassure them that he wanted to 
take care of national identity but the big mistake is that nobody knows what is 
national identity and nobody can give specific definition of what it is. (Interview with 
the UMP MP, 2016).  
 
The FN’s impact on the right-wings UMP’s immigration discourse and policies also 
manifested itself through the management of immigration inflows. Thus, in 2006 Sarkozy 
introduced his ‘selective immigration’ strategy, which aimed to reduce overall 
immigration to France, by increasing the share of highly skilled labour migration at the 
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expense of unwanted family migration. With the failure to increase highly skilled 
migration and the overall increase in migration numbers (Tribalat, 2017) under Sarkozy’s 
presidency, he completely redefined his approach to immigration before 2012 
presidential election because of the concerns over the defection of his electorate to the 
radical right (Interview with Sarkozy’s former special adviser on immigration, 2016). His 
minister of the Interior Claude Guéant promised to cut legal immigration by 20,000 per 
year and maintain 180,000 net migration level. This Anglo-Saxon quota approach, which 
is not typical to France, was introduced under Sarkozy. This pledge is an attempt to 
prevent the alienation of Sarkozy’s electorate to the radical right FN in the upcoming 
2012 presidential election. In order to show that the government is addressing the 
concern and adopting an approach to reduce the number, the minister of the Interior 
Claude Guéant issues a Circular on students, which aims to restrict their access to the 
French labour market (Interview with Sarkozy’s former special adviser, 2016). Overall, 
FN's impact on Sarkozy’s immigration stance cannot be underestimated. However, it 
should be said that the FN has not been immune to change on the political landscape, 
by undergoing transformations since its creation, and that there has been “a reciprocal 
dynamic of influence between the FN and the parties of the centre right” (Shields, 2011: 
80). But as the focus of this chapter is on the impact of the FN on the right-wing UMP, it 
is important to stress that not only Sarkozy, but also other prominent representatives of 
the UMP have adopted FN’s rhetoric on immigration and Islam (Shields, 2013: 192). 
FN’s rise was not the only factor that contributed to the redefinition of the immigration 
policies in France, but has been a crucial one, which forced right-wing UMP and Sarkozy 
to reinforce its position on the issue to prevent its electorate from defecting. It led to the 
implementation of more restrictive immigration policies in France, both regarding 
integration and regarding the management of the inflows. 
  
6.4.3 Effects of the EU integration  
Migration from the EU has never been a concern for France, on the contrary, in the post-
war period French political authorities had preferences for European migration, instead 
of migration from former colonies because it was easier to assimilate Europeans than 
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North Africans (Schain, 2012). Overall, in France EU migration has not been a target of 
the right-wing’s discourse or policies during Sarkozy’s era. However, certain concerns 
towards the EU were present within the right-wing political establishment, but they were 
not related to the intra-EU migration, they were connected to the security issue of EU’s 
external border. Unlike the UK, EU enlargement did not present a significant concern for 
the right-wing UMP as France chose to impose transitional labour controls on the new 
EU member states (Drew and Skinskandaragah, 2007). Despite the absence or 
substantial concerns with intra-EU migration, the EU, nonetheless, played a salient role 
in the security discourse on immigration, which manifested itself in a wish to retain control 
over the EU’s external borders. Also, loss of sovereignty, which manifested itself in the 
necessity of cohesion between the EU law and the French law has created constraints 
for right-wing parties in power to tighten non-EU family immigration.  
 
The UMP remained primarily concerned with illegal migration coming from other EU 
member states, especially Italy and the protection of the maritime border with European 
Border and Coast Guard Agency FRONTEX (Interview with the UMP MP, 2016). 
France’s attachment to the European treaties like Schengen created anxieties because 
of the lack of control over the French border with other EU member states. The absence 
of border controls with neighbouring countries creates anxieties about illegal migration 
stemming to France: 
 
So, they came primarily from the Middle East, Pakistan, Afghanistan, Syria to get 
to the UK or other countries in Europe. There is also irregular migration from 
French colonies, from the black Africa, Maghreb… People, who pass specifically 
through Italy and arrive to France. (Interview with the UMP MP, 2016).   
 
The lack of control over external EU border led to tensions with Italy in spring 2011, after 
the Arab Spring, when a number of illegal immigrants entered France from a border with 
Italy. The inflow of illegal immigrants from North Africa led to the closure of the French 
internal border with the issue being escalated to the EU level. The biggest French 
concern regarding the EU is the ineffective control of the EU’s border and the 
malfunctioning of the Schengen area, which erases borders with other EU member 
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states and creates concerns over the increase of illegal migration to France. Therefore, 
right-wing parties in power emphasised the need to protect EU’s external border because 
of the migration inflow from the Middle East and the need to transform Schengen to 
prevent the inflow of illegal immigration to France (Interview with the current French 
prime minister, Edouard Philippe, 2016). In this sense, the EU posed concerns for right-
wing parties in power as ineffective controls of the EU borders led to the increase in 
illegal immigration.  
 
Second, loss of sovereignty also manifested itself through necessity of cohesion 
between the French law and the EU law. These concerns related to the impossibility of 
the French government to reduce unwanted family migration because of the European 
legal framework (Interview with Edouard Philippe, 2016; current French prime-minister; 
Interview with Sarkozy’s former adviser, 2016). This dominance manifested itself in the 
loss of sovereignty, where supranational EU had more control over immigration than 
previously:  
 
Nowadays the policies are communitarised, visa policies, border control… So, 
there are subjects where Europe exercises more competence than member states. 
(Interview with a senior civil servant and a former head of Interministerial 
Committee on Immigration Control, Patrick Stefanini, 2016).  
 
Overall, changes in French immigration policy were not driven by intra-EU migration, 
however, necessity of cohesion between the French law and the EU law presented 
certain constraints for right-wing parties in power on the issue of non-EU family 
reunification. 
 
6.4.4 Perceived concerns over economic development  
Perceived economic anxieties of the public towards immigration were underpinning the 
evolution of the French immigration policy between 2002 and 2012 as much as in the 
past, after the end of the Second World War, when French immigration policy was largely 
dependent on the economic needs of the country. Global financial crisis that unfolded in 
2007 presented a constraint for Sarkozy achieving his desired increase of highly skilled 
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migration to France. Immigration became intertwined with welfare through the lens of 
non-EU family migration with Sarkozy’s selective immigration approach that focused on 
decreasing the number of economically non-beneficial migrants.  
 
When the French economy was affected by global economic change during the 1970s 
oil crisis, the unemployment increased and there was no need for the foreign labour force 
(Interview with the UMP MP, 2016; Interview with the current French prime minister, 
Edouard Philippe, 2016). France adopted the same policy as Switzerland: exporting 
unemployment in economically insecure times by halting foreign labour migration. Right-
wing UMP was concerned about the slowdown in French economic growth and 
subsequent increase in unemployment (Interview with the current French prime minister, 
Edouard Philippe, 2016), therefore arguing for more selective approach to immigration, 
focusing on the attraction of highly skilled immigrants instead of low-skilled or family 
migrants. Selective immigration policy was introduced to prevent the inflow of low skilled 
migration from non-EU countries to France, as it could not add to the already existing 
high levels of unemployment in French suburbs. The 2005 riots in French suburbs 
highlighted the socio-economic deprivation of those areas. Sarkozy introduced his 
selective immigration approach in 2006, focusing on the increase in highly skilled labour 
migration that would benefit the economy: 
 
In 2005, the French economy does not behave well, we already have massive 
unemployment […] The economy does not function well and if we continue with 
the open immigration, we will not be able to give jobs to immigrants as much as 
we did in 1960s. In 1961-1964 many immigrants from Magreb countries came to 
France. But back then we had economic growth, job growth and housing. In 2005 
we did not have growth, we do not have housing or jobs. And this was the reason 
why we needed to slow down immigration. (Interview with a senior civil servant and 
a former head of Interministerial Committee on Immigration Control, Patrick 
Stefanini, 2016).  
 
The right-wing UMP maintained restrictive control of the non-EU labour migration, 
opening a small availability (thirty) of positions in different regions of France, while the 
list for the citizens of new EU member states was five times bigger (Fédération National 
des Travaux Publiques, 2008). After the 2005 and 2007 Eastern enlargements, France 
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imposed temporary transitional controls for labour migration from new EU member states 
(Drew and Siskandarajah, 2007) because it was worried about the impact of uncontrolled 
labour from these countries on unemployment and on the French labour market. Such 
restrictive policies towards non-EU migrants are explained by the logic of limiting 
unwanted labour migration, including posing restrictions to the citizens of newly joined 
EU countries to access French labour market (Interview with a senior civil servant and a 
former head of Interministerial Committee on Immigration Control, Patrick Stefanini, 
2016). In order to increase highly skilled non-EU migration, which would be beneficial for 
the economic development of the country, Sarkozy introduced the card of competences 
and talents. However, in the period between 2007 and 2011, only 1143 such cards were 
delivered (Ministère de l’Intérieur, 2014), and the policy of increasing highly skilled labour 
migration flows from seven to fifty per cent failed because: 
 
It addressed the non-existent problem. It is because of this we have delivered too 
little, because it responds to the problem that does not exist, those people who fall 
within the requirements of the card don't need it as they are recruited by the 
companies directly. (Interview with Sarkozy’s former adviser, 2016).  
 
Furthermore, in 2011, immigration minister Claude Guéant reversed the policy and 
curbed non-EU students’ right to stay in France to find a job upon graduation. As 
mentioned previously, this circular was not a result of the economic concerns about 
unemployment or the French labour market, it was a political move before 2012 
presidential election to reduce immigration numbers (Interview with Sarkozy’s former 
adviser, 2016).  
 
The analysis of the interviews has found that the global financial crisis was not used by 
Sarkozy to toughen immigration discourse and reframe it through social welfare lens. 
Family immigration was redefined through a social welfare lens, but this was not linked 
to the global financial crisis, which happened after the selective immigration approach 
was adopted by Sarkozy in 2006. Current French prime minister Edouard Philippe 
explained that the 2007 global economic crisis reinforced the discourse on 
unemployment and social security, and interrupted the implementation of Sarkozy’s 
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selective immigration policy (Interview with the current French prime minister, Edouard 
Philippe, 2016). Former head of Inter-ministerial Committee on Immigration Control, 
Patrick Stefanini highlighted that the failure to deliver on increasing highly skilled 
migration was because of the arrival of the global financial crisis.  
 
In the beginning it worked, 2007-2008, but then, I answer your question why it did 
not work, it is because the crisis arrived, global financial crisis. It is not that the 
firms don't hire foreigners any more, they don't hire at all. With global financial crisis 
we started to slow down, but we did want to increase labour migration. (Interview 
with a senior civil servant and a former head of Interministerial Committee on 
Immigration Control, Patrick Stefanini, 2016).  
 
During his presidential campaign, Sarkozy promised to reform immigration and reinforce 
integration, but 2007-2008 global financial crisis interrupted the implementation of these 
reforms (Interview with Sarkozy’s former adviser, 2016). According to the Directorate 
General of the Treasury, in 2009 France has seen the worst slowdown in its economic 
growth since the Second world war, with a 2.6 per cent GDP drop (Vincent, 2011: 1). 
The crisis led to major job losses in the period between 2008-2009 (Vincent, 2011: 1). 
The crisis undermined the success of this selective immigration policy as it had a 
negative impact on the economic situation in France, which saw an increase in 
unemployment and a plummeting in job growth. Finally, Global financial crisis also had 
an impact on the resources available for successful implementation of immigration 
policies, particularly integration measures (Interview with the current French prime-
minister, Edouard Philippe, 2016). 
 
Immigration becomes intertwined with welfare through the lens of non-EU family 
migration. The aim of selective immigration was to reduce family migration, which was, 
according to Sarkozy, putting a strain on the French welfare system. Particularly, the 
anxieties over family migration, which represents the biggest inflow in France, are linked 
to immigration from Muslim countries: “They come here, they don't work and they have 
the right to social housing, they have the right to free healthcare, they profit from the 
social welfare system and they do not work” (Interview with Sarkozy’s former adviser, 
2016). Hence, more restrictive requirements (salary, housing) for family migration were 
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adopted as part of the 2006 immigration law in order to prevent family migration that 
would rely on social welfare (Interview with Edouard Philippe, current French prime 
minister, 2016; Interview with Sarkozy’s former adviser, 2016). Such restrictive approach 
managed to get family migration down form approximately ninety to eighty-six thousand 
in the period from 2007 till 2010 (INSEE, 2012). 
 
Immigration was tied to the needs of the economy and the emphasis was made on 
highly-skilled immigration, which would contribute to economic development. Thus, non-
EU migration was strictly controlled and France also imposed restrictions on citizens of 
the new EU member states in an attempt to prevent the inflow of unskilled labour. Global 
financial crisis reinforced the discourse on unemployment and insecurity on the job 
market, but did not lead to the reframing of immigration through social welfare lens, which 
happened, when Sarkozy announced his selective immigration approach in 2006. Global 
financial crisis, though, posed a constraint for Sarkozy’s attempts to reform immigration 
and integration.  
 
6.4.5 Perceived identity anxieties about Muslims and their integration  
Identity was another causal factor that shaped French immigration policy. Perceived 
concerns of the public over identity triggered the change that integration policies 
underwent under the right-wing government and Sarkozy’s presidency. In France, the 
politics of immigration is not only focused around the management of the inflows, but is 
also focused on the issue of integration: “The question of Islam, the question of identity 
is very important. I am drawing your attention to the fact that the often in France, when 
we are talking about the politics of immigration, this is not a problem, we are talking about 
integration” (Interview with Edouard Philippe, current French prime minister, 2016). 
Immigration politics in France equally concentrates on the management of the inflows as 
well as on the questions of identity and culture, integration (Interview with the UMP MP, 
2016). 
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Identity concerns remain a contentious issue because of the country’s colonial past, 
which led to many individuals from former colonies settling in France, often with their 
families (Schain, 2012). Decolonisation had an impact on the development of integration 
policy because of the relationship that France had with its former colonies (Interview with 
the UMP MP, 2016). After the decolonisation of French empire and the 1970s oil crisis, 
France experienced large inflows of family migration primarily from Muslim background 
(Hollifield, 2014), which was creating tensions between secular France and increasing 
presence of Islam on its territory. Integration policy in France is closely associated with 
colonialism: “current ‘problems, particularly associated with laïcité and national 
integration, are a replay of echo of the colonial past. In this way, urban protest in the 
banlieus has become an extension of the Algerian War and demands for ethnic minorities 
to ‘integrate’ have been cast as a repackaged form of colonial ‘assimilationist’ ideology” 
(Chabal, 2017: 71). Evolution of the French integration policy is effectively focused on 
the French citizens of immigrant origin, on those living in French suburbs (banlieues), 
and on those, who are French, but don’t feel accepted by the French society, either 
economically or culturally:  
 
Of course, the problem is not 200, 000 immigrants that arrive every year, rather 
the problem is 5-6 million of people in France, whose grandparents were 
immigrants, but they are now French, but they have a problem with national 
identity. […] The problem is not the foreigners, it is the French that are not 
assimilated. (Interview with the current French prime-minister, Edouard Philippe, 
2016). 
 
Despite being a multicultural country, France rejects multiculturalism and expects 
immigrants to integrate in French society by adhering to the values of the Republic. In 
France the debate around integration is influenced by the colonial past and is calibrated 
by the issue of Islam and danger that it poses to the French national identity, a concept 
that does not have one established definition, especially considering France’s diverse 
immigration background. The fear of Islam and its presence in France was driving 
Sarkozy to toughen integration policies (Interview with Sarkozy’s former adviser, 2016). 
Changes in French integration policy are driven by the concern of the French about the 
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disappearance of national identity, about the invasion of foreign cultures, which is 
represented through the lens of Islam:   
 
The French society is afraid. It is afraid to be invaded, it is afraid to recognise itself 
(de se reconnaître), it is afraid to lose its identity and all these fears crystallise 
through the question of Islam nowadays. (Interview with a former regional director 
of FASILD and ACSE, Frederic Callens, 2016).  
 
The incompatibility between Republican values and Islam led to the numerous debates 
on integration of Muslims into French society, including contentious debates on 
headscarves and full veils. In 2003, Stasi Commission, which was set up to investigate 
the situation with wearing headscarves in public schools, concluded that there is a need 
to create legal framework that will regulate the situation (Interview with a former head of 
the Office for territorial, social and cultural integration, Marie-José Bernardot, 2016), 
which later led to the adoption of the law on prohibition of religious symbols in public 
schools. The fears about the erosion of French national identity led to the launch of the 
debate on national identity in 2009, which was halted shortly after because of public 
disapproval, but which triggered the adoption of the 2010 law on the coverage of the face 
in public. Thus, identity anxieties combined with the public opinion on the issue led to the 
adoption of more restrictive policies towards cultural integration of Muslims in France.  
 
However, Sarkozy only targeted cultural integration, by reinforcing the Republican values 
of laïcité, and has not focused on addressing economic integration. Economic integration 
aims to incorporate people into French society by erasing discrimination of immigrants 
and the French of immigrant origin, creating opportunities for achieving better 
educational results, decreasing unemployment and increasing wages. Socio-economic 
deprivation in the French suburbs came to the forefront of the French political agenda in 
2005, when violence erupted in Parisian suburbs. Even though the violence was a direct 
response to the accidental electrocution of two teenagers of immigrant origin, who were 
running away from the police, more generally it highlighted the social exclusion, 
discrimination and inequality experienced by residents of the banlieues, who are by and 
large of immigrant and working-class origin (Beaman, 2017: 57). These riots led to the 
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evolution of integration policy and triggered an important change in Sarkozy’s integration 
approach, shifting it from an anti-discrimination to an equal opportunities paradigm. 
However, this change in approach erased an important legal instrument of punishment 
of those who were discriminating, and it did not give equal opportunities for immigrants. 
The change in Sarkozy’s integration discourse after 2005 riots aimed to draw away 
attention from discrimination to equal opportunities: 
 
Nicholas Sarkozy closes the only public institution in charge of discrimination - 
FASILD (Fonds d’action et de soutien pour l’intégration et la lutte contre les 
discrminations) and proposes to create the institution that will focus on the notion 
of equal opportunities […] which is not attached to legal framework, meaning that 
in case of discrimination you cannot sentence anyone. (Interview with a former 
regional director of FASILD and ACSE, Frederic Callens, 2016).  
 
As the head of the Office in charge of integration during Sarkozy’s presidency, Marie-
José Bernardot highlighted that the lack of political will to properly finance the integration 
budget was an obstacle to developing integration (Interview with a former head of the 
Office for territorial, social and cultural integration in the Ministry of the Interior, Marie-
José Bernardot, 2016). Furthermore, the absence of the right-wing’s political will to 
address economic integration was linked to a fear of losing the public on the issue 
(Interview with a former head of the Office for territorial, social and cultural integration in 
the Ministry of the Interior, Marie-José Bernardot, 2016). While it is more pleasant to 
show the electorate that on cultural integration we have toughened the rules (Interview 
with Sarkozy’s former adviser, 2016), it is more politically risky to address economic 
integration. Sarkozy’s approach focused on cultural integration, but neglected socio-
economic integration in socially deprived areas with high immigrant concentration. 
Despite the promise and the introduction of equality opportunities approach, the 
improvement with economic integration is not felt by the residents in those areas 
(Chrisafis, 2015). On the contrary, ‘between 2008 and 2011 the gap widened between 
unemployment rates in “sensitive urban zones” and in surrounding areas’ (The 
Economist, 2013). Therefore, Sarkozy’s aim to improve socio-economic integration was 
only present on the level of discourse, but lacked the political will to improve the actual 
situation in the banlieues.  
 190 
 
Even though the timeframe of this research is limited to the end of Sarkozy's presidency, 
it should be said that identity concerns were reinforced on the agenda of the leftist 
government of former French president Francois Hollande between 2012 and 2017. With 
the terrorist attacks on France in 2015 and 2016, the integration debate in France 
acquires a new security dimension. It poses questions about the success of integration, 
the integration of the descendants of French immigrants, who were born and brought up 
in France, but who are attacking French republican values, not foreigners, but French 
(Interview with the current French prime minister, Edouard Philippe, 2016; Interview with 
a former regional director of FASILD and ACSE, Frederic Callens, 2016). It signals the 
failures of integration of the French of immigrant origin, in terms of both cultural and 
economic integration. Anti-Islam attitudes are being reinforced through the security lens 
and identity and integration discourse in France continues to be focused on Islam.  
 
Perceived anxieties of the public about integration of Muslims of immigrant origin led the 
right-wing UMP to pursue more restrictive integration discourse and policies. The 
incompatibility between Islam and the Republican principle of laïcité drove the integration 
debate to the right. Sarkozy managed to defend laïcité by targeting cultural integration 
and prohibiting the wearing of headscarves in public schools and the wearing of full veil 
public. Yet, he did not have a political will to address the other republican principle of 
equality, by focusing on economic integration of immigrants and creating equal 
opportunities for immigrants and French of immigrant origin (Interview with Frederic 
Callens, former regional director of FASILD and ACSE, 2016; Interview with Marie-José 
Bernardot, former head of the Office for territorial, social and cultural integration in the 
Ministry of the Interior, 2016). This demonstrates that Sarkozy’s approach towards 
integration was focused on adopting more restrictive stance towards cultural practices, 
but did not aim to improve economic integration, because that would undermine his 
restrictive discourse on management of the inflows (Interview with a former head of the 
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Office for territorial, social and cultural integration in the Ministry of the Interior, Marie-
José Bernardot, 2016).  
 
6.5 Causal mechanisms  
Having explained the causal factors that led to the evolution of Sarkozy’s immigration 
stance, it is equally importantly to elaborate on mechanisms that accounted for 
immigration policy change. This research has found that two mechanisms allowed 
Sarkozy and his party to make immigration policy in France more restrictive. The first 
mechanism is framing, which concentrates on the argumentation of the positions on 
immigration, which is necessary for every political party to justify its position on the issue. 
Framing explains how these causal factors feature in the framing of immigration issue in 
Sarkozy’s rhetoric. The second mechanism is a procedural one, which focuses on the 
implementation of the ideas into policies and is institutional reshuffle architected by 
Sarkozy, which led to departmental competition. Since in France, the president is the 
one who defines the policy direction, it was Sarkozy who initiated several institutional 
reshuffles and established new political structures, which resulted in immigration and 
integration policy change and also accounted to the gaps between policy demands and 
police outcomes.  
 
6.5.1 Framing  
During the last ten years the right-wing was in office, Sarkozy and his party had 
toughened their immigration stance. There has been a change in the framing of 
immigration before the 2007 presidential elections and toward the end of Sarkozy’s 
presidency. In general, the rhetoric had shifted from the limitation of certain inflows to 
the limitation of overall immigration numbers. Thus, framing of family migration through 
a social welfare lens was aimed at justifying a more restrictive approach to family 
reunification, which was the biggest inflow in the country that Sarkozy wanted to reduce. 
He attributed blame to family migrants for putting pressure on the economy. Sarkozy’s 
diagnostic framing (Snow and Benford, 1988: 200-201) identified family migrants as 
unwanted immigration because of the pressure they were perceived to place on 
economy and social welfare. This diagnostic framing, which attributed blame to 
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immigrants, was a justification for more restrictive immigration policies towards family 
migrants, and amounted to the framing of family migration a social welfare lens. Sarkozy 
framed socio-cultural issue of family migration through an economic lens, blaming family 
immigrants for putting a strain on social welfare system and making insufficient efforts to 
integrate. Hence, Sarkozy’s prognostic framing (Snow and Benford, 1988: 200-201) 
proposed to increase financial requirements and introduce mandatory integration for 
family members in the form of the CAI.  
 
Another example of the change in immigration discourse refers to the highly skilled 
labour migration. While before 2007 presidential election Sarkozy framed highly skilled 
labour migration as beneficial for economic growth, such discourse disappeared before 
2012 presidential election. With the strong presence of the radical right FN, Sarkozy 
feared defection of his electorate to Marine Le Pen before the 2012 presidential election. 
Towards the end of his presidency, Sarkozy substantially changed his framing on 
immigration, by diagnosing that not only should family migration be restricted, but that 
numbers of legal migration inflows in general were too high. One of his 2012 electoral 
pledges proposed to cut immigration in half, from 200,000 to 100,000 a year (Sarkozy, 
2012). This was done to show commitment to reducing immigration with the aim of 
recuperating Le Pen’s electorate. In order to reduce overall immigration numbers, 
student migration was the new target of the conservative immigration minister Claude 
Guéant, who framed student migration in a negative light, by arguing that studying at 
French universities had become a way of getting into the country for reasons other than 
education. Furthermore, in addition to pressure to reduce overall immigration numbers 
from the FN, economic anxieties that student migration posed for the French labour 
market, also shaped Guéant’s framing of immigration. Prognostic framing of student 
migration included the issuance of Guéant’s circular, which denied recent non-EU 
graduates the right stay in France in search for a job. 
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Framing of the integration issue was completely shaped by the issue of Islam and its 
presence in France (Interview with Sarkozy’s former adviser, 2016). Sarkozy framed 
Islam as a threat to the values of equality and secularism, the cornerstones of the French 
republicanism. The emphasis on cultural integration was at the heart of Sarkozy’s 
discourse. Prognostic framing manifested itself in the opposition to headscarves in 
French public schools and full veils in public places. Muslims were blamed for insufficient 
integration into French society, and framing of the perceived failure of Muslim 
communities to integrate allowed Sarkozy to reinforce concerns about the erosion of 
French national identity. Sarkozy’s prognostic framing, which aimed to find solutions to 
the diagnosed problem, resulted in the launch of the national identity debate in 2009. 
Having discussed the argumentative mechanism of framing, the chapter now examines 
the second mechanism of institutional reshuffle that also led to the departmental 
competition. While institutional reshuffle permitted Sarkozy to fulfil some of his 
immigration pledges and to reshape French immigration policy in a more restrictive way, 
departmental competition explains why Sarkozy failed to deliver on some of his 
promises.  
 
6.5.2 Institutional reshuffle and departmental competition  
Mechanisms that account for immigration policy change in the French case are not 
obvious. Unlike in the UK, where the Conservatives were in the Coalition government 
with the Liberal Democrats and unlike in Switzerland, where political decisions need to 
be consensual, in France the president directs policy-making if his party has a majority 
in the French parliament. Hence, the adoption of new immigration and integration laws 
between 2002 and 2012 was possible because the right-wing UMP had the majority in 
the parliament and there was no need to reach consensus with other political parties. 
Institutional reshuffle mechanism, which refers to the dissolution of certain institutions 
and their replacement by the new ones, or the fusion of immigration and integration 
politics under one institution or the separation of immigration and integration matters to 
the different ministries, explains how immigration and integration policy changed. While 
departmental competition mechanism, whose essence lies in the competition between 
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the various organisms that were fused within the same institution explains the 
occurrence of the gaps between policy demands and policy outcomes. The conflicts of 
interest within the fused institutions led to the resistance of ministers and staff to the 
implementation of new policies. Sarkozy instigated the institutional reshuffle, which was 
designed to achieve the implementation of his political discourse into policies. 
Departmental competition that followed the reshuffle explains Sarkozy’s failure to deliver 
on his immigration and integration proposals. There were two major institutional 
reshuffles that were interconnected. One was with the reference to the change in 
integration paradigm, and another one regarding immigration policy in general.  
 
The change in integration approach happened in 2006, when Sarkozy decided to move 
from anti-discrimination approach to the equality of opportunities, which was a regression 
because in 2006 FASILD was replaced by the new integration agency the ACSE that 
incorporated urban policy (la politique de la ville), that was responsible for social 
promotion (promotion sociale) of the French of immigrant origin, that dealt with those 
young people, who were integrated, but discriminated (Interview with a former regional 
director of FASILD and ACSE, Fréderic Callens, 2016). It took time to reform the 
administration and these two policies were under the authority of two different ministries 
- the Ministry of Urban policy and the Ministry of Social Affairs and Integration - with the 
attempt to harmonise two policies. However, between 2007 and 2009, the politics of 
urban policy dominated the ACSE, and ultimately took control of the budget and staff 
(Interview with a former head of the Office for territorial, social and cultural integration in 
the Ministry of the Interior, Marie-José Bernardot, 2016). Intra-departmental competition 
within the ACSE partially leads to the failure of integration policy, and the importance of 
integration for Sarkozy leads to the re-separation of these policies. Intra-departmental 
competition manifested itself in the wish of every minister to have their own budget and 
independent decision-making powers. This made cooperation impossible and 
precipitated the failure of integration policy (Interview with a former head of the Office for 
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territorial, social and cultural integration in the Ministry of the Interior, Marie-José 
Bernardot, 2016).  
 
Furthermore, the divisiveness of the 2009 national identity debate and the rise of the FN 
led Sarkozy decide to separate the integration question from the urban policy question 
(Interview with a former regional director of FASILD and ACSE, Fréderic Callens, 2016). 
As a result, integration policy was placed completely under the authority of the Ministry 
of Immigration, Integration, National Identity and Co-development, and later of the 
Ministry of the Interior, which is better equipped (Interview with a former head of the 
Office for territorial, social and cultural integration in the Ministry of the Interior, Marie-
José Bernardot, 2016; Interview with a former regional director of FASILD and ACSE, 
Fréderic Callens, 2016). This institutional reshuffle led to a conflict of interest between 
staff from the ACSE and the Ministry of Immigration, Integration, National Identity and 
Co-development: 
 
This is already a loss of time because people that are in these different organisms 
are not very happy. Those, who come from the ACSE, they find themselves in the 
new organism that tell them to do things differently, to do different things and work 
with different methods, other objectives and other actors (Interview with a former 
head of the Office for territorial, social and cultural integration in the Ministry of the 
Interior, Marie-José Bernardot, 2016).  
 
The gap between Sarkozy’s policy demands and policy outcomes is also explained by 
the fact that the question of integration policy went away from the ACSE, from the social 
actors, to the governmental ministry because of the tension between those who come 
from the ACSE and those in the Ministry. The incorporation of integration policy under 
the ministerial umbrella shows Sarkozy’s commitment to maintaining strong immigration 
discourse. At the same time, however, it also hampered the effective delivery of policy 
outcomes. Thus, this evidences the gap between political demands and policy outcomes 
because the inclusion of integration policy completely under the Ministry leads to the 
exclusion of social actors like the ACSE from strategic planning and governance, which 
is necessary for the implementation of integration policy (Interview with a  former regional 
director of FASILD and ACSE, Fréderic Callens, 2016). Powerful integration discourse 
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of Sarkozy and his attempt to incorporate integration matters completely to the Ministry 
of Immigration, Integration, National Identity and Co-Development impeded the 
successful application of integration policy in France because of the power that the 
Ministry exercised over the ACSE on integration matters.  
 
Secondly, institutional reshuffle relates to the immigration issue in general. It shows the 
evolution of institutions that were responsible for immigration matters and explains how 
such a reshuffle failed to close the gap between Sarkozy’s policy demands and his policy 
outcomes. When Sarkozy became French president, he quickly fulfilled his electoral 
pledge to create the ministry that would be responsible for immigration and national 
identity. In 2007 the Ministry of Immigration, Integration, National Identity and Co-
Development was created with the idea of reuniting the responsibilities of three different 
ministries: Ministry of Integration and Social Affairs, Ministry of the Interior and Ministry 
of Work under one ministry (Interview with Sarkozy’s former adviser, 2016). This 
institutional reshuffle, the fusion of three ministers under the same umbrella led to 
considerable opposition by the ministers and their administrations, who were supposed 
to work together. There was a very strong resistance of each of the ministers and very 
strong resistance of the administrations to compromising with each other and to sharing 
a common budget and decision-making powers (Interview with Sarkozy’s former adviser; 
Interview with a senior civil servant and a former head of Interministerial Committee on 
Immigration Control, Patrick Stefanini, 2016):  
 
So, we have made it badly, we have put all together. The administrations that have 
reunited in this new ministry, did not really work together. In addition, there are 
physical constraints as well. When the people want to work together, physical 
constraints do not matter. Physically people are in different ministries, but legally 
they are under authority of one Ministry of Immigration. And, we have not put 
different services in the Ministry that we should have put because there was a lot 
of disagreement between the ministries. The new Ministry was created, but the 
people did not want to work together and in three years the Ministry has been 
dissolved. (Interview with Sarkozy’s former adviser, 2016). 
 
Moreover, the appointment of Sarkozy’s close political allies as the heads of the new 
Ministry - Brice Hortefeux and later on Eric Besson, who were not experts on immigration 
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(Interview with Sarkozy’s former adviser, 2016) was detrimental to achieving his goals 
on immigration. To sum up, institutional reshuffle, which fused immigration matters 
originally under the authority of three ministries into one, led to departmental competition 
within the new organism and the weak ministers that were in charge of it led to the 
dissolution of the Ministry in 2010. Moreover, faced with political pressures from the 
electoral rise of the FN and the failure of the national identity debate led to dissolution of 
the Ministry in 2010. Immigration and integration matters returned under the authority of 
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the Ministry of the Interior. Thus, institutional reshuffle led to the departmental 
competition within the new institutions, which explains the gap between Sarkozy’s policy 
demands and immigration and integration policy outcomes.  
 
6.5.3 Causal chain of the change in Sarkozy’s position on immigration and 
evolution of French immigration policy  
Having discussed causal factors that led Sarkozy and his party to make French 
immigration policy more restrictive and the mechanisms that accounted for the change 
and also prevented Sarkozy from achieving his goals on immigration, the final part of the 
chapter draws a complete causal chain. It presents the explanation of immigration policy 
change, incorporating causal factors, mechanisms, agency and the context. 
Mechanisms only occur where there is an entity and an activity performed by this entity 
(Beach and Pedersen, 2008: 30) and the activation of the mechanisms is context-
dependent (Pawson, 2001: 5), therefore context affects the triggering of the mechanism.  
 
The institutional reshuffle mechanism was activated as Sarkozy had decision-making 
powers that would enable him to do so, while departmental competition mechanism was 
a result of institutional reshuffle, created an unfruitful context for cooperation between 
fused institutions, as the actors within new organisations resisted sharing resources and 
decision-making powers and accounted for the gaps between Sarkozy’s policy proposals 
and policy outcomes.  
 
6.6 Conclusion 
Immigration policy in France between 2002 and 2012 underwent a considerable 
transformation, tightening family migration, redefining integration policy by prohibiting the 
wearing of headscarves in public schools and full veils in public, and creating tougher 
conditions for student migration. This change started when Sarkozy was the minister of 
the Interior, a position which he used as a platform for his candidacy for the 2007 
presidential elections. He adopted an accommodative strategy towards the FN and the 
salience of immigration remained high under his presidency.  
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Four causal factors underpinned the logic of Sarkozy’s immigration position and 
subsequent policy change. Out of five hypotheses that were tested, four were confirmed. 
First, the hypotheses that public opinion was instrumental, especially with regard to the 
redefinition of integration policy was confirmed. Clearly, there is a two-way relationship 
with Sarkozy trying to influence the public opinion on immigration, but also the 
importance of public attitudes driving this change. Public opinion was also reflected in 
the increasing support for the radical right FN, which was another factor that underpinned 
the toughening of Sarkozy’s immigration discourse and policies. Second, the hypothesis 
on anxieties about national identity, integration and Islam was also confirmed, 
demonstrating that identity concerns contributed to the change in Sarkozy’s rhetoric and 
led to the major changes in integration policies. The prohibition of religious symbols in 
public schools and the ban of full veils in public places represent Sarkozy’s approach to 
addressing cultural integration, while socio-economic integration was ignored. Third, the 
hypothesis on the effects of the EU integration, which played a salient role in the security 
discourse, was confirmed. The effects of the EU integration emphasised the importance 
of the protection of the EU external border from illegal immigration from third countries. 
The concerns over the loss of sovereignty, namely the necessity of cohesion between 
the EU law and French law had an impact only on the evolution of Sarkozy’s discourse, 
but not on policies. Finally, the hypothesis about the impact of economic anxieties on 
Sarkozy’s position is only partially confirmed Sarkozy’s immigration stance was 
underpinned by the economic development. But, on the other hand, Global financial 
crisis did not lead to the reframing of immigration through social welfare lens. Framing 
family migration through welfare concerns happened, when the selective immigration 
approach was introduced in 2006, which preceded the Global financial crisis. This crisis, 
though, presented a constraint for Sarkozy to succeed in his selective immigration by 
expanding highly skilled labour migration because it decreased the French economic 
growth, which resulted in increased unemployment.  
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The mechanism of framing prepared fertile ground for Sarkozy to justify the subsequent 
change in immigration policy. It is a mechanism that precedes the decision-making 
process. The successful adoption of new immigration legislation was possible as the 
president had the parliamentary majority and there was no need to reach consensus with 
other political parties. The research identified that institutional reshuffle generated the 
replacement and fusion of certain institutions and actors, which, in turn, led to the change 
in integration paradigm and the adoption of more restrictive policy choices. The second 
mechanism of departmental competition acted as a constraint because it manifested 
itself in the opposition of actors and their administrations to cooperate and to share 
decision-making powers and resources. While causal factors shaped Sarkozy’s framing 
of immigration, which highlights the importance of the structure in explaining immigration 
position change, the importance of agency is crucial in the cases of institutional reshuffle 
and departmental competition as the resistance of the actors to cooperate impeded the 
transformation of electoral pledges into policy outcomes. It demonstrates that not only 
the structure shapes the choices of the agency, but also that the agency can also be 
paramount in altering the structure and influencing policy outcomes.  
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Chapter 7 
The right-wing parties in power and immigration policy in comparative 
perspective: explaining the variation in right-wing parties’ responses 
 
7.1 Introduction  
Immigration policy in France, Switzerland and the UK has been redefined as a result of 
a variety of exogenous factors. As the preceding chapters have demonstrated that 
between 2002 and 2015 right-wing parties in power in Western Europe have toughened 
their immigration stance, which subsequently led to the redefinition of immigration 
policies, introducing more restrictive rules for family, student and labour migration. While 
France and Switzerland have witnessed major restrictions in integration policies in the 
wake of a perceived threat to national identities, which were primarily focused on the 
integration of Muslims in those societies, identity anxieties did not underpin the logic of 
immigration policy change of the British Conservatives. The importance of immigration 
as a policy priority for these parties has resulted in major changes not only for each 
countries’ national politics, but also has had a profound impact on the international 
context, by producing some important critical junctures. In both the UK and Switzerland, 
immigration policy change led to critical junctures such as the referendum on Brexit and 
the Initiative Against Mass Migration. In the UK, the Conservative Party agreed to a 
public referendum on exiting the European Union (the ‘Brexit’ referendum) partly as a 
response to public concerns about immigration and the EU and the perceived impact on 
the UK as a whole, but also as a response to growing Euroscepticism within the party 
itself. In Switzerland, immigration anxieties of the SVP led to the acceptance of the 
Initiative Against Mass Migration, which almost brought back an old quota system for 
immigration and threatened the Swiss relationship with the EU as it undermined the free 
movement of people principle. At the same time, France introduced the ban of 
headscarves in French state schools and a burqa-ban in public places, signalling a  
u-turn in the French integrationist approach during Sarkozy’s era. Furthermore, the 
salience of immigration increased as a result of the arrivals of refugees by sea, which 
had an impact on the free movement of people, temporary closing the borders between 
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Denmark and Sweden in autumn 2015. Some countries, like Hungary, opted for the 
construction of fences with other countries, including Serbia, to prevent the inflow of 
illegal immigration. Terrorist attacks in France, Belgium, the UK and Spain have 
reinforced the security aspect of immigration as some terrorists were of immigrant origin. 
The United States of America have not been immune to the immigration issue either, 
which has been politicised by Trump during his presidential campaign and during his 
presidency. With immigration becoming a top issue on the political agenda in Europe 
and beyond, it is crucial to explain what drives right-wing parties in power to toughen 
their immigration stances, as it blurs the boundaries between right-wing parties and their 
radical right competitors, signalling the revival of exclusionary nationalism (Inglehart and 
Norris, 2017; Guiraudon, 2017; Lequesne, 2016).  
 
The empirical chapters of this thesis traced the introduction of more restrictive 
immigration policies in all three cases and the analysis of these cases suggests that the 
causes of immigration policy change are broadly similar. However, the way these 
narratives are used by the three right-wing parties in power differs and remains largely 
context-dependent. On the surface, this means that the rhetoric of the UK Conservative 
Party, the UMP and the SVP has become increasingly anti-immigration, with a sort of 
shared attitude towards restricting immigration. Yet in practice, the perspectives on 
dealing with immigration concerns in the three cases remain distinct and different. This 
chapter offers insights into why this is the case. This chapter is in essence an 
amalgamation of all the findings from the three empirical chapters, bringing the findings 
together in a comparative framework for the first time in the thesis. Apart from comparing 
the findings, the aim of this chapter is to demonstrate if the proposed hypotheses that 
were set out in the theory chapter were confirmed or falsified and how the findings of this 
research add to the theories of party policy change and to POS theory.  
 
The goal of this research was not simply to explain the outcome of immigration position 
change in three cases, but to make a contribution to the broader literature on why parties 
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change their policy stances, in other words, to offer certain generalisations. As process-
tracing is limited in producing generalisations to other cases because it is only able to 
draw within-case inferences, a comparative case study framework overcomes this 
limitation, and, by comparing these inferences, can provide grounds for explanations 
beyond a particular case. This is the added value of the comparative case study 
approach, which is crucial not only for theory testing, but also for theory refinement, 
examining accounts for differences and similarities in three cases. The comparative case 
study is a useful tool for overcoming the limitations of generalising from qualitative 
research. Furthermore, with regard to mechanisms, quantitative research is only useful 
if established indicators exist for the hypothesised mechanisms. Direct observation of 
novel mechanisms requires a qualitative approach. Comparing mechanisms can 
highlight the conditions under which some mechanisms are likely to occur, while others 
do not. To sum up, comparison is crucial for offering grounds for generalisation and for 
theory refinement because it explains what accounts for the variation in three cases.    
 
7.2 Causal factors: similarities and differences across three cases    
This research has investigated which exogenous factors have led right-wing parties in 
power to change their positions on immigration, and subsequently to change immigration 
policies. Six hypotheses, which outlined the factors, were based on theories of party 
policy change, were tested in all three cases. These hypotheses were constructed and 
tested with the elite interview data. 
H1: Party competition on the right, or more specifically, the presence of strong radical 
right competitor leads right-wing parties in power to adopt an accommodative strategy 
(Meguid, 2007) towards their rivals and go hard line on immigration3.  
                                                 
3 It should be noticed that in Swiss chapter the hypothesis about the impact of party 
competition is absent as in Swiss case, there was no credible competitor for the SVP 
that would be further to the right in the Swiss political spectrum.  
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H2: Right-wing parties in power pursued restrictive immigration stance as a response to 
shifts in public opinion on the issue, which became more negative over the years.  
 
H3: Perceived identity concerns of the public about the threat from Islam and integration 
of Muslims resulted in the introduction of more restrictive policies in integration domain.   
 
H4: Perceived economic anxieties of the public over immigration over unrestricted EU 
immigration were at the origins of the changing approach to immigration.  
 
Table 5: Causal variance across three cases 
Country UK Switzerland France Political 
opportunity 
structures 
Public opinion 
shifts 
Yes Yes Yes  
Party competition Yes No Yes Radical 
right’s 
presence 
POS 
Effects of the EU 
integration 
Yes Yes No Relationship 
with the EU 
POS 
Perceived 
concerns over 
economic 
development 
Yes Yes Yes  
Perceived identity 
anxieties of the 
public  
No Yes Yes Citizenship 
regime POS 
Home Office’s 
ideological 
dogmatism 
Yes No No Agency-
related factor 
Influence of 
interest groups 
Yes - -  
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H5: 2007-2008 global financial crisis underpinned more restrictive approach of the three 
right-wing parties in power on immigration and led right-wing parties in power to reframe 
immigration through social welfare lens.  
 
H6: The effects of the EU integration and widening of the EU community made the right-
wing parties in power to pursue a more restrictive immigration stance. 
 
Table 5 demonstrates if the hypotheses about the causes of immigration policy change 
were confirmed or falsified in each of the cases and also point to the differences and 
similarities across the cases in terms of factors that lead to immigration policy change. 
The table also contains POS theory, which explains the variation in the factors, 
identifying specific attributes of national POS that account for absence or presence of 
these factors. Furthermore, the table points out the limitations of the theories that focus 
on exogenous factors by highlighting two additional causal factors that led to immigration 
policy change in the UK case: Home Office’s ideological dogmatism and the influence of 
interest groups, which are agency-related factors. Finally, the following table raises the 
question of whether these explanations were applicable or consistent across the three 
case studies or different? Are there similarities that can be drawn out? 
 
The discussion around the findings presented in this table starts with the presence or 
absence of the factors that were outlined in the hypotheses, then it proceeds with the 
identification of the new agency-related factors that were identified by the elite interview 
data and finishes with the explanation of the variation of the factors across the cases by 
specifying how POS theory explains that variation.   
 
Public opinion shifts  
The analysis of the three cases demonstrated that public opinion was an important 
exogenous factor for three right-wing parties in power and had an influence on their 
changing immigration stances. These findings confirm the hypothesis that argued that 
public opinion is a factor that leads parties change their polices and support the theory 
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(Adams et al., 2004; Meyer, 2013) that parties change their policy positions when opinion 
starts to shift away from the party. UMP, the Conservative Party and the SVP reacted to 
toughening of public opinion on the issue and altered their policy positions in a more 
restrictive manner to prevent the alienation of their electorates. Thus, public opinion was 
the backbone of the Conservative’s immigration policy-making during Coalition 
government. The Home Office and the Conservatives wanted to reassure the public in 
their strong attachment to the net migration target of ‘tens of thousands’, which 
underpinned the logic of majority of immigration policies under the Coalition government. 
For the SVP public opinion was important, but it was not exactly driving the immigration 
policy change as the SVP has had a strong anti-immigrant and anti-EU stance, which 
did not go in line with the public opinion, which supported the free movement of people 
and its subsequent extensions. However, public opinion was crucial for the SVP in 
launching the Initiative Against Mass Migration in 2011, when the attitudes of the public 
towards the free movement of people changed. Finally, the respect of the result of the 
Initiative on Expelling Criminal Foreigners (Implementation), which was rejected by the 
voters, demonstrates that the SVP takes into account public opinion and is not intending 
to toughen the legislation after losing the Initiative. Finally, in the French case, public 
opinion was crucial first, in toughening integration policies, particularly the integration of 
Muslims and, second, led to the u-turn on immigration policy, forcing Sarkozy to dissolve 
the Ministry of Immigration, Integration, National Identity and Co-Development, halt the 
2009 national identity debate and modify Guéant’s circular, by lifting restrictions on 
foreign non-EU graduates.   
 
 
Party competition  
 
The findings of this research confirm the hypothesis that parties, and particularly right-
wing parties change their policies, when there is a presence of a strong radical-right 
competitor (Adams and Somer-Topcu, 2009; Akkerman, 2012; Downs; 1957, Sides and 
Citrin; 2007). However, this hypothesis was confirmed in two cases: France and the UK, 
and was not tested in the Swiss case, where there is no credible competition for the SVP 
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from other radical parties. The electoral growth of radical right parties in France and in 
the UK led right-wing parties in power in these countries to toughen their respective 
immigration policy stances by adopting an accommodative strategy (Meguid, 2007) 
towards their radical right competitors. Even though the initial conditions were different 
in two cases, meaning that France has already experienced a presence of the FN’s 
candidate in the 2002 presidential election, which shocked the French political 
establishment, in the UK UKIP only started to emerge as a competitor after 2010 (Ford 
and Goodwin, 2014). The change in rhetoric and in policies shows that Sarkozy and the 
Conservative party were worried about defection of their electorate to radical right 
parties. In France such shifts can be seen to have taken place after 2002 presidential 
election, at the time of Chirac administration, when Sarkozy was appointed as the 
Minister of the Interior. In the UK, a more restrictive character of the Conservative Party 
rhetoric appeared before 2010 general election and was translated into restrictive 
immigration policies under the Coalition government. Finally, in Switzerland party 
competition on the right was not a driver of SVP’s restrictive immigration stance as the 
party did not have a credible radical right competitor, which would alienate party’s votes.  
 
Effects of EU integration  
 
One of the theories focusing on exogenous factors argued that parties change their 
policies as a response to the wider socio-economic changes in a political environment 
(Fagerholm, 2015). In this research these changes were operationalised through the EU 
integration and its effects (Geddes, 2003). The analysis of the elite interview data 
indicated that the hypothesis about the effects of EU integration, which led right-wing 
parties in power to change immigration policies in a more restrictive direction, was 
confirmed in two cases: in Switzerland and in the UK. Comparison of the three cases 
demonstrated that the effects of the EU integration played different roles in the UK, 
Switzerland and France, and that they only led to immigration policy change in 
Switzerland and in the UK, but not in France. In the UK, the effects of EU integration 
manifested themselves in the lack of control over EU migration, which increased as a 
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result of the EU enlargements, that were not followed by the introduction of transnational 
agreements with the new EU member states led the UK Conservative Party to adopt a 
tougher position on immigration. In the Swiss case, enhanced Europeanisation of the 
Swiss immigration policy, which manifested itself through the effects of the free 
movement of people, underpinned SVP’s hard-line Eurosceptic position. This eventually 
led to the launch of the Initiative Against Mass Migration, which aimed to restrict 
immigration from within the EU and regain control of it. Furthermore, not only economic 
effects of the EU integration led the conservative parties to redefine their immigration 
stances, but also legal ones. In particular, the necessity of cohesion between the EU law 
and the national laws of Switzerland and the UK were leading the Conservative Party 
and the SVP to push for tougher immigration stance and the relationship between these 
countries and the EU. It led to the critical juncture in British politics – a referendum on 
exiting the EU, which resulted in a majority vote to leave the EU (commonly referred to 
as Brexit). This finding supports the theoretical suggestion (Fagerholm, 2015) that 
political parties react to crucial socio-economic changes, but also develops it further, 
pointing that such big-scale changes like widening of the supranational EU can lead to 
the critical junctures in immigration policy and beyond. This research brings added value 
to the literature on party policy change not only by operationalising changes in the 
broader political environment, but also points out that these changes have a 
considerable impact on the national immigration policy making (in the case of 
Switzerland and the UK). The analysis of Sarkozy's immigration approach between 2002 
and 2012 suggests that effects of EU integration were not a causal factor behind more 
restrictive immigration policies as EU immigration has not been a concern for France 
since the enlargements. While certain anxieties about the free movements of persons 
manifested themselves in the reinforced security discourse around the external borders 
of the EU. These concerns only had an impact on Sarkozy’s immigration rhetoric, but did 
not translate into more restrictive immigration policies.  
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Perceived concerns over economic development 
 
The hypothesis, which emphasised the importance of perceived economic concerns 
(Citrin et al., 1997; Burns and Gimpel, 2000; Malhorta et al., 2013; Mayda, 2006) of the 
public on immigration was confirmed in all three cases and led to toughening of 
immigration policy positions of right-wing parties in power. Aiming to control intra-EU 
migration from poorer Eurozone countries, the Conservatives redefined EU immigrants' 
access to some of the welfare benefits from universal to residence-based. The findings 
revealed that the Conservative Party hardened its immigration policy because of 
unrestricted EU immigration. Similarly, in France, economic anxieties about the cost of 
family reunification, which remains the largest immigration inflow. Sarkozy’s support for 
strict controls for non-EU labour migration was underpinned by the fears that the French 
economy would struggle if an open immigration approach was adopted and that 
increased migration will import unemployment. Finally, in Switzerland economic 
concerns linked to unlimited EU migration underpinned SVP’s logic on immigration policy 
change.  
 
 
The impact of the global financial crisis  
The findings from three cases demonstrate that the hypothesis that right-wing parties in 
power changed their immigration policies as a response to the global economic change 
(Adams et al., 2009), which was operationalised through global financial crisis in this 
research was disconfirmed in all three cases. Furthermore, the second part of the 
hypothesis, which argued that global financial crisis led to the reframing of immigration 
through social welfare lens was also disconfirmed in all the cases. In France global 
financial crisis was not the cause behind Sarkozy's logic on limiting immigration inflows, 
as more restrictive immigration approach towards family reunification preceded the 
crisis. Global financial crisis prevented the implementation of Sarkozy's selective 
immigration approach because of economic difficulties on the labour market and high 
unemployment rates. In France, the crisis explained the gap between Sarkozy's policy 
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demands and policy outcomes. In Switzerland global financial crisis per se did not have 
an impact on the SVP’s logic of immigration-policy making, but the combination of the 
effects of EU integration combined with the global financial crisis, which led to the 
increased migration from EU members that were more affected by the crisis, with the 
concerns about the free movement of people, produced a more restrictive policy stance, 
which eventually led to the Initiative Against Mass Migration. Finally, the analysis of the 
interview data in the UK case demonstrated that global financial crisis was used in a 
public discourse to stress the importance of redefining EU immigrants’ access to some 
of the welfare benefits from universal to residence-based, but, as Conservative Party 
politicians confided in private conversation, it was more a sign of a conservative ideology, 
that aimed to limit welfare for everyone, not just foreigners, rather than an effect of the 
global financial crisis.  
 
Perceived identity anxieties  
The findings of this research indicate that perceived identity concerns of the public on 
immigration (Brader et al., 2008; Citrin et al., 1990; Luedtke, 2005; McDaniel et al., 2011; 
McLaren, 2001; Sides and Citrin, 2007) underpinned the logic of right-wing parties in 
power in Switzerland and in France, confirming the hypothesis  in these two cases and 
rejecting it in the case of the UK, where this did not happen. Findings from the French 
case demonstrate that Sarkozy's position on integration was driven by the perceived fear 
of Islam as a threat to French national identity, therefore pushing for enhanced 
assimilation of Muslims into the French society. Anxieties about Islam led Sarkozy to 
introduce two major integration policies. First, in 2004 the prohibition of religious symbols 
in French state schools and then the introduction of the so-called ‘burqa ban’, which 
prohibited covering the face in public places in 2010. Similarly, concerns about the so-
called ‘Islamisation’ of Switzerland were one of the factors that led the SVP to argue for 
tougher integration requirements. Such rhetoric was primarily directed against Muslims 
and later translated into a policy change. Using the instruments of direct democracy, the 
party launched the Initiative Against the Construction of Minarets in 2009, which was 
supported by the majority of the Swiss population. Finally, the analysis of the interviews 
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found that identity anxieties did not underpin the logic of Conservatives’ position change 
on immigration, as the party chose to build its immigration stance change primarily 
through the economic perspective.   
 
Home Office’s ideological dogmatism and the role of interest groups  
In addition to the theory driven exogenous factors, this research found two agency-
related factors that reinforced the UK Conservative Party’s position on immigration: 
Home Office’s ideological dogmatism and the influence of interest groups on immigration 
decision-making process. Despite testing factors that were structural and exogenous to 
the party, the analysis of the interviews found that the role of the agency cannot de 
disregarded. First, Home Office’s ideological dogmatism was the factor that led to the 
evolution of British immigration policy in a more restrictive way. As explained in more 
detail in chapter four, agenda-setting powers and control over evidence permitted the 
home secretary Theresa May, who had prime-ministerial patronage, to pursue her 
restrictive policy stance. Second, the influence of interest groups on immigration 
decision-making of the Conservative Party was another factor that emerged from 
interview data analysis. However, some interest groups were able to exert greater 
influence on political parties than others. The proposals of right-wing interest group 
MWUK were more successful in influencing the Conservatives because they aimed to 
limit immigration, while those interest groups that wanted to ease certain immigration 
restrictions, did not manage to succeed as much as they wanted. It should be said that, 
originally this thesis sought to investigate the impact of various interest groups on 
decision-making process in all three cases, but the low response rate and refusal of the 
representatives from these groups to provide an interview made it impossible. Even 
though this research presents the findings about the impact of the interest groups on the 
UK Conservative Party’s logic, it does not necessarily mean that in two other cases this 
impact is absent. Future research can fill this gap and focus on examining how interest 
groups enable or constrain political parties in their decision-making choices on 
immigration.   
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7.3 Explaining causal factor variation  
Given that causal factors have been both similar and different in three cases, immigration 
policies overall changed in a more restrictive direction, though with some differences 
within countries. It is important to point out what explains this variation in policies 
because it helps to identify the direction of immigration policy that other countries, which 
share similar characteristics, might pursue. Table Four illustrates that the UK, 
Switzerland and France vary in relation to three causal factors: party competition on the 
right, effects of the EU integration and perceived identity concerns of the public. This 
research explains the variation in parties’ stances and immigration policies through the 
theory of political opportunity structures (POS), which has been previously discussed in 
chapter two, which describes POS as attributes of the environment in which political 
parties operate. POS explain what accounts for the variation in outcomes of immigration 
policy change, meaning why certain causal factors had an influence on right-wing parties’ 
in power immigration stance, while others did not. As described by Tarrow (1998: 76-77) 
POS are attributes of the political context that influences strategies of collective actors. 
In other words, POS affect the behaviour of collective actors like interest groups (Princen 
and Kerremans, 2008: 1129), and, likewise, political parties. The choices that right-wing 
parties in power made in three cases do not only depend on the causal factors that 
influenced their decisions, but these causal factors were shaped into different narratives 
based on the POS pertinent to each case. This thesis has identified four attributes of 
POS that explain the variation in immigration policies in three countries: citizenship 
regime, party’s attitude to the EU, strength of radical right competitor and democracy 
type, which explain what accounted for the differences in shaping immigration policies in 
the UK, Switzerland and France. While first three attributes of the national POS explain 
causal factor variation, democracy type refers to explaining the variation with the causal 
mechanisms, which is discussed further in this chapter, namely in the subsection  
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Table 6: Variation in political opportunity structure in three cases 
Country Citizenship regime Party’s 
attitude to the 
EU 
Strength of 
radical right 
competitor   
Democracy 
model 
UK Multicultural Eurosceptic From weak to 
rising 
Parliamenta
ry  
Switzerland  Ethnic-
assimilationist  
Non-member/ 
Eurosceptic 
Absent  Consensus 
France  Civic-assimilationist Europhile  Strong Semi-
presidential 
 
7.3.1 Citizenship regime  
This research has found that identity anxieties underpinned the logic of immigration 
policy change in Switzerland and in France, while in the UK, identity anxieties were not 
the driver of the Conservative Party's change in immigration during Cameron’s 
leadership. Despite both France and the UK being former colonial empires and having a 
substantial population of foreign origin, cultural backlash occurred in France, but not in 
the UK. The right-wing parties in power in France and in Switzerland were quite similar 
in their approach to integration, being driven primarily by anti-Muslim attitudes. The 
findings of this research establish that type of citizenship regime is a relevant aspect of 
POS that explains why in France and Switzerland identity anxieties underpinned 
immigration policy-making logic of the conservative parties, while in the UK it did not 
happen. Both Switzerland and France represent assimilationist type of citizenship regime 
(Guigni and Passy, 2004), while the UK belongs to a multicultural citizenship regime. 
Assimilationist regimes require the immigrants give up their differences and assimilate 
to the host country, while multicultural regimes recognise the differences of ethnic 
minorities (Guigni and Passy, 2004: 58-59).  
 
Identity concerns have been central to the right-wing in France and Switzerland, which 
is explained with the opportunities provided by type of citizenship regime that these two 
countries share. Sarkozy’s profoundly anti-Islam discourse and policies are explained 
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through the fear of Islam and the absence of separation between private and public 
sphere in Islam is particularly relevant to France, where the principle of laïcité 
(secularism) and equality are at the core of the republican tradition (Marthaler, 2008; 
Drake, 2011). The integration of foreigners and integration of the French of immigrant 
origin has been equally important for France as the management of immigration inflows. 
National identity anxieties have been driving Sarkozy’s discourse and policies since 2003 
until the end of his presidency and the assimilationist character of French citizenship 
regime provided Sarkozy with the opportunity to adopt two laws prohibiting the wearing 
of hijab in state schools and the wearing of burqa in public places. Undoubtedly, not only 
the assimilationist citizenship regime and the republican principles of equality and 
secularism allowed Sarkozy to pursue tough integration rhetoric, but also the growth of 
the FN, which has been increasing the salience of national identity for decades.  
 
In Switzerland, identity anxieties underpinned the immigration policy logic of the SVP 
because ethnic-assimilationist regime presented an opportunity for the party to voice 
these concerns and to argue for higher levels of integration, targeting the presence of 
Islam in Switzerland and the integration of Muslims. However, it is important to 
emphasise that the identity dimension has been at the core of the SVP’s ideology since 
the creation of the party and this partly accounts for why the identity was driving SVP’s 
immigration policy stance. As the UK belongs to a multicultural type, which recognises 
diversity and does not require immigrants to assimilate and to give up their culture, 
multiculturalism did not present the opportunity for the Conservative Party to frame its 
discourse through an identity lens. Furthermore, it would undermine party’s path of 
detoxification in order to expand its platform to a broader electorate, therefore the 
Conservatives balanced their rhetoric carefully not to be branded racist. Despite having 
a substantial part of the population from the former colonies, in the UK identity concerns 
were not used in the Conservative’s discourse as the multicultural citizenship regime did 
not present an opportunity to do so without costs. The party chose to frame immigration 
anxieties through an economic lens instead of an identity one partly because UK’s 
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multicultural approach to integration provided few opportunities for the party to do so 
without the alienation of key swing constituencies. 
 
7.3.2 Strength of radical right competitor  
While the UK Conservative Party and the UMP in France were concerned about the 
alienation of their electorate to radical right competitors and this resulted in the adoption 
of an accommodative tactic (Meguid, 2007) towards radical right, in Switzerland this did 
not happen. It did not occur in the Swiss case because the SVP does not have any 
radical right competitor. The presence of a radical right party as an attribute of the POS 
explains why the UK Conservative Party and Sarkozy and his party have altered their 
immigration stances and led to subsequent immigration policy change. However, it 
should be highlighted that the presence of niche party competitor does not necessarily 
lead to the adoption of accommodative strategy by mainstream party. In the competition 
between such parties, mainstream party strategy depending on the threat of the niche 
party and its electoral success (Meguid, 2007: 96). By adopting accommodative 
strategies, right-wing parties in power come closer to the so-called ‘pathological 
normalcy’, which represents the radicalisation of mainstream values, typical for radical 
right parties (Mudde, 2010).  
 
In France the electoral threat from the FN has been high since 2002 when Jean-Marie 
Le Pen made it to the second round of the presidential election. This in part led to the 
tightening of immigration policy under two terms of Sarkozy being a Minister of the 
Interior between 2002 and 2007. Both the 2007, and, especially the 2012 presidential 
campaigns were centred around immigration as one of the key issues on Sarkozy’s 
agenda. The analysis of the 2007 vote confirmed that adopting an accommodative 
strategy towards the FN yielded results and allowed Sarkozy to recuperate some of the 
FN’s electorate (Mayer, 2007). In the UK, however, the radical right UKIP has not always 
been a credible competitor for the more mainstream Conservative Party. From 2010, 
when the party started to become a serious contender (Ford and Goodwin, 2014), UKIP’s 
threat had an influence on the Conservative’s immigration stance and partly accounted 
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for the introduction of more restrictive immigration policies under the Coalition 
government. Furthermore, anxieties about the defection of the Conservative’s electorate 
to UKIP forced the Conservative Party to keep its ‘tens of thousands’ immigration target 
in the 2015 general election manifesto, which was not particularly successful as UKIP 
managed to take almost a third of the Conservatives electorate (Murdoch et al., 2017). 
Despite the fact that both the UK and France have a majoritarian system in parliamentary 
elections, which keeps niche parties like FN and UKIP at bay, the threat that the radical 
right presents for the right-wing parties is voter defection. As much as the right-wing 
parties do not want to alienate its electorate to radical right, it also seeks to attract radical 
right’s voters to boost its chances of winning office in competition with other mainstream 
parties. Furthermore, the threat from the radical right is higher in France, when it comes 
to the presidential election, because the competition is between the candidates, and as 
the 2002 and recent 2017 presidential elections demonstrated, Jean-Marie Le Pen and 
Marine Le Pen were able to make it to the second round and becoming the direct 
opponent of the mainstream candidate. This makes the right-wing parties in France 
particularly vulnerable to the electoral successes of radical right, especially during 
presidential elections. Therefore, the presence/strength of radical right competitor is a 
POS that explains why in France and the UK the right-wing parties adopted an 
accommodative strategy on immigration towards the extreme competitor, while in 
Switzerland this did not happen. The SVP did not have any credible radical right 
competitor that would endanger its electoral success, therefore this variable is irrelevant 
in the Swiss case.  
 
7.3.3 Relationship with the EU  
The effects of EU integration were one of the drivers behind the right-wing parties in 
power change on immigration, which subsequently led to the evolution of British and 
Swiss immigration policy, while in France anxieties about EU integration were not a major 
concern for Sarkozy and did not lead to the redefinition of the French immigration policy. 
Historically, SVP and the UK Conservative Party have been Eurosceptic parties, but their 
positions varied with SVP being a hard-Eurosceptic party, opposing EU in principle and 
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Conservatives representing a soft version of Euroscepticism, where the party opposes 
further European integration (Taggart and Szczerbiak, 2004). However, as recent 
political events in the UK demonstrate, Euroscepticism within the Conservative Party and 
the UK is becoming more mainstream (Brack and Startin, 2015; Startin, 2015). 
Euroscepticism is entering right-wing politics and is not a defining feature of parties on 
the extreme ends of the political spectrum, it is now shared by right-wing parties, whose 
positions are becoming more EU wary (Conti and Memoli, 2012). The EU enlargements 
and the extension of the free movement of people to the new EU member states, 
important features of European integration, define parties’ positions on the issue of 
immigration, which is closely connected to integration processes within the EU.  
  
The countries’ relationships with the EU sheds light on why anxieties about the EU were 
picked by the SVP in Switzerland and the Conservative Party in the UK, but were not 
exploited by Sarkozy in France. The similarity between Switzerland and the UK in terms 
of incorporating EU anxieties into the logic of immigration policy change is explained by 
Eurosceptic attitudes of the SVP and of the Conservative Party. Hard-core 
Euroscepticism is at the heart of the SVP’s ideology, which explains constant opposition 
to the EU and resistance to signing more treaties with the EU as the SVP sees it as 
giving up Switzerland’s sovereignty to the EU. While the Conservative Party does not 
have the same level of Euroscepticism as the SVP, anti-European sentiment within the 
party, which started to become divisive for the party in 1990s (Taggart, 1998: 365) and 
which became an official policy of the party in 1997 (Usherwood, 2013: 286), combined 
with an increase in negative attitudes of the public towards the EU led David Cameron 
to call the referendum on Britain’s exit from the EU.  
 
Both, the SVP and the Conservative Party viewed intra-EU migration through the 
economic lens, arguing that it does not only increase the numbers that these two 
countries can absorb, but also that it poses threats to their respective labour markets, by 
increasing the competition and suppressing the wages. In Switzerland and the UK, the 
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conservative parties linked EU anxieties to the economic concerns around intra-EU 
migration, especially during the times of Eurozone crisis, which “propelled the EU into 
an unprecedented phase of uncertainty” (Usherwood and Startin, 2012: 2). The SVP and 
the Conservative Party were driven by the numerical targets to reduce the overall 
migration numbers, which was not possible because of the free movement of people. 
This preoccupation led to major policy change in both cases: in Switzerland economic 
concerns about EU migration led to the Initiative against mass migration, which aimed 
to restrict the free movement of people from the EU, and in the UK it resulted in the 
referendum on the UK’s exit from the EU. Similar approach to redefining immigration 
policies in the UK and Switzerland was possible because of Euroscepticism, typical of 
the SVP and the Conservative Party presented an opportunity to incorporate concerns 
about the inability to control EU migration. Even though Switzerland is not part of the EU, 
its relationship with the EU is developed through a set of bilateral agreements. It should 
be said that being a member or non-member of the EU does not present a POS that 
determines the variation in party’s responses on immigration, it is a POS of the attitude 
of the party (Eurosceptic/Europhile) to the agreements between the EU and the country, 
is what shapes immigration policy in a respective country. The findings of this research 
support previous research, which argues that Eurosceptic attitudes are a result of 
enhanced EU integration (Taggart, 1998). Furthermore, this study refines Taggart’s 
(1998) findings by pointing out that Eurosceptical attitudes are not any more the defining 
features of the fringe parties, and that Euroscepticism has infiltrated mainstream political 
space with established parties voicing their anxieties.    
 
Sarkozy’s and the UMP’s approach was different in France because the party was not 
characterised by Eurosceptic attitudes. On the contrary, Sarkozy viewed the EU as a 
platform for reinstating France’s image on the European and world scene (Drake, 2011). 
The party has not been immune to Eurosceptic attitudes, but it was more of a soft 
Euroscepticism (Usherwood and Startin, 2013: 6). UMP did have concerns about the 
EU, but they were smaller and their nature was different to that of the SVP’s in 
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Switzerland and the Conservatives’ in the UK. The main anxieties about the EU were 
focused on the strength of the EU’s external border and the influx of illegal migration of 
third country nationals through neighbouring countries that did not have effective controls 
of their borders. The absence of major economic anxieties around EU migration explains 
why critical junctures like Brexit or the Initiative Against Mass Migration did not occur in 
the French immigration policy. Managing third country migration was a priority for 
Sarkozy, both in terms of cultural anxieties and in terms of economic ones. The attitude 
of the right-wing parties to the EU in three cases, whether Eurosceptic or Europhile, is 
an important facet of the POS that explains why Brexit and the Initiative Against Mass 
Migration occurred in the UK and Switzerland, while in France the anxieties about EU 
were not a driver of immigration policy change.  
 
7.3.4 Generalisation of causes  
The purpose of this research goes beyond providing three explanations for policy 
change, but aims to offer certain generalisations of causes that influenced the right-wing 
parties’ positions on immigration. Even though process tracing allows one to make only 
within-case inferences about causes and mechanisms of policy change and does not 
enable one to generalise the findings to the population of cases (Bennet and Checkel, 
2015), this can be overcome to a degree through comparison. As Beach and Pedersen 
(2013: 69) point out, generalisation to other cases or cross-case inference become 
possible through comparison of the findings of the cases. 
 
This research has tested the existing theories of party policy change and the findings 
demonstrate that only two causal factors were present across three cases, and led to 
the toughening of right-wing parties’ stances on immigration: shifts in public opinion and 
concerns over economic development, or, in other words, economic anxieties about 
immigration. The findings supported the theory that suggests that parties change their 
policies as a response to public opinion (Adams et al., 2004; Adams et al., 2006; Ezrow 
et al., 2011; McDonald and Budge, 2005; Meyer, 2013). First, public opinion on 
immigration was the driver behind the right-wing parties’ change on immigration in all 
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three cases, and this comparative finding which was consistent across all three cases 
allows us to suggest that public opinion might be a driver of policy change in other cases. 
It should be said that public opinion does not only affect the strategies of political parties, 
but that it is affected by the political parties as well (Page and Shapiro, 1983: 188). 
However, the goal of the study was not to explore if there is a two-way relationship, but 
to test the theory of the responsiveness of political parties to public opinion. As the 
findings indicate that three conservative parties considered public opinion when 
changing their immigration policies, it gives grounds to generalise that this could happen 
in other cases as well.  
 
Second, concerns over economic development linked to immigration underpinned the 
Conservative's, Sarkozy’s and the SVP's logic of introducing more restrictive immigration 
stance. Both in Switzerland and in France the development of immigration policy has 
been largely dependent on the country's economic situation and tied to the needs of the 
economy. Economic anxieties were primarily linked to the effects of EU integration like 
the free movement of people, which did not pose any restrictions on EU migration. In 
less advantageous economic times, like during the global financial crisis, all three parties 
argued that increased migration from poorer Eurozone countries was detrimental to the 
labour markets because it contributed to the unemployment levels and suppression of 
wages. The findings of this research support theoretical propositions, which view 
opposition to immigration through economic lens (Adams et al., 2009; Citrin et al., 1997; 
Dustmann and Preston, 2001; Haupt, 2010; Hibbs, 1997; Garret, 1998; Mayda, 2006; 
Pierson, 2001; Ward et al., 2011) and point out that economic concerns had an influence 
on party’s policy positions as in three cases parties considered economic anxieties of 
the population. These anxieties were primarily linked to low-skilled migration. 
Comparative findings allow us to make a cautious suggestion that conservative parties 
are likely to toughen immigration policies based to capitalise on voters perceptions of 
concerns over countries’ economic development, possibly even if they are unfounded. 
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The variation in conservatives’ logic on immigration policy-making manifested itself in 
three causal factors: identity concerns, the role of the EU and party competition on the 
right. First, the research has found that identity anxieties underpinned the logic of 
immigration policy change in Switzerland and in France, while this did not happen in the 
UK. The findings give grounds to suggest that in countries with assimilationist model of 
citizenship regime, right-wing parties in power would factor identity concerns into their 
logic of immigration policy change as assimilationist regime provides an opportunity 
structure for the rightist parties to justify their immigration stances. Second, party 
competition on the right was a driver behind toughening of the immigration position of 
the UMP in France and of the Conservative Party in the UK, whereas that did not occur 
in Switzerland. These findings allow to make certain generalisation that right-wing parties 
in power adopt an accommodative strategy (Meguid, 2007; Mudde, 2010) toward their 
radical right competitor when the strength of this competitor is high and there is a threat 
of voter defection. Finally, EU anxieties led to the redefinition of immigration policies in 
Switzerland and in the UK, while in France they were not the drivers of immigration policy 
change. These suggestions about generalisation of these drivers of immigration policy 
change to other cases becomes possible by accounting for three POS factors 
(citizenship type, party competition on the right and party's attitude to the EU), which 
explain the variation in parties’ approaches to immigration.  
 
7.4 Causal mechanisms: similarities and differences 
Having discussed the causes of immigration policy change in three cases, the chapter 
proceeds with the discussion of the mechanisms that accounted for the change. The 
elaboration of mechanisms is necessary because causes constitute only the explanation 
why do parties change their immigration stance, but not how it happens and how these 
choices affect policy change. Mechanisms are crucial for the understanding of the 
process of change because they connect the cause and the outcome, they explain what 
enables and what constrains political actors in making their choices dominant. First, it 
examines the mechanisms that were responsible for the change in each case and, 
second, it explains what accounted for the variation in the mechanisms of immigration 
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policy change in the UK, Switzerland and France. Process tracing established that 
framing, as one of the previously theorised mechanisms (Snow and Benford, 1998; 
Faletti and Lynch, 2009; Rydgren, 2003) occurred in all three cases, while departmental 
competition and direct democracy (Afonso, 2005; Afonso, 2013; Albertazzi and 
McDonnel, 2015; Papadopoulos, 1997) emerged as a result of the data analysis and 
their presence varied from case to case. Hampshire and Bale (2015) arrived at a similar 
conclusion in their research about the impact of political parties on immigration policy, 
but they labelled departmental competition as intra-coalition dynamics and 
interdepartmental conflict. Some mechanisms that appear from the analysis provided 
bring the added value to the research on causal mechanisms, by identifying two 
mechanisms that were responsible for immigration policy change, namely departmental 
competition and direct democracy. In addition to framing, that has been previously 
established as a discursive mechanism (Snow and Benford, 1988: 200-201; Rydgren, 
2003), this research has identified two new mechanisms that explain how political parties 
translate their choices into policies. Thus, departmental competition, found as a 
mechanism in the case of the UK and France, and direct democracy in the case of 
Switzerland, are procedural mechanisms that can be tested in other cases that examine 
policy changes. Table Seven presents the mechanisms that accounted for immigration 
policy change in three cases and points to the type of democracy opportunity structure, 
which explains the variation in mechanisms across the cases.  
 
Table 7: Variance of causal mechanisms in three cases 
Category  UK Switzerland France 
Framing  Yes Yes Yes 
Departmental 
Competition  
Yes No Yes 
Direct Democracy  No Yes No 
 
7.4.1 UK 
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Framing was a mechanism that the Conservative Party used to justify the change in its 
immigration policy positions. Through diagnostic framing (Rydgren, 2003; Snow and 
Benford, 1988: 200-201), the party attributed blame for social problems to immigrants, 
while prognostic framing (Rydgren, 2003; Snow and Benford, 1988: 200-201) 
represented the adoption of a more restrictive immigration stance. Apart from the 
Conservative Party, other actors were involved in framing immigration in a negative light. 
The Home Office and the right-wing interest group MWUK, which pressured the party to 
pursue a tougher immigration approach was also responsible for restrictive immigration 
framing. The Conservatives did not increase the salience of a socio-cultural cleavage 
over the economic one, but reframed one through the lens of another. Immigration was 
redefined through a social welfare lens to demonstrate to the voters the importance of 
both immigration and economy themes for the right-wing parties in power. Departmental 
competition was a second mechanism that referred to the process of immigration policy-
making under the Coalition government. As various governmental departments had 
different ideas on the essence of the British immigration policy, the ideas of those 
departments that had greater availability of resources, including decision-making powers 
and political patronage, prevailed over the other ones.  
 
 
 
7.4.2 France  
Two mechanisms accounted for the introduction of more restrictive French immigration 
policy under Sarkozy’s presidency. Framing concentrated on the justification for the 
change in immigration approach. Sarkozy’s framing differed during his term as Minister 
of the Interior and as President, depending on the context, which has also been 
changing. The second mechanism, which allowed Sarkozy to fulfil his electoral promises 
was through an institutional reshuffle, which resulted in departmental competition. This 
institutional reshuffle helped Sarkozy to fulfil some of his electoral promises on 
immigration, led to the change in integration approach, when FASILD was replaced by 
ACSE, when an anti-discrimination approach was replaced with an equality of 
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opportunities approach. Furthermore, the institutional reshuffle also led to the 
competition between departments, which were merged together. In the French case, 
departmental competition does not only shed light on why certain ideas on immigration 
won over the other ones, but also explains the gap between policy demands and policy 
outcomes. The dissolution of the Ministry of Immigration, Integration, National Identity 
and Co-Development, which was the backbone of Sarkozy’s 2007 immigration pledge, 
accounted for this gap. The resistance of ministers and their administrations to share 
decision-making powers and resources under the umbrella of the new Ministry explains 
why Sarkozy was unable to translate his electoral pledges into policies.   
 
7.4.3 Switzerland  
The SVP used framing as a discursive mechanism that allowed the party not only to 
popularise its immigration stance, but also to criticise the positions of the Swiss 
government, which is a characteristic feature of the populist parties. Framing allowed the 
SVP to influence immigration policy through a top-down approach, when the party was 
in control of the FDJP. Direct democracy, which is an idiosyncratic feature of the Swiss 
political system, represents a second mechanism that enabled the SVP to shape Swiss 
immigration policy in a more restrictive way. The inability to control the FDJP, after 
Blocher failed to get re-elected to the Federal Council, had an impact on the SVP’s ability 
to define a direction of immigration policy-making through governmental routes. 
Furthermore, the lack of consensus between the SVP and others in the parliamentary 
arena led the SVP to use the instruments of direct democracy, shaping Swiss 
immigration policy through a bottom-up approach. The Swiss case demonstrates that 
even though the use of direct democracy depends on the political context, the activation 
of this mechanism is contingent upon the agency of political parties and other actors 
involved in the process of policy-making.  
 
7.5 Explaining the variation of mechanisms in three cases  
Table Seven shows that framing was present in all three cases, pointing that all three 
political parties used it as a justification for immigration policy change. Departmental 
competition was present in both French and British immigration policy making, Swiss 
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immigration policy change was a result of the activation of direct democratic mechanism 
by the SVP. While in the UK departmental competition accounted for the explanation of 
why certain policy choices prevailed, in France it was a result of the institutional reshuffle 
and shed the light on the dominance of some policy choices, but also explained the gap 
between Sarkozy’s policy demands and immigration policy outcomes. The variation in 
causal mechanisms in the UK, Switzerland and France is explained through attributes of 
national POS that capture different types of political regimes: parliamentary, consensus 
democracy (Lijphart, 2012) and semi-presidentialism in France (Duverger, 1980; Elgie, 
2009). Different models of democracy accounted for the occurrence of different types of 
mechanisms that led to immigration policy change in three cases.  
 
Types of democracy are important in explaining the variation of mechanisms in the three 
cases because they account for different policy-making logics. In France, which is an 
archetype of semi-presidentialism (Elgie, 2009), major decisions are made by the strong 
president, who has the support of his party in the Assemblée Nationale if there is no co-
habitation regime. Likewise, in the UK, which represents the Westminster model of 
democracy, executive power is usually concentrated within one party (Lijphart, 2012). 
Even though the Conservative Party was in the Coalition government with the Liberal 
Democrats, they remained a major player, retaining the majority of ministries. The logic 
of the executive branch’s power in France and the UK is similar and decision-making 
powers are concentrated in the hands of a party (UK) or one powerful president (France). 
Therefore, in the UK, those departments that had the Prime Minister’s patronage on 
immigration were able to pursue their ideas into policies, while in France, the institutional 
reshuffle that led to departmental competition was orchestrated by Sarkozy. In the UK 
case, departmental competition explained immigration policy change, while in France 
institutional reshuffle and departmental competition shed the light on both the existence 
of the gaps between policy demands and policy outcomes and on subsequent policy 
change. Finally, the Swiss political system, which is based on the consensus between 
political players, where power is dispersed to different actors (Lijphart, 2012: 33), 
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presented opportunities for another mechanism to occur. Direct democracy mechanism, 
which was activated by the SVP as a result of the inability to reach a consensus with 
other political parties led to the major changes in Swiss immigration policy. This 
demonstrates that POS serves as a concept that accounts for explaining the variation in 
mechanisms in the UK, Switzerland and France. 
 
7.4.4 Generalisation of mechanisms  
As with the causes, this research aimed at not only pointing to different causal 
mechanisms responsible for immigration policy change in three cases, but also to offer 
some suggestions about the potential presence of these mechanisms in other cases. 
Mechanisms are portable, meaning that they operate in different cases, but the outcome 
that they produce is context-dependent. This research asked what were the mechanisms 
that accounted for immigration policy change of the right-wing parties in power and the 
analysis of case studies identified that previously theorised mechanism of framing 
(Faletti and Lynch, 2009; Rydgren, 2003) was present in immigration policy change in 
the UK, Switzerland and France. The findings from the three case studies demonstrated 
that framing was a mechanism that accounted for the argumentation of political parties 
in changing their positions. This discursive mechanism might be found in other cases 
that deal with party policy change, but its operation would be dependent on the context 
as the variation in the forms and outcomes of framing in the three contexts examined in 
this thesis demonstrated. Different models of democracy explain why departmental 
competition occurred in France and in the UK, while it did not occur in Switzerland, where 
a direct democratic mechanism was partly responsible for immigration policy change. 
Comparative findings give grounds to suggest that departmental competition as a 
mechanism is likely occur in those democracies that are not bound by consensual 
politics. Both parliamentary and semi-presidential democracies fall within that range. It 
is impossible for departmental competition to lead to the policy change in Switzerland, 
as the country belongs to consensus model of democracy (Lijphart, 2012), where major 
political decisions are the outcome of a consensus between different political actors.  
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7.5 Conclusion 
This research sought to explain what drives right-wing parties in power to change their 
positions on immigration and what causal mechanisms make this change possible. By 
comparing the UK, Switzerland and France, the chapter pointed out to the presence of 
the variation in causes, which are explained by several attributes of national POS. First, 
strength of radical right competitor, citizenship regime, country’s relationship with the EU 
were POS that clarified why some factors underpinned the logic of immigration policy 
change of the right-wing parties in power, while others did not. Second, the concept of 
POS enables explanation of the variation in comparative case studies. The framework 
of causal factors that were traced in three cases can be tested in other cases of 
immigration policy change and beyond as some of the factors are not only applicable to 
immigration issue, but can be extrapolated to other policy issues as well. Finally, the 
research highlighted that some contextual factors that are external not only to the party, 
but to the country in question, like global economic change and changes in the wider 
political environment (widening of the EU) do not only explain the logic of policy change, 
but also shed the light on the occurrence of critical junctures within country’s political 
landscape. Brexit in the UK and the Initiative Against Mass Migration in Switzerland 
demonstrate that factors exogenous to the country do not only produces changes in that 
country’s domestic environment, but have implications for the wider political context, 
namely for country’s relationship with supranational institutions like the EU. 
 
The chapter highlighted that causes of immigration position change and subsequent 
policy change are mainly similar in the UK, Switzerland and France, but the way right-
wing parties in power frame some of the factors into specific narratives are different, 
which depends on the context in which the development of immigration policy takes 
place. This means that even though the same causal factors led to the change in party’s 
immigration stance, the way they were used by right-wing parties in power, the concerns 
they raised were different and context-dependent. The analysis of three case studies 
demonstrates that some causal factors are sufficient to change party’s stance, but 
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sometimes this change is explained by conjunctural causation (Ragin, 1987: 27-28), 
when a combination of more than one factor is necessary to lead to the change in 
immigration stance of political parties.  
 
As for the mechanisms that accounted for policy change, they can be tested in the future 
research that addresses policy change from political parties’ perspective, to any policy 
issue in question. Framing was a discursive mechanism that justified immigration stance 
change, while departmental competition and direct democracy explained why certain 
policy choices prevailed and why policy gaps occurred. While some causal factors might 
only be applicable to particular policy areas, the situation with causal mechanisms is 
different as the essence of their operation is the same across cases, while the outcomes 
that they produce are context-dependent. POS also sheds the light on the variation in 
mechanisms that are responsible for immigration policy change. The type of democracy 
(parliamentary, consensus and semi-presidential) help to explain why departmental 
competition was present in the UK and France, while direct democracy mechanism, 
activated by the SVP, accounted for immigration policy change in Switzerland. Future 
research can examine if departmental competition and direct democracy are responsible 
for policy change in other country cases or in other policy domains. 
 
Overall, this research highlighted that theories of party policy change examining 
exogenous causal factors provide an essential insight into the explanation of policy 
change as the factors exogenous to the party drive political parties to adjust to new 
changes and new challenges. Therefore, structural explanations are important, but 
agency also plays a critical role, as it decides which factors which factors to take into 
account during the decision-making process. The role of the agency is crucial for the 
activation of the mechanisms, even though the outcome of the mechanism is context-
dependent. This study did not aim to advance the ontological discussion on the agency 
versus structure problem, but demonstrated that structural factors are necessary for the 
explanation of policy change and that attributes of POS are responsible for explaining 
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the variation in right-wing parties’ positions on immigration and mechanisms that are 
responsible for the change. By tracing the external factors that influenced the right-wing 
parties’ decision-making process, the research found one agency-related factor that was 
crucial in shaping British immigration policy in a more restrictive direction. The 
importance of Home Office’s ideological dogmatism in the UK case highlights that a 
complete picture of party position change and subsequent policy change is possible if 
both dimensions are considered: structure and agency. Hence, future research can 
examine the role of agency in policy change, focusing on intra-party dynamics and other 
stakeholders that influence parties’ policy stances, which will provide a more 
comprehensive explanation of why political parties change their policy positions.   
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Chapter 8  
Conclusion  
 
Right-wing parties in the UK, Switzerland and France have considerably tightened their 
rhetoric and immigration policies between 2002 and 2015 as a response to a variety of 
exogenous factors. The research asked two questions: why did right-wing parties in 
power change their positions on immigration and what specific mechanisms accounted 
for this change? By examining legal migration, which included work, student and family 
migration routes, the research has found that changes in public opinion and economic 
anxieties about immigration were two causal factors that three right-wing parties in power 
shared and that underpinned their logic of immigration policy change. It also found that 
the changing nature of parties’ stances on immigration differed with regard to the effects 
of the EU integration, party competition on the right and identity anxieties. The research 
has identified three salient attributes if national POS that explain this variation: a party’s 
attitude to the EU, the presence of strong radical right competitor and citizenship regime. 
As for the mechanisms, framing s a discursive mechanism was present across all three 
cases, while departmental competition accounted for the immigration policy change in 
France and the UK and the (ab)use of direct democracy by the SVP led to the evolution 
of the Swiss immigration policy.  
 
The research reflected on the importance of factors external to parties in terms of their 
immigration policy-making. Chapter two reflected on the agency versus structure debate 
and examined the literature on party position change, adopting an exogenous approach, 
which emphasised that structural factors provide a better insight into the logic of 
immigration policy change than agency ones. Chapter three sketched out a comparative 
case study framework and elaborated on the process tracing method, which helped 
establish the causes and mechanisms responsible for immigration policy change. Three 
empirical chapters followed that delved into a discussion of the factors and mechanisms 
responsible for the change, while the discussion chapter compared the findings from 
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three cases, and reflected on what accounted for the variation in causes and 
mechanisms in three country cases. Explaining the variation is crucial for offering 
grounds for generalisation of causes and mechanisms to other cases. By highlighting 
what makes the approaches of right-wing parties in power to immigration different, the 
findings can then suggest whether certain factors or combinations of the factors can be 
present in particular contexts similar to those of the countries studied. The aim of this 
research was not limited to offering three separate explanations of outcomes, but aimed, 
by comparing the findings, to suggest that some of causes and mechanisms might be 
generalisable to the other cases. 
 
The findings suggest that exogenous factors are crucial in explaining immigration policy 
change and that the explanation of this change is broadly similar in three cases, but the 
way these narratives are exploited by the right-wing parties in power in three country 
cases are different and are context-dependent. The findings suggest that exogenous 
factors are salient in explaining why the change has happened. The findings about 
mechanisms give grounds to suggest that framing is a discursive mechanism that 
enables political actors to justify their policy positions and that political parties in other 
cases will use it when aiming to change policies. Furthermore, the presence of the same 
mechanism of departmental competition, which explained policy change in France and 
the UK, suggests that it can be extrapolated to other cases of Western democracies, 
both parliamentary and semi-presidential.  
 
8.1 Research findings  
This research set two main research questions. The first question asked what are the 
factors that accounted for immigration position of right-wing parties in power and 
subsequent immigration policy change. The second question thought to trace causal 
mechanisms that accounted for this change.  
Theoretical framework of this research suggested that in order to answer these question, 
one needs to look at the theories of party policy change, more specifically to the theories 
that focus on the structural explanations, or in other words, external to the party factors. 
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While highlighting that factors external to a party are structuring party’s policies, the 
theoretical underpinning of the thesis also recognises the importance of the agency, 
stating that while agent's choices are shaped by the structure, the latter is not immune 
to the actions of agency (Most and Starr, 1989). Therefore, the analysis of the data 
demonstrated that in each case agency could not be disregarded as it played a crucial 
role in producing the change. Therefore, in the French case, a lot of immigration policy 
change has been directly associated with the personality of Nicolas Sarkozy and in the 
UK case, immigration policy change has been driven by the then-home secretary 
Theresa May. However, accounting for the role of the agency in immigration policy 
change, this research focused on the factors exogenous to the party that shaped the 
agency’s (parties’) positions. Thus, highlighting the shortcomings of the agency-related 
explanations, this study concentrated on exploring external factors that led right-wing 
parties in power to change their immigration policies. The second question aimed to 
uncover causal mechanisms that were responsible for producing the change. The 
research has found that while framing as a discursive mechanism that describe the way 
parties felt about immigration and the ways they proposed to deal with it, confirmed the 
presence of this mechanism that was theorised in chapter two. However, the research 
also stressed the necessity to search for the mechanisms that refer to the actual policy-
making process.  
 
Causes  
Six hypotheses regarding the causes of immigration policy change of three right-wing 
parties in power were set. The following paragraphs explain whether these hypotheses 
were confirmed or falsified, and to what extent they support or reject theories on party 
policy change.  
 
H1: Party competition on the right, or more specifically, the presence of strong radical 
right competitor leads right-wing parties in power to adopt an accommodative strategy 
(Meguid, 2007) towards their rivals and go hard line on immigration.  
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The findings indicate that party competition on the right was a variable that led right-wing 
parties in power to alter their immigration stances. However, this happened only in 
France and the UK, where parties were threatened with the presence of strong and 
growing radical right. Sarkozy’s increasingly restrictive stance was a response to a 
variety of factors, one of which was the rise of the radical right FN. Thus, in order to 
please the public and to some extent neutralise his radical right competitor, Sarkozy 
adopted an accommodative strategy that aimed to prevent the defection of his electorate 
to the FN. The Conservatives in the UK considerably tightened their immigration stance 
once in the Coalition government, as since 2010 UKIP started to emerge as a credible 
competitor, gaining more electoral ground (Ford and Goodwin, 2014). This hypothesis 
was not tested in the Swiss case as there was no competitor for the SVP that would be 
further to the right on immigration.  
 
H2: Right-wing parties in power pursued restrictive immigration stance as a response to 
shifts in public opinion on the issue, which became more negative over the years.  
This hypothesis was confirmed in all three cases, where parties felt the necessity to 
please the public on immigration, which issue salience rose significantly. An initial 
detoxification strategy of the Conservatives took a sharp turn as the party needed to 
respond to the changing of public opinion on immigration in a more restrictive direction, 
which started in opposition, when Bulgaria and Romania joined the EU and continued 
throughout the Coalition government. The idea of achieving the net migration target to 
please the public was a backbone of the Conservative’s immigration policy between 
2010 and 2015. In Switzerland, SVP’s restrictive immigration stance was a response to 
increasing public attitudes, which had also become more radical over the years 
influenced by SVP’s propaganda campaigns, which demonstrates a two-way relationship 
between the SVP and public opinion on immigration. The SVP successfully employed 
this strategy, which was demonstrated by the acceptance of some of their prominent 
initiatives related to immigration and integration. Finally, in France, Sarkozy adopted a 
more restrictive integration stance in particular, which led to the introduction of policies 
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that targeted Muslim population in France. However, in the French case, public opinion 
was also important in making immigration policy less restrictive, which was shown with 
a reference to student migration. 
 
H3: Perceived identity concerns of the public about the threat from Islam and integration 
of Muslims resulted in the introduction of more restrictive policies in integration domain.   
Comparative findings show that identity concerns were an underlying factor that led to 
immigration policy change in France and Switzerland, while in the UK, Conservative 
Party did not use this factor in their attempt to toughen immigration policies. Sarkozy’s 
tougher stance concerned both the management of the inflows and Muslim integration, 
which remained a crucial block of the French immigration policy. Perceived identity 
anxieties of the public on immigration, which manifested themselves in the fear of Islam, 
underpinned the logic of integration policy change and led to the introduction of the laws 
that targeted the female Muslim population in the expression of their religion. Sarkozy’s 
approach focused on cultural integration, while failing to target the socio-economic 
integration of migrants. Identity anxieties over the perceived Islamisation of Switzerland, 
which had been constantly present in the SVP’s rhetoric, were a salient factor that 
shaped Swiss immigration policy in a more restrictive direction. These perceived identity 
concerns of the public were successfully translated into the Initiative Against the 
Construction of the Minarets in 2009 and continued to dominate the SVP’s rhetoric, with 
the party having launched a new anti-Islam initiative, which prohibits the covering of 
faces in public places. In the UK the hypothesis was falsified as the Conservative Party 
opted to toughen immigration policy through the economic lens and the multicultural 
citizenship regime hindered the reframing of immigration through identity lens.  
 
H4: Perceived economic anxieties of the public over immigration were at the origins of 
the changing approach to immigration.  
The findings reveal that this hypothesis was confirmed across all three cases, 
highlighting the importance of the economic concerns of the public, which, though, 
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referred to different types of migration in each case. Thus, the Conservative’s tough 
stance on immigration has been a response to the labour market anxieties, brought by 
unrestricted intra-EU migration. Aiming to limit the labour market concerns, the party 
redefined the access of the EU migrants to benefits from universal to residence-based. 
Similarly, in Switzerland, unlimited intra-EU migration that became possible with the free 
movement of people had an impact on SVP’s immigration stance and resulted in a major 
critical juncture - the Initiative Against Mass Migration, which aimed to limit uncontrolled 
migration from the EU. In France economic anxieties were also crucial for Sarkozy, but 
they were primarily linked to non-EU family migration, which remained the largest 
immigration inflow. 
 
H5: 2007-2008 global financial crisis underpinned more restrictive approach of the three 
right-wing parties in power on immigration and led the parties to reframe immigration 
through social welfare lens.  
This hypothesis was falsified in all the three cases. In the UK context austerity was not 
at the heart of the redefinition of immigration through social welfare angle. In public 
discourse the Conservatives framed the introduction of more restrictive policies for 
immigrants as a result of the austerity, but the analysis of the interview data revealed 
that this was done only to please the public. Global financial crisis was not the underlying 
causes behind the more restrictive immigration rhetoric and policy changes as SVP’s 
stance did not intensify during that period. Finally, in France the reframing of immigration 
through the social welfare lens was not a result of the global financial crisis’s impact, but 
was a means to reduce unqualified and unwanted family migration, which was set 
Sarkozy’s immigration paradigm in 2006, before the crisis happened. However, global 
financial crisis played a role in Sarkozy’s immigration approach by presenting an 
obstacle for Sarkozy to succeed in implementing his selective immigration strategy as 
the economic growth slowed and led to increased unemployment 
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H6: The effects of the EU integration and widening of the EU community made the right-
wing parties in power to pursue a more restrictive immigration stance.  
This impact of the EU integration on the redefinition of immigration policies was 
confirmed in the UK and in Switzerland, while in France it only led to the change in 
Sarkozy’s immigration discourse, but did not lead to the actual immigration policy 
change. Hence, the eurosceptic attitudes of the SVP were driven by the loss of 
sovereignty to the EU, which, combined with economic concerns over EU migration, 
resulted in a major policy change - the Initiative Against Mass Migration. In the UK, 
effects of the EU integration were also concentrated around the lack of control over EU 
migration, which eventually led to Brexit, as immigration was one of the defining themes 
in Brexit debate. As in two other cases, in France, the EU variable also played a role, but 
a different one as Sarkozy was not concerned with the intra-EU migration, but more 
preoccupied with the lack of control of the EU’s external border created anxieties about 
illegal migration from third countries to France through other member states, and had an 
influence on Sarkozy’s eurosceptic discourse. 
 
Cross-case comparison of the right-wing parties’ immigration stances in the UK, 
Switzerland and France, gave grounds to suggest that causes of immigration policy 
change are not unique and can be extrapolated to the wider population of cases, and 
careful consideration of the context gives an explanatory power to suggest what 
accounts for the cross-case differences. 
 
Despite some differences, the causes of immigration policy change of the right-wing 
parties in power in three cases are by and large similar, but the way that these causal 
factors are used by parties are different and context dependent. A comparison of the 
cases demonstrated that public opinion and perceived economic anxieties of the public 
were present across all three cases. The logic behind immigration policy change varied 
with regard to three factors: the effects of the EU integration, party competition on the 
right and perceived identity concerns of the public towards immigration.  
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The research has identified four factors of a national POS that explain the variation in 
causal factors that led right-wing parties in power to change their immigration stances. 
First, perceived identity anxieties were behind the logic of immigration policy change in 
Switzerland and France, who both shared the same assimilationist type of citizenship 
regime. The interviews found that in the UK they were not the underlying cause because 
UK belonged to multicultural type of regime, which recognised cultural differences and 
did not require assimilation to a host society. Second, the effects of the EU integration 
drove immigration policy stance of three parties differently, which is explained by the 
country’s relationship with the EU. Both the SVP and the Conservatives share 
Euroscepticism, but to a different extent, though. Therefore, the effects of the EU 
integration, including EU enlargements had an impact on the immigration stances of 
these parties, while in France, UMP would see Europe as a platform to reinforce its 
power (Drake, 2011) and that conservative UMP in general would not view Europe as 
much a threat as the SVP or the Conservatives. Third, the POS factor that explains the 
variation in changing immigration stance of the conservative parties in three countries is 
party competition. During period studied, in France and in the UK, the radical right FN 
and UKIP were enjoying growing electoral fortunes and that had an impact on the 
radicalisation of the right-wing parties’ positions on immigration. In Switzerland that did 
not occur because there was no credible right-wing competitor. Finally, the findings from 
the UK case contribute to the existing theories on party policy change by highlighting the 
new factors that led the UK Conservative Party to amend its immigration stance: Home 
Office’s ideological dogmatism, which emphasises the importance of the agency in 
producing the change and the pressure from interest groups involved in immigration 
policy-making. Interest groups like MWUK were more successful in lobbying the UK 
Conservative Party than those of the educational sector such as the UUK because their 
objectives corresponded with those of the Home Office and because they had greater 
resources to influence the government through the right-wing media. The Home Office’s 
control over agenda setting, evidence twisting and lack of communication among 
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governmental departments were instrumental in pursuing more restrictive immigration 
policies. Thus, this research does not only test the existing exogenous theories of party 
policy change, but also adds to them by pinpointing to the new factors that should be 
taken into account.  
 
Causal mechanisms  
Second research question sought to provide an understanding to the process of 
immigration policy change, tracing the mechanisms that accounted for it. This research 
confirmed the presence of one theorised mechanism - framing. In all the cases framing 
was crucial in demonstrating right-wing parties’ positions on immigration as it was the 
initial mechanism that lay ground for the actual policy-making mechanisms. Framing, 
which consisted of diagnostic and prognostic parts (Snow and Benford, 1988: 200-201) 
was used by the political parties to justify their immigration policy change. Three 
additional mechanisms were found across three cases that explain how the change 
happened. Thus, departmental competition was a mechanism in case of the UK and 
France, where institutional reshuffle originally led to the departmental competition, while 
in Switzerland direct democracy accounted for the change. The research has identified 
that one of the attributes of the national POS explained the variation in mechanisms that 
produced immigration policy change: type of democracy. Therefore,  departmental 
competition could not be possible in the case of Switzerland based on its democracy 
model. Consensual model of democracy in Switzerland, which required general 
compromise between major political actors, and in the absence of this the SVP resorted 
to the (ab)use of direct democracy to change immigration policy in their direction. The 
SVP was able to influence and change Swiss immigration policy through a bottom-up 
approach, successfully using the instruments of direct democracy, which highlighted the 
importance of the agency in activating mechanisms that accounted for immigration policy 
change in the Swiss case.  
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Cross-case comparative findings on causal mechanisms allow to make a careful 
suggestion that departmental competition, which envisages the rivalry or conflicts 
between different governmental departments, can be extrapolated to other cases of 
immigration policy change. Those departments that have the patronage of key political 
figures like the prime minister or the president have their ideas and their policy choices 
to dominate. The presence of this policy-making mechanism can be tested in the future 
research that examines policy change and is not only limited to immigration sphere. 
Finally, the research concluded that while structural factors were crucial in explaining 
party policy change, the role of the agency was key in the activation of the mechanisms 
that accounted for this change.  
 
8.2 Implications  
The findings of this research provide both implications for theory and for policy process. 
On a theoretical level, it investigates how existing theories on exogenous factors explain 
immigration policy change of right-wing parties in power and examines their application 
in three cases. Policy process implications focus on the interaction between different 
actors involved in immigration policy making and their strategies on pursuing their goals.  
 
8.2.1 Implications for theory  
The theoretical implications of this study are two-fold. The first part refers to the theories 
on party policy change, examining the explanatory role of exogenous causal factors that 
influence right-wing parties’ positions. It offers insights into the causal factors that lead 
to immigration policy change in three cases, adding to existing party policy change 
theories by identifying new factors that are both agentic and structural. Thus, Home 
Office’s ideological dogmatism and by operationalising large-scale changes such as the 
effects of the EU integration through EU enlargement. The identification of new factors 
is important because it broadens the explanations of why parties change their policies 
and the new factors identified in this research can be tested in other cases, where parties 
have changed or may change their immigration stances. The second relates to the 
scholarship on causal mechanisms, which account for the process of change, and 
illustrates how framing is a discursive mechanism in all three cases, but how its 
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application differs depending on the context and the factors that are pertinent to each 
case. The study contributes to the theories on mechanisms by identifying new 
mechanisms such as departmental competition and direct democracy, derived from the 
case studies, suggesting that some of them might be generalisable to other cases as 
well. The research contributes to the literature on political parties and immigration by 
bridging theories of party policy change with theories on causal mechanisms, which 
together are necessary for providing a full explanation of what causes the policy change 
and how the change occurs.  
 
The choice to address party policy change focusing on factors external to the party is 
explained by the limitations of agency related explanations, that account only for internal 
party factors. Such agency-related theories (Harmel and Janda, 1994; Janda et al., 1995; 
Harmel and Tan, 2003) are not sufficient because parties are not immune to external 
pressures, which affect their decision-making. As pinpointed by Partos and Bale (2014) 
internal drivers are not able to explain everything and external shocks should be 
supplemented with other factors than just loss of office. This research does not suggest 
that theories that emphasise the importance of agency factors are flawed, rather that 
they are unable to yield sufficient explanations of party policy change. Therefore, this 
study focused primarily on the examination of external causes that underpin the decision-
making processes of right-wing parties in power on immigration as the outcome is 
context dependent (Faletti and Lynch, 2009). By examining the context in three cases, 
the research identified four factors of a national POS that explain the variation behind 
the logic of three right-wing parties in power on immigration. This brings added value to 
the research on party policy change because it enables to identify the direction of 
immigration positions other right-wing parties that operate in similar contexts.  
 
Causes   
The right-wing parties in power change on immigration can be explained through a range 
of exogenous factors. This research tested existing theories on party policy change and 
found that party competition on the right, the importance of public opinion and high 
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salience of immigration makes the right-wing parties in power adopt more a restrictive 
immigration stance and subsequently leads to the change in immigration policies. This 
research has not only tested the existing theories, but also provided a conceptualisation 
to the theory of global economic change (Adams et al., 2009) which states that right-
wing parties in power are more prone to react to global economic change by altering 
their policy positions. Global economic change was operationalised through the lens of 
the global financial crisis, which served as a critical juncture. The findings suggest that 
some right-wing parties in power do not alter their immigration policy positions as a 
response to global economic change and that this can be explained with a reference to 
the economic context in which policy change is happening. Thus, while the global 
financial crisis led to the toughening of immigration rhetoric in France and the UK, it did 
not happen in Switzerland, where the economy suffered less during the crisis and where 
there has not been much change in SVP’s rhetoric, which was restrictive on immigration 
even before the crisis. This finding implies that a critical junctures’ influence on party’s 
positions can depend on the nature and consistency of the discourse that the party had 
before, meaning that if the party’s rhetoric has been quite restrictive before the critical 
juncture happened, it is likely that critical juncture will not have a major influence on 
party’s position. However, the Swiss case findings are not sufficient for modification of 
the theory on global economic change and the suggestion that parties respond differently 
need to be tested in the other cases before refining the theory. While something like 
global financial crisis promoted different reactions of the right-wing parties in power with 
regard to their immigration stance, the findings in three cases suggest that more 
generally, economic concerns were a driver of more restrictive immigration policies.  
 
It is suggested in the literature that political and socio-economic change makes parties 
alter their policy positions as they need to adjust to the change (Fagerholm, 2015). While 
this suggestion stands, it has not been conceptualised in the literature on exogenous 
factors of party policy change. In the context of immigration policy and within the 
timeframe, this research proposed to conceptualise this political change as the widening 
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of the EU and its impact of the EU on immigration policies of nation states. The findings 
suggest that in the UK and Swiss cases, the widening of the EU has brought primarily 
economic anxieties, which partially led to the major critical junctures like Brexit in the UK 
and the Initiative Against Mass Migration in Switzerland. By operationalising this change 
as an EU enlargement variable, this research traced another exogenous factor that 
influenced the mainstream’s right position on immigration.   
 
Apart from conceptualising some theoretical suggestions into specific variables, this 
work expanded on the range of causal factors that lead right-wing parties in power to 
change their positions on immigration. The analysis of interview data demonstrated that 
there are other factors that were responsible for the redefinition of immigration policies 
in a more restrictive way. One of them, identity concerns emerged in the cases of France 
and Switzerland, where these kinds of anxieties concentrated around the issues of Islam 
and Muslim integration into French and Swiss societies. While in the UK, despite its 
colonial history and diverse immigration background, these anxieties were not shaping 
British immigration policy between 2005 and 2015, in France and Switzerland they were 
crucial. Hence, theories on party position change on the issue of immigration, can be 
complemented by identity anxieties with future theory focusing on what accounts for 
some parties accounting for these concerns, while others ignoring them. This research 
explained that differences in incorporating identity anxieties as drivers of immigration 
policy change depends on the citizenship regime of the country. While both the UK and 
France are former colonial empires, right-wing parties’ choices differ in two cases, 
because the UK represents multiculturalism relative to France or Switzerland, while 
France represents civic-assimilationist type. Findings from the Swiss case only reaffirm 
the importance of citizenship regime in accounting for identity anxieties because 
Switzerland also belongs the cases with assimilationist approach to integration. 
Switzerland and France share this characteristic and identity concerns come high up on 
the agenda for the right-wing parties in those countries.  
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In addition to the exogenous factors that have been tested in this research, the analysis 
of immigration policy change in the UK case sheds the light on the agency related factor 
that was crucial in explaining the evolution of British immigration policy in a restrictive 
direction. Home Office’s ideological dogmatism, which manifested itself in the control 
over agenda setting and evidence, led to the domination of more restrictive policy 
choices as the Home Office and the home secretary had Prime Minister’s patronage on 
the issue. This finding highlights that theories that explain party position change from 
agency related explanations (Harmel and Janda, 1994; Janda et al., 1995; Harmel and 
Tan, 2003) should consider a new dimension of the political patronage of powerful party 
actors that make some policy choices prevail over the other ones.  
 
Mechanisms  
While theories of party policy change trace the causal factors that lead to the change in 
parties’ positions, they do not fully account for how the change happens, examining the 
mechanisms that explain this change. They address the causes, but not always the 
mechanisms. This research not only explores the causes that influence immigration 
policies of right-wing parties in power, it also traces the mechanisms that explain the 
process of the change and examines how these mechanisms operate depending on the 
context, and whether they produce the same policy outcome in different cases. This 
research addressed this gap in immigration policy making in three cases: UK, 
Switzerland and France, pointing to mechanisms that account for the change. While the 
presence of framing (Goffman, 1974; Rydgren, 2003; Snow and Bedford, 1988) as a 
mechanism has been established in all three cases, process tracing identified the 
mechanisms that accounted for the actual policy-making process: departmental 
competition and direct democracy, which adds to the array of existing causal 
mechanisms (Faletti and Lynch, 2009: 8).  Cross-case findings suggest that in policy-
making, the nature of mechanism activation and operation does not only depend on the 
context, but also on the agency, focusing on resources that political actors responsible 
for policy making possess.  
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Euroscepticism  
Finally, this research also contributed to the literature on Euroscepticism (Boomgarden 
et al., 2011; Kuhn, 2012; Meijers, 2017, Usherwood, 2013; Usherwood and Startin, 
2012). It explored the impact of the supranational entities like the EU on the development 
of the national immigration policies. It identified that even though the effects of the EU 
integration were present in all three cases, and were an important factor in the evolution 
of immigration policy stances of right-wing parties in power, the challenges and anxieties 
the EU factor brought were different and context dependent. While in the UK and in 
Switzerland, the major challenges that emerged from the effects of the EU integration 
were the free movement of people and the necessity of cohesion between the EU law 
and the national laws, which subsequently led to major critical junctures like Brexit and 
the Initiative Against Mass Migration. In France, the effects of the EU integration were 
presented through a border issue, more specifically the control of the EU external 
borders and illegal immigration. This research demonstrated that there is a two-way 
relationship between the EU and the nation states and that not only supranational EU 
can have an adaptational pressure on the development of the immigration policies in 
three countries, but also that domestic changes within the states structure the 
relationship with the EU as evidenced by Brexit and the Initiative Against Mass Migration. 
 
8.2.2 Implications for policy process  
The findings of this research are relevant to the various actors involved in policy making, 
including politicians, special advisors and interest groups by shedding the light on the 
process of immigration policy making in three cases. This thesis addressed immigration 
decision-making process of right-wing parties in power, but the implications for policy-
making process can go beyond immigration and can be extrapolated onto other policy 
areas. It is important to highlight that this research did not aim to make any policy 
recommendations as it did not study policy outcomes, but focused on policy outputs, or 
on the process of policy-making and how certain policy choices prevailed over the other 
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ones. This study provides implications for policy process, exploring how right-wing 
parties in power came up with a particular view on immigration and how these ideas were 
translated into policy outputs. Some implications are country specific and some vary 
across cases. One of the implications that actors involved in policy process can learn is 
the significance of competition between different departments and actors and that the 
ability to remove or neutralise other actors depends on the nature of the political system, 
which explains where power resources lie. Findings from the UK and France suggest 
that the same mechanism of departmental competition can be generalised to other cases 
as it produced a similar outcome in different political systems: parliamentary and semi-
presidential democracies. It does not matter what kind of democracy it is, what matters 
that those actors who possess bigger resources and have support of those actors 
responsible for policy-making process, get their policy choices to dominate. 
 
How existing theoretical framework can be used in the future research 
Future studies on the role of political parties in the process of policy change can use 
existing theoretical frameworks, which combine previous research on factors that make 
parties change their policy positions with the additional factors found in this study. 
Therefore, future research should test for the exogenous factors that were 
operationalised and tested in this work and examine if they have an impact on the parties’ 
policy stances. Future research should not necessarily focus on immigration policy in 
other cases and the impact of these factors on other issues, as the factors discussed in 
this research are not necessarily restricted to particular policy issues. This research 
explored how external factors led to party policy change through the lens of immigration, 
but exogenous factors like the global financial crisis, the effects of the EU integration, 
party competition, ideological dogmatism of governmental departments can be equally 
applied to study other policy areas. The same logic follows the mechanisms that account 
for policy change. New cases on party position change and subsequent policy change 
should test for the mechanisms traced in this research. Thus, departmental competition 
between different governmental and societal actors can also be extrapolated on the other 
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cases of decision-making processes and future studies could examine if the operation 
of these mechanisms produces the same outcomes or different ones, depending on the 
context in which mechanisms are activated by political actors.  
 
 
8.3 Generalisability of findings  
From a methodological point of view, generalisations are not possible with process 
tracing, which only provides within-case inferences. However, the inability of process 
tracing to yield cross case inferences and generalise to the population of cases (Beach 
and Pedersen, 2013) can be overcome by the comparison of findings across three cases, 
which can produce certain explanations, which give grounds to suggest that it can be 
extrapolated to the population of cases. Comparative findings suggest that causes of 
immigration policy change are broadly similar in three countries, which, to a certain 
extent, can be generalised to other cases as well. This should also be tested in other 
cases. Process tracing is the method that enables the researcher to trace the 
mechanisms that cannot be derived from statistical research and certain generalisations 
about mechanisms become possible given the comparison of findings across three 
cases. 
 
 
 
8.4 Suggestions for further research  
This study has explored immigration policy change of the right-wing parties in power from 
an exogenous perspective, which in the context of agency versus structure debate, 
emphasises the importance of structural, contextual factors in explaining the logic of the 
change. The research does not completely disregard the role of the agency, but pinpoints 
that context is crucial in explaining the outcome. Future research can contribute both 
theoretically and empirically to the scholarship on right-wing parties in power and 
immigration policy change. 
 
From a theoretical perspective, future research can complement this explanation by 
examining the role of the agency of political parties and civil servants, who at times, can 
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become too politicised, in the process of policy change, which will provide a complete 
understanding of immigration policy-making logic by focusing also on agency’s role in it. 
Even though, some research (Bale, 2013; Bale and Partos, 2014; Gruber and Bale, 
2014) has already addressed the issue in the British case, particularly with a reference 
to immigration policy, however, it explored only a limited range of agency factors, which 
can be extended by further research. Future studies can focus on the role of agency in 
immigration decision-making in Switzerland and France, exploring how intra-party 
dynamics lead to certain policy choices to prevail over the other ones. Furthermore, new 
avenues can address the role of non-governmental stakeholders such as pressure 
groups, ethnic groups, trade organisations, unions, involved in immigration policy 
making, exploring why some of them are more successful in lobbying their ideas to 
governmental actors than others.  
 
As immigration became one of the most salient issues in politics, parties on both sides 
of the ideological spectrum cannot disregard the issue and need to address it in one way 
or another. While this research examined exogenous factors that influence party policy 
change of right-wing parties in power, future studies can focus on parties on the other 
side of the ideological spectrum, mainstream left parties to examine if the factors that 
underpin their immigration policy logic are different. This will help to see if the right-wing 
and left-wing parties share some of the factors and to investigate what accounts for the 
variation in their immigration policy responses. Such research would not only bring 
contribution to the theories of party policy change, but would refine them by providing a 
typology of exogenous factors that account for party position depending on the 
ideological side.  
 
From an empirical perspective, new avenues for future research are provided by critical 
junctures like Brexit in the UK and the Initiative Against Mass Migration in Switzerland 
which add a new dimension to the research on Euroscepticism, focusing on political 
parties and their efforts to use certain policy areas like immigration to undermine their 
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relationship with the EU. While this study examined the top-down approach, exploring 
national states’ responses to the EU, future studies can focus on a bottom-up approach, 
examining the impact of national immigration debates on the EU dimension, how national 
states responses to the EU adaptational pressure lead to the application of EU policies 
in these European states. Finally, it opens avenues for studies on Britain and the EU, 
which can explore how critical junctures like Brexit affect the policy-making process 
within the party and how different factions within the Conservative Party reconcile their 
contrasting interests and shape the future policy.  
 
This thesis aimed to answer, first, what causal factors led right-wing parties in power in 
the UK, Switzerland and France to toughen their immigration stances and subsequently 
change their immigration policy. Second, this research sought to trace causal 
mechanisms that accounted for this change. It demonstrated that the causes of 
immigration policy change in three cases are broadly the same as parties had similar 
concerns about immigration, but that these exogenous factors were used differently by 
three parties, depending on the context in which the change was happening. It also 
established that framing, departmental competition, and direct democracy were the 
mechanisms that accounted for immigration policy change in three cases. Comparison 
of cases highlighted that the ideas of those departments prevailed and won that had 
bigger resources and support of the executive. The findings highlight the importance of 
accounting for the context, which provides opportunities and constraints for political 
parties to exploit these factors differently in the process of immigration decision-making. 
Despite the variation in parties’ positions on immigration, the research did not offer three 
separate explanations, but, by comparing the findings across the cases, sought to 
demonstrate that some of the causes and the mechanisms might be generalisable to the 
other cases, which can be tested in the future research. 
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Appendix A 
 
       Information for participants 
 
Project:  Conservative parties and immigration: evidencing and explaining policy 
change in the UK, Switzerland and France between 2002 and 2015  
 
Researcher: Anna McKeever (PhD Candidate, School of Criminology, Politics and 
Social Policy) 
Supervisory team: Prof. Cathy Gormley-Heenan and Dr. Markus Ketola, Dr. Ciaran 
Burke 
 
Invitation 
You are being invited to take part in a research study. It is important that you understand 
what the research is about and what you will you be asked to do. Please read the 
following information and do not hesitate to ask any questions. Thank you for taking the 
time to consider this invitation.  
 
What is the purpose of the research?   
The research aims to understand the logic underpinning the shifts in immigration policy 
between 2002 and 2015. The project seeks to answer the following key questions: 1) 
How has immigration and asylum policy changed in the UK/Switzerland/France?  2) Why 
has policy change taken place? 3) What mechanisms accounted for this change? 
 
What is the contribution of the project? 
The project will contribute to the current debates on the variance of the European 
approaches to the on-going immigration crisis in Europe, by drawing on the similarities 
and differences in the evolution of public policy within three European countries - UK, 
France, and Switzerland – as a consequence of the interplay between local, national and 
European politics.  
 
Why have I been chosen? 
You have been chosen as a potential interviewee for this research due to your 
background and work in the relevant political/policy-making field and your work/influence 
on immigration policy in the UK/Switzerland/France.  
 
What will happen to me if I take part? 
You will be asked to participate in a semi-structured interview with the researcher in order 
to answer a series of questions on immigration policy and/or positions of your political 
party. You will be provided with a consent form and be asked to complete it, which will 
outline the use of the research data which will be collected during the course of the 
interview by the researcher. The interviews will be audio-recorded, with your permission.  
 
What do I have to do? 
You are asked to respond to the questions asked in the interview as honestly and 
comprehensibly as possible. Please remember you will be given full anonymity. You are 
free to withdraw from the interview at any time and discontinue your participation in the 
project at any time without penalty. 
 
Are there any risks? 
Information provided during the interview, including the attached consent form will be 
securely stored and your name will not be made public. All work is conducted within the 
code of practice and data protection policy of Ulster University. The data will be stored 
securely for ten years in accordance with the University’s policy. The objectives, 
methodology and ethical considerations of this research have been reviewed and fully 
approved by an ethics committee within Ulster University. If you have any queries in 
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relation to this ethical approval, you can contact Ulster University Research Governance 
Department for further details.   
 
Are there any possible benefits in taking part?  
You may view your contribution to the research and its subsequent dissemination and 
possible contribution to the academic and public debate on immigration as a possible 
benefit to taking part in the research.   
 
What will happen to the results of the study? 
The results of the study will be published in a form of a Doctoral Dissertation. They are 
expected to be published in 2017 by Ulster University. If possible, the results will be 
published by academic publisher and disseminated to the public. The results can 
possibly lead to further research on the topic.   
 
Who is organising and funding the research? 
The research is organised by a research team that includes a PhD student and her 
supervisors. The research has been funded by Ulster University. 
Contact 
Anna McKeever (PhD Candidate) - McKeever-A7@email.ulster.ac.uk / 07462807251 
School of Criminology, Politics and Social Policy, Ulster University, Room 2D02, Shore 
road, Newtonabbey, BT37 0QB, Northern Ireland.  
 
Prof. Cathy Gormley-Heenan (supervisor) - c.gormley@ulster.ac.uk / 028 90366132 
School of Criminology, Politics and Social Policy, Ulster University, Room 03A16, Shore 
road, Newtonabbey, BT37 0QB, Northern Ireland. 
 
Dr. Markus Ketola (supervisor) m.ketola@ulster.ac.uk / 028 90366502 
School of Criminology, Politics and Social Policy, Ulster University, Room 03A15, Shore 
road, Newtonabbey, BT37 0QB, Northern Ireland. 
 
Dr. Ciaran Burke (supervisor) – c.burke@ulster.ac.uk/ 028 90366384 
School of Criminology, Politics and Social Policy, Ulster University, Room 12L25, Shore 
road, Newtonabbey, BT37 0QB, Northern Ireland. 
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Appendix B  
Consent Form  
Project:  Right-wing parties in power and immigration: evidencing and explaining 
policy change in the UK, Switzerland and France between 2002 and 2015 
 
Researcher: Anna McKeever 
 
Supervisor: Prof. Cathy Gormley-Heenan 
 
Supervisor: Dr. Markus Ketola  
 
Supervisor: Dr. Ciaran Burke  
 
Completion of this form indicates the signatory’s consent to take part in the above 
mentioned PhD research project being conducted at the School of Criminology, Politics 
and Social Policy.  
 
I confirm that I have been given and have read and understood the information sheet for 
the  
above study and have asked and received answers to any questions raised.                   
[    ] 
 
I understand that my participation is voluntary and that I am free to withdraw at any time 
without giving a reason and without my rights being affected in any way.                  
[    ] 
 
I understand that the researchers will hold all information and data collected securely 
and in confidence and that the researcher ensures that I cannot be identified as a 
participant in the study. I understand that my name will not be made public and, therefore, 
I give permission for the researchers to hold relevant data.                  
[    ] 
 
I agree to take part in the above study                                                                                          [    
] 
 
 
Name of Participant                             Signature                                                    Date 
 
 
Name of Researcher                      Signature                                                       Date
 275 
 
Appendix C  
Sample Topic Guide  
Questions:  
SVP has been a key player in Swiss politics in general, but particularly when it comes to 
immigration. In general, would you say that the party has been successful in achieving 
its goals (what are the main achievements) over the last ten years? 
 
Are there divisions/tensions between different factions of the party regarding immigration 
and asylum? I mean, is there a division between economic liberals (business interests, 
more open labour market) and social conservatives? 
 
When SVP talks about limiting migration, does the party distinguish between EU and 
non-EU migration? If yes, how? If yes, what kind of migration it is more important to 
reduce? There are currently quotas on foreigners who come from non-EU and non-EFTA 
countries. Does the Party favour further lightning of the quotas for non-EU and non-EFTA 
migrants? 
 
Picking up on different types of migration, is it more important to limit one particular route 
than another. Follow up: or is it more important to limit overall migration? If it is more 
important to limit one particular route than the other, what are the concerns that that drive 
the limitation of a particular route?  
 
SVP has been opposing closer ties with the EU and is opposed to further EU integration. 
What concerns have been driving such opposition? What are the main concerns, what 
are the main area SVP is concerned about when opposing the EU? To what extent this 
kind of attitudes are motivated by the concerns about national identity, welfare, economic 
worries, Europeanisation?  
 
 
In 2005 parliamentary session the Parliament accepted several amendments proposed 
by the SVP regarding immigration, to the Law on foreigners, they were introduced while 
Christoph Blocher was a head of FDJP? 
 
 
In 2007 the SVP has launched the Initiative Against the Construction of Minarets. Were 
there any particular events that triggered that? What were the concerns of the party?  
 
The relationship between the political system and policy change: has the political system, 
and in particular, direct democracy make it easier or more difficult to implement changes 
in immigration and asylum policy? How important is direct democracy is an instrument 
that can change public opinion? 
 
Did global financial crisis have any impact on the Swiss budget in terms of reduction of 
the welfare?  
 
 
The SVP has been the most popular party in the last ten years, but it is hard to pass the 
legislation because it does not have the absolute majority in the Parliament. However, 
do you agree on certain immigration and asylum issues with other right-wing parties, (ike 
the PLR). Has the situation changed over the last ten years? Is it easier to agree now or 
more difficult or the same?  
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Although the Swiss economy is relatively well off and unemployment is relatively low 
compared with other European countries (4.7%), many Swiss people worry about the 
effects of immigration. What are the main concerns?  
 
SVP has long been arguing about the reduction of migration. Is it somehow connected 
with any economic hardship that Switzerland had suffered when Global financial crisis 
has hit in 2008? Has SVP rhetoric regarding the reduction of migration intensify during 
the economic crisis? If yes, what were the main concerns?                                            
 
The party started to collect the signature for the Initiative Against Mass Migration in 2011. 
What triggered that? Why the Party did not do it earlier if it has been opposing migration 
for a long time? Follow up: Does it mean that EU and Europeanisation have come as a 
key factor that influenced SVP’s decision on launching the Initiative? In what way? 
 
Swiss government just recently announced (beginning of March) that it might use 
unilateral safeguard close to curb migration. The Swiss cabinet has proposed to use a 
unilateral safeguard clause to curb immigration if it is unable to reach agreement with 
the European Union on limiting influxes of foreigners.  What are your thoughts on the 
issue?  
 
 
The Initiative Against Mass Migration. No details of the proposal have been announced 
yet, apart from the fact that the proposed unilateral safeguard clause provides for annual 
limits to be set by the cabinet on the number of permits issued to people from EU and 
European Free Trade Association (EFTA) countries if immigration exceeds a certain 
threshold. However, apart from the reintroduction of quotas, there was also a 
requirement for national preference when filling a job and restriction of immigrants’ rights 
to social benefits. Have these two latter requirements been taking into consideration? If 
no, why?  
 
The new plan will apply to all types of immigrants? Are cross-border workers a problem 
for Switzerland? If yes, how? Will the new clause apply to students?  
 
In February 2016, Swiss people rejected the Initiative for Expelling Criminal Foreigners 
(Implementation), which meant that there was a list of crimes, a catalogue, according to 
which the person can be send back to their home country. Will the Party pursue any 
further attempts to pass this legislation? 
 
EU impact/Europeanisation. How does the party view future relationship with the EU? In 
case of implementing unilateral safeguard clause, EU would probably want to review the 
bilateral agreements. The SVP really only opposes free movement bilateral agreement? 
Or any others? What will be the cooperation between the EU and CH? 
 
Is the so-called ‘welfare tourism’ more applied to certain categories of migrants, in the 
view of the party and the government?  
 
Right after the February 2014 referendum, Switzerland refused to signed the extension 
of the free movement of people with Croatia. However, in the beginning of March 2016, 
the agreement with Croatia has been signed? What influenced this change in 
Switzerland’s position? Was the extension of the free border zone with Croatia an 
attempt to smooth things with the EU? SVP did not welcome this decision, but said it will 
not pursue launching the initiative against it. Why so? What are the concerns behind it?  
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Appendix D 
   Example of the Codebook  
 
 
 
First cycle coding   Definition of the 
code 
Indicators on how to 
flag the theme  
Examples  
Party competition on 
the right (theory-driven 
code)  
This node addresses 
Conservatives’ 
changing position on 
immigration as a 
result of increasing 
electoral pressure 
from UKIP, when the 
Conservative party 
tightens its policies 
and proposes new 
policies as a way of 
trying to prevent its 
right-wing electorate 
from alienating to the 
radical right.  
Mentioning of UKIP, 
other parties’ positions 
on the issue, loosing 
electoral base, 
elections, extremists, 
election results.  
Well, they were 
attached to it 
because they 
were frightened of 
competition from 
right-wing parties 
like UKIP. 
Because they had 
some of their own 
supporters, kind 
of nationalist. 
Shifts in public opinion 
(theory-driven code)  
The theme concerns 
the impact of public 
opinion on 
Conservatives’ 
immigration 
discourse and policy 
change. It examines 
wether the 
Conservatives 
included public 
opinion as a factor 
while determining 
the context of their 
policies and wether 
they were worried 
about loosing the 
public. Also it 
describes the 
specific concerns of 
the public, related to 
immigration that 
Conservatives 
thought were 
important to address 
in their immigration 
policies.  
referencing to public 
concern, public 
debate, general 
election,  perceptions, 
British people, public, 
electorate, or phrases, 
where these words are 
not explicitly 
mentioned, but where 
it is implied that public 
opinion was important 
while considering how 
immigration discourse 
and policies should be 
developed 
 People here get 
very angry when 
they read that 
some Polish 
people have been 
here, working 
here and then 
they get back to 
Poland and they 
get family 
allowance and it 
creates a lot of 
anger. So, and I 
think you have to 
deal with that, 
those kind of 
abuses, otherwise 
you loose the 
public. 
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First cycle coding   Definition of the 
code 
Indicators on how to 
flag the theme  
Examples  
Global financial crisis 
(theory-driven code) 
The impact of the 
global financial crisis 
on immigration 
debate. Whether 
immigration 
discourse became 
more restrictive as a 
result of global 
financial crisis and 
subsequent 
Eurozone crisis. Is 
there a connection 
between global 
financial crisis and 
welfare reduction, 
whether welfare was 
aimed to be reduced 
based on the impact 
of Eurozone crisis on 
the British economy. 
Did austerity brought 
by global financial 
crisis have an impact 
on the intertwining of 
welfare rhetoric with 
immigration?  
referencing to 
Eurozone crisis, 
recession, economic 
growth, austerity, 
unemployment, 
economy, work 
migration, welfare, 
jobs, economic 
success, low-paid 
work. 
It is quite simply 
the economic 
collapse in many 
southern 
European 
Eurozone 
countries. The 
HUGE numbers of 
Spanish, Italians 
in particular came 
here because 
even in the hight 
of the recession it 
was easier to find 
a job here, in 
Britain, than it was 
in Spain, Italy, 
Greece, Portugal, 
Ireland as well to 
an extent. So, a 
lot of them came 
here. 
Effects of the EU 
integration  
The theme concerns 
the changing pace of 
immigration because 
of the EU’s free 
movement of people, 
absence of 
transitional controls 
with A8 EU 
countries. It also 
addresses 
competition on the 
labour market and 
anxieties about 
welfare benefits 
given to EU 
migrants. Finally, it is 
about the impact of 
EU law on the UK’s 
law. 
Poles, Bulgaria, 
Romania, East 
European migration, 
EU migration, work 
migration, Europe, EU 
referendum, 
increasing numbers of 
EU migrants, EU, 
welfare concerns over 
EU migrants, EU 
national, benefits.  
I think there was a 
clear moment that 
it was seen that 
the transitional 
arrangements for 
new countries 
joining the EU 
was a lack of 
safeguard or 
control asked by 
Britain in the 
negotiations about 
the accession of 
the new countries. 
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First cycle coding   Definition of the 
code 
Indicators on how to 
flag the theme  
Examples  
Influence of interest 
groups (data-driven 
code) 
When the issue 
becomes 
increasingly salient,  
media coverage 
becomes more 
extensive. It 
examines wether the 
saliency of 
immigration, 
portrayed by right-
wing media 
influenced the 
Conservatives’ 
position on the 
issue, by making it 
more restrictive. It 
investigates whether 
the salience of 
certain immigration 
debates was 
increased because 
of interest groups 
lobbying.  
right-wing media, 
lobbying, newspapers, 
electoral issue, 
electoral concern, 
rising numbers, high 
pressure, campaigning 
about immigration.  
There was a lot of 
propaganda and 
that newspapers 
like The Daily 
Mail, which is 
quite prominent 
on this issue were 
given information 
in support of their 
argument. 
Home Office’s 
ideological dogmatism 
(data-driven code) 
It describes Home 
Office’s role in 
decision making 
process, its views, 
interactions with 
different 
departments and 
other actors involved 
in immigration 
policy-making. It 
examines the 
approach that the 
Home Office and the 
Home Secretary had 
on immigration. 
any mentioning of the 
Home Office and the 
home secretary, the 
work Migration 
Advisory Committee, 
differences between 
the Home Office and 
other different 
departments, evidence 
on different aspects of 
immigration, including 
pros and cons,  
And also, the 
home secretary 
only asks the 
MAC the 
questions that she 
wants to. 
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First cycle coding   Definition of the 
code 
Indicators on how to 
flag the theme  
Examples  
Mechanisms  This code identifies 
different pathways 
through which 
immigration policy 
was defined and 
made. It explores 
how various actors 
tried to influence  the 
rhetoric of the 
Conservative party 
and subsequently 
how this translated 
into more restrictive 
immigration policies. 
Interactions between 
various actors 
involved in 
immigration policy 
making.  
Actions or behaviour 
of various actors 
involved in 
immigration policy-
making, describing in 
what way they were 
advocating their views, 
interaction between 
different actors,  
They weren’t 
interested in 
discussion of the 
document, they 
were interested in 
obedience. And 
they used the fact 
that they had a 
special line to the 
Home Secretary 
to say that: “Look, 
I know that this is 
what she wants – 
do it, ok?”. That’s 
it. I found it very 
frustrating and 
annoying’ 
 
 
 
